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IV. TRIAL PROCEEDINGS
A. Joinder and Severance
Under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, joinder
of two or more counts against one defendant, or joinder of two or more
defendants in one action, is permissible in certain circumstances."1 ' If
it appears upon joinder that one or more of the parties is unduly
prejudiced, the court may, in its discretion, sever the counts or sever the
defendants under Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. 
312
The purpose of joinder is to achieve judicial economy; the purpose
1311. FED. R. CRIM. P. 8 provides:
(a) Joinder of Offenses. Two or more offenses may be charged in the same
indictment or information in a separate count for each offense if the offenses
charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, are of the same or similar
character or are based on the same act or transaction or on two or more acts or
transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.
(b) Joinder of Defendants. Two or more defendants may be charged in the
same indictment or information if they are alleged to have participated in the same
act or transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions constituting an of-
fense or offenses. Such defendants may be charged in one or more counts together
or separately and all of the defendants need not be charged in each count.
1312. FED. R. CRIM. P. 14 provides in pertinent part:
If it appears that a defendant or the government is prejudiced by a joinder of of-
fenses or of defendants in an indictment or information or by such joinder for trial
together, the court may order an election or separate trials of counts, grant a sever-
ance of defendants or provide whatever other relief justice requires.
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of severance is to rectify any prejudice resulting from a properly joined
action. 13 " The Ninth Circuit recently considered six cases in which
joinder and severance issues were raised.
In United States v. Escalante, 1314 defendant Escalante was con-
victed of conspiring to import heroin. He made a pretrial motion re-
questing that the court sever his case from that of his co-defendants on
the ground that the organized crime connections of one co-defendant
would be disclosed at trial and would be greatly prejudicial.1 3 15 The
trial court rejected his severence motion.1
316
In upholding Escalante's subsequent conviction, the Ninth Circuit
focused on the discretionary nature of an order to sever. 131 7 The court
held that the test for determining an abuse of discretion in denying
severance is "whether a joint trial would be so prejudicial that the trial
judge could exercise his discretion in only one way."'' 31" The court ob-
served that a defendant has both the burden of proving clear, manifest
or undue prejudice from the joint trial, 319 and of showing more than
that a separate trial would have provided a better chance for acquit-
tal.1320 The court stated that a defendant bears the difficult burden of
demonstrating:
[a] violation of one of his substantive rights by reason of the
joint trial: unavailability of full cross-examination, lack of op-
portunity to present an individual defense, denial of Sixth
Amendment confrontation rights, lack of separate counsel
among defendants with conflicting interests, or failure prop-
erly to instruct the jury on the admissibility of evidence as to
1313. Eg., United States v. Brashier, 548 F.2d 1315, 1323 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1111 (1977).
1314. 637 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 449 U.S. 856 (1980).
1315. Id at 1201.
1316. Id at 1200.
1317. Id at 1201. See United States v. Gay, 567 F.2d 916, 919-20 (9th Cir.) ("The broad
discretion of the District Court as an aspect of its inherent right and duty to manage its own
calendar" was not abused when defendant's severance motion, which was based on a co-
defendant's offer to give exculpatory evidence, was denied), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 999 (1978).
See also United States v. Kaplan, 554 F.2d 958, 966-67 (9th Cir. 1977) (refusal to sever not
abuse of discretion where there was only "remote likelihood" that co-defendant's exculpa-
tory testimony would become available after severance).
1318. 637 F.2d at 1201 (citing United States v. Mills, 597 F.2d 693, 696 (9th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193, 198 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006 (1978)).
1319. 637 F.2d at 1201. See United States v. McDonald, 576 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830 (1978).
1320. 637 F.2d at 1201 (citing United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193, 198 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1006 (1978)); United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 359 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976).
[Vol. 15
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each defendant [citations omitted]. In other words, the
prejudice must have been of such magnitude that the defend-
ant was denied a fair trial.
1 321
The Escalante court stated that "[t]he prime consideration in as-
sessing the prejudicial effect of a joint trial is whether a jury can rea-
sonably be expected to compartmentalize the evidence as it relates to
separate defendants."' 132 2 Recognizing that careful instructions to the
jury will neutralize the prejudicial effect of evidence pertaining to co-
defendants, the court assumed that a normal jury would follow a
judge's instructions to limit certain evidence to certain defendants.1
323
The court thus found that Escalante did not sustain his burden of prov-
ing prejudice and affirmed the conviction.
324
In United States v. Seifert, 1325 the Ninth Circuit recently consid-
ered the propriety of severance motions to enable co-defendants to tes-
tify on behalf of other defendants at separate trials. Both before and
during trial a co-defendant told counsel that he would testify and ex-
culpate Seifert.
1326
When the co-defendant abruptly refused to testify, Seifert moved
for severance under Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
1321. 637 F.2d at 1201.
1322. Id See United States v. Brady, 579 F.2d 1121, 1128 (9th Cir. 1978) (a properly
instructed jury should be reasonably able to appraise the separate evidence against each
defendant, notwithstanding the fact that each defendant was blaming the others for the
crime), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1074 (1979); United States v. Gaines, 563 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th
Cir. 1977) (denial of severance motion not error where trial court protected defendant's
rights by allowing into evidence only a summary of a co-defendant's confession, excluding
any reference to defendant); United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 359 (9th Cir. 1975)
(conclusion that jury was able to compartmentalize evidence followed from verdict finding
only some defendants guilty of same offenses), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976).
1323. 637 F.2d at 1201-02. See United States v. Sullivan, 595 F.2d 7, 8-9 (9th Cir.) ("Our
whole jury system is based on the recognized ability of the jury to follow the court's instruc-
tions."), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 933 (1979); United States v. McDonald, 576 F.2d 1350, 1356
n.8 (9th Cir.) (no abuse of discretion in denial of severance where defendant's argument
based on slight prejudice resulting from joined jury trial), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830 (1978);
United States v. Martinez, 429 F.2d 971, 975 (9th Cir. 1970) (no abuse of discretion where
trial court exercised care in instructing jury to safeguard individual interests of each defend-
ant), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 915 (1971). Cf. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453
(1949) ("The naivi assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the
jury... all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction.").
1324. 637 F.2d at 1202. The Ninth Circuit recognized that some of the evidence relating to
Escalante's co-defendants was harmful to him. The court concluded, however, that the jury
was carefully instructed to disregard that evidence in determining Escalante's guilt or inno-
cence and that Escalante had shown no reason to believe that the jury would not have been
able to follow the trial judge's instructions. Id
1325. 648 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 1980).
1326. Id at 563.
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dure. 1327 Although the trial court recognized that there was a "high
probability that [the co-defendant] would have testified on behalf of
Seifert at a separate trial,"' 32 it did not find manifest prejudice, and
denied the motion. 1
329
The Ninth Circuit reversed. The court noted that the defendant
was required to show that failure to sever was so manifestly prejudicial
as to outweigh the concern for judicial economy. 33 0 In addition, the
court stated that the defendant must show that if the trial had been
severed, the co-defendant would have testified favorably for Seifert.1
331
The court found that Seifert had sustained his burden and that
"[c]onsiderations of judicial economy [did] not outweigh the serious-
ness of the prejudice to Seifert, who was denied the right to present
important exculpatory evidence."'
332
A different result was reached in United States v. Mayo. 1333 There,
as in Seifert, a defendant sought severance in order to use a co-defend-
ant's allegedly exculpatory testimony. The trial judge denied the mo-
tion, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 1334  Using the test applied in
Seif ert,1335 the court found that Mayo did not show that the co-defend-
ant would testify on Mayo's behalf.
3 36
In United States v. Kenny, 1331 three defendants were tried and con-
victed of conspiracy, fraudulent government contracting activities, and
1327. Id
1328. Id
1329. Id
1330. Id See United States v. Armstrong, 621 F.2d 951, 954 (9th Cir. 1980) ("Joinder is
the rule rather than the exception."). The Seifert court relied on Escalante for the proposi-
tion that a requirement of "manifest prejudice" obligated the defendant to show a violation
of a substantive right. 648 F.2d at 563 (citing United States v. Escalante, 637 F.2d 1197,
1202 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 856 (1981)). See supra text accompanying note
1321.
1331. 648 F.2d at 563. See United States v. Vigil, 561 F.2d 1316, 1317 (9th Cir. 1977) (per
curiam) ("When the reason for severance is the asserted need for a codefendant's testimony,
the defendant must show that he would call the codefendant at a severed trial, that the
codefendant would in fact testify, and that the testimony would be favorable to the moving
defendant.").
1332. 648 F.2d it 564. Moreover, the court noted that the trial court must also consider the
possible weight and credibility of the testimony and the economy of severance at the time
the motion was made. 1d See United States v. Kaplan, 554 F.2d 958, 966 (9th Cir. 1977).
The court determined that the co-defendant's testimony would have rebutted the testimony
of the Government witness as it related to Seifert, and that another witness' testimony incul-
pating Seifert would also have been discredited. 648 F.2d at 564.
1333. 646 F.2d 369 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1127 (1981).
1334. Id at 374.
1335. See supra text accompanying note 1331.
1336. 646 F.2d at 374.
1337. 645 F.2d 1323 (9th Cir.), ceri. denied, 452 U.S. 920 (1981).
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bribery. An additional count of income tax evasion was joined against
defendant Kenny.1338 On appeal, the defendants claimed that the in-
come tax evasion count against Kenny should have been severed.
Kenny asserted prejudice due to a lack of preparation; the other de-
fendants claimed prejudice because the tax evasion charge against
Kenny was brought at the same trial.1
339
The Ninth Circuit upheld the joinder under Rule 8(b) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure "on the basis that the defendants
were 'alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in
the same series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or of-
fenses.' ",1340 The court stated that the participation of all defendants in
every act constituting each joined offense was not essential to proper
joinder.' 341 Noting that "'Rule 8(b) should be construed broadly in
favor of initial joinder,' ,,1342 the court observed that initial joinder is
proper against multiple defendants "'whenever the common activity
constitutes a substantial portion of the proof of the joined
charges.' "1343
The Kenny court reaffirmed the principle that the defendant has
the burden of showing that the concern for judicial economy is out-
weighed by the joinder's prejudicial effect. If the defendant sustains this
burden, the court must exercise its discretion and sever.1344 The court
determined that the defendants had not sustained their burden and af-
firmed their convictions.
1 345
In United States v. Burreson, 131 three defendants were convicted
of violations of the Investment Company and Investment Advisors
Acts of 1940, securities fraud, mail fraud, and conspiracy. 347 Conspir-
1338. Id at 1327 n.l.
1339. id at 1344.
1340. Id (quoting FED. R. CPiM. P. 8(b)).
1341. Id
1342. Id (quoting United States v. Ford, 632 F.2d 1354, 1373 (9th Cir. 1980)).
1343. 645 F.2d at 1344 (quoting United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879, 899 (9th Cir. 1970),
cer. denied, 401 U.S. 924 (1971)).
1344. 645 F.2d at 1344. Moreover, the court made it clear that the burden of proof on
defendants is substgntial: they must "make a strong showing of prejudice in order to obtain
relief under the rule.' Id (citing Williamson v. United States, 310 F.2d 192, 197 (9th Cir.
1962)).
1345. 645 F.2d at 1345. The court stated that much of the evidence relating to the tax
evasion charges also related to the charges of fraud and bribery and would have been admis-
sible in any event. Id See United States v. McDonald, 576 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1978)
(some degree of prejudice necessarily occurs when defendants are joined for trial, but more
than a slight degree of prejudice must be shown before severance will be granted).
1346. 643 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1981).
1347. Id at 1346.
1982]
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acy was the only offense charged against all defendants.1341 On appeal,
the defendants claimed that they were improperly joined in the same
indictment and that their motions to sever should have been
granted. 1349
The Ninth Circuit rejected defendants' contentions, holding that
Rule 8(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allowed joinder
because proper joinder did not require the participation of all defend-
ants in every act. 1350 Moreover, the court noted that "when one person
serves as a common link between the transactions, joinder under Rule
8(b) is proper."'1351 The common link in Burreson was the holding
company the defendants had used for their illicit enterprise.
135 2
The court also found no evidence of prejudice because each de-
fendant was independently represented, and the jury was able to sepa-
rate the charges against the individual defendants.
1 53
In United States v. Davis, I'll three defendants were convicted of
various drug related charges.1355 One defendant, Snyder, sought sever-
ance of three counts in which he was not named. 356 On appeal, Snyder
claimed that the initial joinder was improper under Rule 8(b)1357 and
that the trial court abused its discretion in not severing the three counts
1348. Id
1349. I at 1347.
1350. Id ("[A]s long as all defendants participated in the same series of transactions, de-
fendants may be joined even though not all defendants participated in every act.") (citing
United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879, 899 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 924 (1971)).
See also United States v. Ford, 632 F.2d 1354, 1370 (9th Cir. 1980) (all counts related to
defendants' scheme of enriching themselves at expense of union pension funds of which they
were trustees).
1351. 643 F.2d at 1347 (citing United States v. Patterson, 455 F.2d 264, 266 (9th Cir. 1972)
(joinder proper where one defendant served as link between all defendants in the transac-
tions leading to indictment for mail fraud)).
1352. 643 F.2d at 1347.
1353. Id See United States v. Camacho, 528 F.2d 464,470 (9th Cir.) (no prejudice in joint
trial of co-defendants where each defendant represented by individual counsel and jury
properly instructed to apply evidence separately as to each), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 995
(1976). The Burreson court also found that the jury was able to separate the evidence based
on the fact that on several counts, the jury found one or more defendants guilty, while
finding another not guilty of the same charge. 643 F.2d at 1347. Accord United States v.
Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 359 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976).
1354. 663 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1981).
1355. Id at 826-27.
1356. Id at 831. Snyder sought severance of counts 2, 8, and 9. Count 2 charged conspir-
acy to possess hashish oil with the intent to distribute, but it involved a beating, to which
Snyder was not a party. Count 8 charged a continuing criminal enterprise against defendant
Davis that incorporated by reference the first 7 counts of the indictment. Count 9 charged
only Davis with willfully filing a false tax return. Id at 831-32.
1357. See supra note 1311.
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under Rule 14.1358
In affirming the denial of severance, the Ninth Circuit first applied
the transaction test set forth in Rule 81351 and determined that joinder
was proper. 1360 The court also found that because there was a substan-
tial overlap of evidence, 1361 the remaining count was properly
joined.1362 The court next determined that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in denying severance under Rule 141363 because the de-
fendant had not sustained his burden of proving the necessary degree
of prejudice.
3 64
B. Guilty Pleas
1. Rule 11 violations
The effect of a guilty plea extends beyond an explicit admission of
the offense charged; it is in itself a conviction.1 365 Following a plea of
guilty, the court need only enter judgment and impose sentence. 1366 A
guilty plea also results in a waiver of constitutional challenges which
might have prevented the prosecution from proving factual guilt.
1367
Because of its final consequences, the entry of a guilty plea must
be preceded by procedural safeguards which ensure that the plea was
made intelligently, voluntarily, and with a full understanding of the
1358. 663 F.2d at 831. See supra note 1312.
1359. 663 F.2d at 831-32. The court noted that the term "transaction," within the meaning
of Rule 8, depends not so much on the immediateness of the connection between occur-
rences, but upon their logical relationship. Id (citing United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d
1076, 1083 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 958 (1971); Moore v. New Cotton Exch., 270 U.S.
593, 610 (1926)).
1360. 663 F.2d at 832.
1361. Id The court found that count 2 was essentially the same as count 1, with which
Snyder was charged, and that the testimony of the same witnesses established both counts.
The court also found that because count 8 incorporated by reference the counts in which
Snyder was charged, it too arose out of the same transaction. Id
1362. Id The court considered Rule 8(b)'s objective of maximum trial convenience con-
sistent with minimum prejudice. See United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879, 899 (9th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 924 (1971); 8 J. MOORE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTCE 8.02[2]
(2d rev. ed. 1982).
1363. 663 F.2d at 833.
1364. Id at 832-33.
1365. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) (guilty plea results in waiver of right to
jury trial, privilege against self-incrimination, and right to confrontation). Id at 243.
1366. Id at 242.
1367. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. at 242-43. The defendant, however, retains other con-
stitutional claims that would have prevented conviction even if factual guilt were estab-
lished. See Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62-63 n.2 (1975) (guilty plea no bar to
defendant's claim that indictment violated double jeopardy clause).
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significance of a waiver of constitutional rights.136 8 Rule 11 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure sets forth these procedural
guidelines. 
1369
The Ninth Circuit has extended a number of the Rule 11 protec-
tions to state court defendants seeking federal habeas corpus relief.
The voluntariness requirement, for example, was recently at issue in
Steinsvik v. Vinzant 1370 where it was alleged that a state court failed to
inform the defendant of the consequences of his guilty plea.
Steinsvik pled guilty to credit card forgery in 1971 and was placed
on probation. In 1974 his probation was revoked, and he was given a
maximum sentence to run concurrently with sentences imposed as a
result of his conviction for the crime of grand larceny. 1371 Steinsvik
contended that his right to due process was violated when he was not
informed of (1) the maximum sentence and the court's duty to impose
it, and (2) the possibility of deportation and the court's power to forbid
it prior to his 1971 plea. He further contended that there was substan-
tial evidence of his incompetence to enter a plea of guilty, thus requir-
ing the trial court to convene a competency hearing.
1372
A procedural standard adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Pebwor/h v.
Conte1373 requires that prior to pleading guilty a defendant be advised
1368. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. at 242-43.
1369. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c) provides that:
Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court must address
the defendant personally in open court and inform him of, and determine that he
understands, the following:
(1) the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, the mandatory
minimum penalty provided by law, if any, and the maximium possible penalty
provided by law; and
(2) if the defendant is not represented by an attorney, that he has the right
to be represented by an attorney at every stage of the proceeding against him
and, if necessary, one will be appointed to represent him; and
(3) that he has the right to plead not guilty or to persist in that plea if it
has already been made, and that he has the right to be tried by a jury and at
that trial has the right to the assistance of counsel, the right to confront and
cross-examine witnesses against him, and the right not to be compelled to in-
criminate himself, and
(4) that if he pleads guilty or nolo contendere there will not be a further
trial of any kind, so that by pleading guilty or nolo contendere he waives the
right to a trial; and
(5) that if he pleads guilty or nolo contendere, the court may ask him
questions about the offense to which he has pleaded, and if he answers these
questions under oath, on the record, and in the presence of counsel, his an-
swers may later be used against him in a prosecution for perjury or false
statement.
1370. 640 F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1981).
1371. Id at 950-51.
1372. Id at 951.
1373. 489 F.2d 266, 267 (9th Cir. 1974).
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of all the potential punishments which may be imposed. In Steinsvik,
the court held that even if the Pebworth requirement had not been sat-
isfied, the defendant's due process rights were not violated because he
was not prejudiced by the sentence imposed. 374 According to the
court, the lack of prejudice stemmed from the fact that although Stein-
svik was given the maximum sentence, he was placed on probation af-
ter pleading guilty.'
375
The court also found no merit in Steinsvik's contention that he was
denied due process when the state court did not inform him of the pos-
sibility of deportation.' 376 In reaching this decision, the court relied
upon previous Ninth Circuit authority which indicated that when the
possibility of deportation is a collateral rather than a direct conse-
quence of a guilty plea, the trial judge is not required to inform the
defendant of the possibility of deportation. 377 The court stated that
Steinsvik's deportation did not result from his 1971 guilty plea but
rather "was contingent upon and a result of his later conviction for an
unrelated offense."
1 378
The defendant further contended that there was substantial evi-
dence of his mental incompetence when he entered his guilty plea.
379
The Ninth Circuit recognizes that a competency hearing is required
when doubt exists as to a defendant's ability to make a choice of pleas
1374. 640 F.2d at 955.
1375. Id In reaching this decision the court relied on Yellowwolfv. Morris, 536 F.2d 813
(9th Cir. 1976). In Ye/lowwo(f two defendants claimed that they had not been informed of
their potential maximum sentences. The court set aside the guilty plea of one of the defend-
ants when he proved that additional information would have resulted in a change of plea.
The other defendant was denied relief because he was unable to show any prejudice. Ac-
cording to the court, while this second defendant may not have been aware of the potential
sentence at the time he entered his plea, he was placed on probation and thus "had nothing
of which to complain." Id at 817.
1376. Steinsvik v. Vinzant, 640 F.2d at 956. 8 U.S.C. § 125 1(a)(4) (1976) provides:
(a) Any alien in the United States (including an alien crewman) shall, upon the
order of the Attorney General be deported who. . .(4) is convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude committed within five years after entry and either sen-
tenced to confinement or confined therefor in prison or corrective institution, for a
year or more, or who at any time after entry is convicted of two crimes involving
moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct, regard-
less of whether confuied therefor and regardless of whether the convictions were in
a single trial.
1377. 640 F.2d at 956 (citing Fruchtman v. Kenton, 531 F.2d 946, 948-49 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 895 (1976)). In Fruchtman, the court held that the possibility of deportation
is not a direct consequence of a guilty plea, and a court is not required to advise an alien that
he could be subject to deportation as a result of that plea. The Steinsvik court limited the
application of Fruchtman, however, to those cases in which the possibility of deportation is a
collateral result of a plea. 640 F.2d at 956.
1378. 640 F.2d at 956.
1379. Id at 951.
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and to understand the consequences of that choice. 138 0 The Steinspik
court noted that a determination of competency to enter a plea of guilty
involves a more comprehensive inquiry than that required in determin-
ing competency to stand trial.' 38'
Steinsvik based his claim of incompetency on (1) his confusion re-
garding the sentencing procedure, (2) his recent hospitalization and
psychiatric treatment, (3) his recent hospitalization for an overdose of
barbiturates, and (4) his limited knowledge of the English language.13
8 2
The record, however, revealed nothing which would have caused the
judge "or any reasonable person to have had good-faith doubt as to
[the] petitioner's competency."'
' 38 3
The court recognized that Steinsvik would -be entitled to relief if
evidence introduced subsequent to the entry of his plea revealed that he
was in fact incompetent, regardless of the insufficiency of the evidence
to raise a good faith doubt in the mind of the trial judge. 38 4 However,
the supplementary testimony presented did not persuade the court that
Steinsvik lacked the competency to plead guilty.
3 5
In contrast, the dissent reasoned that a substantial doubt existed as
to Steinsvik's competency to enter a guilty plea. 38 6 The judge noted
that when the habeas petition was ified, additional evidence surfaced:
thirty-three hours prior to his pleading guilty, Steinsvik had taken an
overdose of barbiturates. 1387 This evidence combined with Steinsvik's
past history of psychological problems and suicide attempts led the dis-
sent to conclude that compelling doubts existed regarding his
1380. Sailer v. Gunn, 548 F.2d 271, 275 (9th Cir. 1977).
1381. 640 F.2d at 951 (citing Sieling v. Eyman, 478 F.2d 211, 214-15 (9th Cir. 1973)). In
Sieling, Judge Hufstedler's language in Schoeller v. Dunbar, 423 F.2d 1183, 1194 (9th Cir.
1970) was quoted with approvah "the standards of competency to plead guilty are higher
than those of competency to stand trial."
1382. 640 F.2d at 952-54.
1383. Id at 953. The court cited Sailer v. Gunn, wherein it was indicated that psychiatric
care alone is insufficient reason for finding incompetency. 640 F.2d at 953 n.4 (citing Sailer
v. Gunn, 548 F.2d at 275). The Sailer court stated:
[U]nder the due process clause a hearing on a defendant's competence to plead
guilty is required if the trial judge entertains or should reasonably have entertained
a good-faith doubt as to the competence of the defendant to understand the nature
and consequences of his plea or to participate intelligently in the proceedings, in-
cluding his ability to make a reasoned choice among alternatives presented to him.
548 F.2d at 275.
1384. 640 F.2d at 954 (citing Zapata v. Estelle, 588 F.2d 1017, 1021-22 (5th Cir. 1979)
(presentation of sufficient facts to create a substantial doubt as to competence results in
entitlement to evidentiary hearing)).
1385. 640 F.2d at 954.
1386. Id at 957 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
1387. Id
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competency.1388
The dissent raises a qualitative question regarding the degree of
fairness afforded this defendant at the time he entered his plea. Al-
though granting a competency hearing may lead to retrospective con-
jecture as to the actual mental competence of the defendant, it is
inconsistent with judicial concern for fairness to deny a hearing that
potentially may raise serious doubts about the defendant's competency.
In this instance, the balance between judicial economy and the assur-
ance of judicial fair play should weigh heavily on the side of a defend-
ant whose competence to plead guilty is legitimately in doubt.
The Ninth Circuit further interpreted the procedural requirements
of Rule 11 in United States v. DeFl6ppis. 1389 In that case, the defendant
requested an evidentiary hearing to ascertain the existence of a condi-
tion in her husband's plea agreement which allegedly operated to dis-
miss charges against her. The trial judge refused the request after
finding no mention of the condition in the transcript of the plea
proceedings. 1390
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit declined to remand the case for fur-
ther evidentiary findings.139' The court noted that under the full collo-
quy requirement of Rule 11,1392 a federal court should not look beyond
the plea transcript of its own proceedings unless otherwise required by
unusual circumstances. 1393 The court also noted that since the same
judge had presided both at the defendant's trial and the plea proceed-
ing, and had conducted the requisite colloquy during these proceed-
1388. Id. at 958. See Van Poyek v. Wainwright, 595 F.2d 1083, 1085 (5th Cir. 1979) (evi-
dentiary hearing granted where defendant had attempted to hang himself and set fire to his
jail cell mattress but court had been unaware of incidents prior to accepting defendant's
plea); Saddler v. United States, 531 F.2d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1976) (evidentiary hearing required
where the court had been unaware of the defendant's history of mental illness); Manley v.
United States, 396 F.2d 699, 701 (5th Cir. 1968) (evidentiary hearing required where the
defendant was experiencing drug withdrawal on the day of his plea).
1389. 637 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir. 1981).
1390. Id at 1375.
1391. Id at 1376.
1392. Id at 1375 n.10. FED. R. CRiM. P. 11 was amended in 1975 to require a thorough
and personal discussion between the court and a defendant pleading guilty or nolo
contendere.
1393. 637 F.2d at 1375. The court distinguished Anthony v. Fitzharris, 389 F.2d 657, 660
(9th Cir. 1968), a case which indicated that a plea transcript should not be regarded as
conclusive. This distinction was based on two aspects of the case: (1)Anthony involved alle-
gations of threats and coercion, which would not have appeared on the record; and (2) the
Anthony court was interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which specifically mandates a hearing
because under this statute a federal judge is required to review state court proceedings. 637
F.2d at 1375.
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ings, he had more freedom to deny a full evidentiary hearing. 1394
The denial of an evidentiary hearing in DeFiippis effectively lim-
ited the circumstances in which further testimony will be admitted re-
garding the content of a contested plea agreement. The court thereby
emphasized that the record should contain a transcription of any collo-
quy that may have occurred. However, notwithstanding the apparent
completeness of a plea transcript, this approach discounts the merits of
testimony offered as a clarification of past events.
In a third case, United States v. Romero, 1391 the Ninth Circuit de-
termined that the defendant was not prejudiced by the district court's
entry of a not guilty plea pursuant to Rule 1 (a).' 3 9 6 Romero claimed
he was denied a fair trial because the district court did not read the
indictment at the time of his arraignment as required by Rule 10. 139
This purportedly resulted in his inability to answer when asked how he
wished to plead. Consequently, the district court entered a plea of not
guilty pursuant to Rule 1 (a).
13 98
The Ninth Circuit found Romero's claims of prejudice to be
groundless because he had previously read a copy of the indictment. 1399
The court noted that arraignment standards require only that the "de-
fendant know what he is accused of and be able adequately to defend
himself."1400 Since Romero was fully aware of the charges against him
and had assistance of appointed counsel at that time, the court con-
cluded that these standards had been met.140 1 The court also observed
that reversal of a conviction is warranted by the existence of potential
prejudice, but not by failure to comply with technical arraignment
1394. Id The court relied on Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (1977), in which the de-
fendant had entered a guilty plea in exchange for receiving a shorter term for the crime of
safe robbery. Id at 65. When this agreement was ignored, he appealed. The Court found
that the ambiguous nature of the record prevented a summary dismissal of the writ. Id at
76. The Court also found that when a judge is present at both a plea proceeding and at a
§ 2255 proceeding, a judge's recollection may enable him to dismiss a § 2255 motion. Id at
74 nA. See Gustave v. United States, 627 F.2d 901, 903 (9th Cir. 1980) (judge's presence at
both proceedings resulted in his ability to assert that defendant was represented by compe-
tent counsel).
1395. 640 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981).
1396. Id at 1015. FED. R. CrIM. P. 11(a) provides: "[i]f a defendant refuses to plead...
the court shall enter a plea of not guilty."
1397. 640 F.2d at 1015. FED. R. CriM. P. 10 provides that: "[airraignment shall be con-
ducted in open court and shall consist of reading the indictment or information to the de-
fendant or stating to him the substance of the charge and calling on him to plead thereto."
1398. 640 F.2d at 1015.
1399. Id
1400. Id
1401. Id
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procedures. 1402
C. Jury Administration
1. Voir dire
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that "[iln all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury. 4 3 To assure a jury's
impartiality, judicial decisions and various statutes provide for a voir
dire examination of prospective jurors by either the court or the attor-
neys for the parties."4°4 A prospective juror who appears partial may
be excused by either party's exercising a challenge "for cause" or a
"peremptory" challenge. Challenges for cause require proof of "a nar-
rowly specified. . . and legally cognizable. . . partiality."'1 5 A party
is allowed an unlimited number of challenges for cause.' 6 Peremp-
tory challenges may be made "for a real or imagined partiality that is
less easily designated or demonstrable."'' 40 7 The number of allowable
peremptory challenges is fixed by statute. 40 8 The Supreme Court and
the Ninth Circuit have recently considered cases involving all of these
aspects of the pretrial determination of a jury's impartiality.
a. racial bias
In Rosales-Lopez v. United States, "09 the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve an inter-circuit confict14'0 over whether it is revers-
1402. Id. See United States v. Rogers, 469 F.2d 1317, 1317-18 (5th Cir. 1972) (conviction
valid absent a showing of prejudice where defendant was not formally arraigned); Garland
v. Washington, 232 U.S. 642, 646-47 (1914) (second arraignment on larceny charge held
technical formality not affecting defendant's substantive rights).
1403. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
1404. See, e.g., FED. R. CRiM. P. 24(b).
1405. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1964) (citing Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68,
70 (1887)).
1406. The party need only furnish a satisfactory reason why a juror should not be seated.
BLACK'S LAW DIMcONARY 769 (5th ed. 1979).
1407. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1964) (citing Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68,
70 (1887)).
1408. See, e.g., Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1886) (number permitted is within
discretion of state legislature "limited only by the necessity of having an impartial jury");
Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919) (number regulated by common law or
Congress).
1409. 451 U.S. 182 (1981).
1410. Some circuits, including the Ninth, require a trial judge to ask a question concerning
racial or ethnic prejudice only when there is some indication that the particular case is likely
to have racial overtones or to involve racial prejudice. See, e.g., United States v. Polk, 550
F.2d 1265 (10th Cir.), cer. denied, 434 U.S. 838 (197); United States v. Perez-Martinez, 525
F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1975). The majority of circuits, however, have adopted a per se rule that a
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ible error to decline a racial minority defendant's request that the court
ask prospective jurors questions concerning racial or ethnic
prejudice.'41 Rosales-Lopez was charged with conspiring to smuggle
Mexican aliens into the United States.141 2 Because Rosales-Lopez was
of Mexican descent, defense counsel requested the court to ask the pro-
spective jurors if they would consider his race in their evaluation of the
case, and how it would affect them. 4 13 The judge asked the jurors a
series of questions, including one regarding their attitudes about the
"alien problem."'41 4 He did not, however, ask any questions directed
specifically to possible racial or ethnic prejudice. 415 The judge con-
cluded his voir dire by inquiring whether there were any reasons why
the jurors could not act fairly and impartially.'
4 6
After the voir dire, defense counsel again requested the judge to
ask the jurors a question about racial or ethnic prejudice; the judge
refused to do so.' 41 7 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld the judge's
refusal. 1418
The Supreme Court began its analysis by emphasizing the broad
discretion accorded to trial judges in determining how best to conduct
voir dire. 14 19 The Court stated that it is difficult for an appellate court
to review a trial judge's decisions respecting voir dire because the judge
determines the impartiality and credibility of prospective jurors from
his immediate perceptions of their demeanor and responses to ques-
tions.1420 Furthermore, Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides trial judges with the ability to exercise broad dis-
cretion during voir dire examination.' 421
trial judge must ask a question on racial or ethnic prejudice when requested by the defend-
ant. See, e.g., United States v. Bowles, 574 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Robin-
son, 485 F.2d 1157 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Carter, 440 F.2d 1132 (6th Cir. 1971);
United States v. Gore, 435 F.2d 1110 (4th Cir. 1970); Frasier v. United States, 267 F.2d 62
(1st Cir. 1959).
1411. 451 U.S. at 183.
1412. Id at 184.
1413. Id at 185.
1414. Id at 186.
1415. Id at 185.
1416. Id at 186.
1417. Id
1418. Id at 187.
1419. Id at 189 (citing Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 528 (1973); Aldridge v.
United States, 283 U.S. 308, 310 (1931)).
1420. 451 U.S. at 188.
1421. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a) provides that the trial court may conduct the voir dire itself
or may allow the parties to conduct it. If the court conducts it, the parties may "supplement
the examination by such further inquiry as [the court] deems proper"; alternatively, the
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The Court explained, however, that in particular cases certain con-
stitutional requirements concerning voir dire must be met and cited
Ham v. South Carolina 1422 as an example of the "special circum-
stances" that constitutionally require questioning about racial
prejudice. 1423 In Ham, the black defendant was convicted of a drug
offense.1424 His defense was that the police had "framed" him in retali-
atibn for his well-known participation in civil rights activities. 1425 The
Court held that because racial issues were "inextricably bound up with
the conduct of the trial,"'1426 there was a consequent need to inquire
specifically during voir dire about the possibility of racial prejudice. 1
427
The Court in Rosales-Lopez indicated that absent "special circum-
stances," the Constitution leaves the determination of the need to ques-
tion about racial prejudice to the judicial system within which the trial
court operates. 1428 It stated that within the federal court system, over
which it exercised supervisory authority, it preferred allowing the de-
fendant to determine whether inquiries should be made into the racial
or ethnic prejudice of prospective jurors;14 21 a trial court's failure to
honor a defendant's request would be considered reversible error only
when the circumstances indicated that there was a "reasonable possibil-
ity" that racial or ethnic prejudice might have influenced the jury. 1430
As examples of when such a "reasonable possibility" might exist,
the Court cited cases in which the defendant was accused of violent
crimes perpetrated against a victim who was a member of a different
racial or ethnic group.1431 It explained that because cases with this par-
court may limit participation to the submission of additional questions, which the court must
ask only "as it deems proper."
1422. 409 U.S. 524 (1973).
1423. 451 U.S. at 189.
1424. 409 U.S. at 524.
1425. Id
1426. Id (citing Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 596 (1976)).
1427. 409 U.S. at 527.
1428. 451 U.S. at 190.
1429. Id at 191.
1430. Id
1431. Id at 191-92 (citing Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976); Aldridge v. United States,
283 U.S. 308 (1931)). In Ristaino, a black defendant was convicted of armed robbery, as-
sault, and battery with intent to commit murder against a white security guard. 424 U.S. at
590. The Court held that under these circumstances there was no constitutional requirement
to question jurors about racial or ethnic prejudice because, unlike the situation in Ham,
racial issues were not bound up with either the commission of the crimes or the conduct of
the defense. Id at 597-98. The Court stated, however, that if such a case were tried in the
federal court system, it would use its supervisory authority to require the federal trial judge
to ask questions of the jurors directed toward the discovery of racial prejudice. Id at 597
n.9. In Aldridge, where a black defendant was convicted of murdering a white policeman,
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ticular fact pattern were almost certain to raise such a possibility, fed-
eral trial judges were absolutely required to make an inquiry regarding
racial or ethnic prejudice if requested by the defendant. 1432 The Court
added that other circumstances might suggest the need to inquire about
racial or ethnic prejudice; however, it remained the trial judge's respon-
sibility to determine whether the circumstances of a particular case in-
dicated that racial or ethnic prejudice might exist, subject to case-by-
case appellate review. 1
433
The Court determined that in Rosales-Lopez no violent criminal
acts had been perpetrated upon a victim of a different racial or ethnic
group, nor did the case involve allegations of racial or ethnic
prejudice. 1434  Thus, Rosales-Lopez contained no "special circum-
stances" of constitutional dimension. 1435 The Court then considered
whether other factors might indicate that racial or ethnic prejudice in-
fluenced the jury. 1436 Finding no such possibility,1437 the Court held
that neither the Constitution nor the Court's supervisory role required
a reversal of Rosales-Lopez's conviction.
431
The Supreme Court's decision in Rosales-Lopez comports with the
Ninth Circuit's position that, absent a constitutional requirement to ex-
amine the jury on voir dire about racial prejudice, a trial judge is re-
the Court did hold that the federal trial judge's failure to inquire into the possibility of racial
prejudice was reversible error. 283 U.S. at 314-15.
1432. 451 U.S. at 192. In his concurring opinion, Justice Rehnquist doubted the wisdom of
creating a per se rule requiring a district court to conduct-voir dire about the issue of racial
prejudice in every case involving a "violent crime" between members of different racial or
ethnic groups.-Id at 194 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). He observed that the use of the terms
"violent crime" and "different racial or ethnic groups" was likely to spawn new litigation
over the meaning of those terms and their application by the district court in its assessment
of the possibility of the existence of racial prejudice. Id Furthermore, he foresaw the possi-
bility that trial judges might decide that asking questions about racial prejudice could exac-
erbate whatever prejudice might exist, rather than aid in exposing it. 1d at 195. Justice
Rehnquist concluded that it was inappropriate for the Court to determine that there was
always a "reasonable possibility" of prejudice when the crime committed was violent; such a
determination should be made by the trial court, "'subject to case-by-case review by the
appellate courts."' Id at 194-95 (quoting id at 192).
1433. d at 192.
1434. Id
1435. Id
1436. Id at 192-93. These factors included the jurors' attitudes toward aliens and Rosales-
Lopez's romantic involvement with the Caucasian daughter of one of the witnesses. Id at
193.
1437. Id at 193-94. The Court stated that the possibility that such prejudice influenced the
jury was remote because the trial court had asked the jurors about their attitudes concerning
the "alien problem," and because the testimony of Rosales-Lopez's girlfriend's mother had
been substantially corroborated by other Government witnesses. Id at 193.
1438. Id at 194.
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quired to inquire about racial or ethnic prejudice only when the
particular circumstances of a case indicate that such prejudice may ex-
ist. 439 This is a considerably more relaxed standard than that estab-
fished by other circuits, where a trial judge must ask questions
concerning racial prejudice if a minority defendant so requests.'
44°
In his dissenting opinion in Rosales-Lopez, Justice Stevens empha-
sized that the plurality's decision represented a change in long-standing
federal law.1" 1 To illustrate this change, he cited Aldridge v. United
States,'442 which required voir dire of jurors about racial or ethnic
prejudice. 443 The Aldridge Court, however, did not appear to limit its
holding only to facts involving defendants and victims of different ra-
cial groups. Although Aldridge did involve the murder of a white po-
lice officer by a black defendant, the opinion rested on state court
decisions that did not necessarily involve defendants and victims of dif-
ferent races. 444
Justice Stevens agreed with the majority of federal judges who
have interpreted Aldridge as establishing a firm rule entitling a minor-
ity defendant to some voir dire about possible racial or ethnic bias,
regardless of the specific facts of the case.' 445 He concluded that al-
though the voir dire in Rosales-Lopez was sufficient to expose any juror
prejudice arising from the particular facts of the case it was inadequate
as a matter of law because "it wholly ignored the risk that potential
jurors in the Southern District of California might be prejudiced
against the defendant simply because he is a person of Mexican
descent." 1446
The Court's refusal to hold that defendants such as Rosales-Lopez
are entitled to voir dire regarding racial or ethnic prejudice demon-
strates an unwillingness to believe that many potential jurors "harbor
strong prejudices against all members of certain racial, religious, or eth-
nic groups for no reason other than hostility to the group as a
1439. See Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 617 F.2d 1349, 1354 (9th Cir. 1980), aft'd, 451
U.S. 182 (1981); United States v. Perez-Martinez, 525 F.2d 365, 368 (9th Cir. 1975).
1440. See supra note 1410.
1441. 451 U.S. at 196 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1442. 283 U.S. 308 (1931).
1443. Id at 315.
1444. Id at 311-12. The Court in.Aidridge relied upon the decision in Pinder v. State, 27
Fla. 370, 8 So. 837 (1891). In Pinder, both the defendant and the victim were black, and the
Court noted the Florida court's holding that the trial court erred by refusing to ask the jurors
if they could give the defendant, a Negro, as fair and impartial a trial as they could a white
person. 283 U.S. at 311.
1445. 451 U.S. at 201-02 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1446. Id at 202.
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whole."'" 7 The Court expressed concern that requiring an inquiry
about racial prejudice whenever the defendant is a member of a minor-
ity group creates the impression "'that justice in a court of law may
turn upon the pigmentation of skin [or] the accident of birth."'"448 It
admitted, however, that "avoiding the inquiry does not eliminate the
problem, and. . . [the defendant's] trial is not the place in which to
elevate appearance over reality.'" 9 Thus, both "reality" and legal au-
thority appear to require trial judges to honor a minority defendant's
request for voir dire about racial prejudice; their failure to do so should
constitute reversible error, regardless of the factual circumstances of the
case.
b. bias against the charge
In United States v. timente, 45o the Ninth Circuit considered
whether the trial judge's voir dire had adequately explored the possibil-
ity that the jurors had preconceptions about the legality of wiretap-
ping. 1411 Pimentel alleged that post-trial conversations with the jurors
indicated that some of them had made up their minds about his guilt
before the court had instructed them on the law. 452 He contended that
this demonstrated that those jurors had believed that all wiretapping
was illegal, and that they failed to consider his primary defense of lack
of intent. 453 A proper voir dire, Pimentel argued, would have uncov-
ered these attitudes, permitting those jurors to have been excused for
cause or to have been challenged peremptorily. 
14 14
The Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court's voir dire questions
and found that while the judge had not asked all of Pimentel's pro-
1447. Id at 196-97 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1448. Id at 190 (quoting Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 596 n.9).
1449. 451 U.S. at 191. In his dissent, Justice Stevens quoted the following statement by
Justice Hughes in Aidridge
The argument is advanced... that it would be detrimental to the administra-
tion of the law in the courts.. . to allow questions to jurors as to racial or religious
prejudices. We think that it would be far more injurious to permit it to be thought
that persons entertaining a disqualifying prejudice were allowed to serve as jurors
and that inquiries designed to elicit the fact of disqualification were barred. No
surer way could be devised to bring the processes of justice into disrepute.
Id at 200-01 (quoting.Akdridge, 283 U.S. at 314-15).
1450. 654 F.2d 538 (9th Cir. 1981).
1451. Id at 541-42. Pimentel was a private investigator hired by companies to determine
whether any of their employees were engaged in unlawful activities. .d at 539. He was
convicted of 2 counts of illegal wiretapping. Id
1452. Id at 542.
1453. Id
1454. Id
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posed questions, which had been designed to probe each juror's atti-
tude about wiretapping, he had asked the jurors as a group if they had
any preconceptions or prejudices about federal wiretap laws.145 5 Re-
ceiving no response to this question, the judge later asked each juror if
he or she had any responses to questions that had already been asked
of the entire group, or if he or she could render a verdict solely on the
evidence presented at trial and the instructions given by the court.
14 6
None of the jurors indicated any problems. 417 The Ninth Circuit held
that the above procedure did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
458
This holding reaffirmed its position that voir dire questions concerning
the jurors' attitudes towards the charged offense do not need to be
asked specifically of each juror, but may be addressed to the jurors as a
group. 459 The court further held that the recounting by defense coun-
sel of his post-trial conversations with some of the jurors, as well as a
declaration filed by one of the jurors personally, was inadmissible to
demonstrate an inadequate voir dire. 46°
The Ninth Circuit also considered Pimentel's argument that the
application of Local Rule 326-1 of the Northern District of California
deprived him of three of the ten peremptory juror challenges allowed
under Rule 24(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus vio-
lating his sixth amendment right to a fair trial. 461 During voir dire, the
defense had exercised only one of the two challenges to which it was
1455. Id
1456. Id
1457. Id
1458. Id (citing United States v. Giese, 597 F.2d 1170, 1182 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 979 (1979)). The Pimentel court indicated that it would not reverse unless the proce-
dures used, or the questions asked, by the district judge were so unreasonable as to constitute
an abuse of discretion. 654 F.2d at 542 (citing United States v. Rosales-Lopez, 617 F.2d
1349, 1353 (9th Cir. 1980), aft'd, 451 U.S. 182 (1981)).
1459. The Ninth Circuit had previously held in United States v. Giese, 597 F.2d 1170 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979 (1979), where the defendant was charged with conspiracy to
bomb two military recruiting centers, that voir dire had been sufficient even though the trial
court had not asked every juror specific questions about his or her attitudes towards law
enforcement and military personnel, the use of firearms, and the Vietnam War. Id at 1182.
1460. 654 F.2d at 542. Only juror testimony concerning extraneous influences on the de-
liberation is admissible; juror testimony concerning the motives of individual jurors and
conduct during deliberations is inadmissible. See Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140,
148-49 (1892); FED. R. EviD. 606(b).
1461. 654 F.2d at 540. FED. R. Cium. P. 24(b) provides that "[i]f the offense charged is
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, the government is entitled to 6 per-
emptory challenges and the defendant or defendants jointly to 10 peremptory challenges."
Local Rule 326-1 provides that peremptory challenges allowed the parties under rule 24(b)
should be exercised alternately between the Government and the defense. The rule allows
the Government one challenge per round and the defense one challenge during its first and
last rounds. The defense is also entitled to two challenges during every other round. The rule
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entitled in round two and had passed both of the challenges to which it
was entitled in round three. The defense had then exercised all of its
remaining challenges.1462  Pimentel argued that treating his three
passes as waivers of peremptories under the local rule was analogous to
the district court's actions in United States v. Turner. 1463
In Turner, the defendant and his two co-defendants had agreed
that each would be able to use three of the ten peremptories allowed
them under Rule 24(b) and that the final challenge would be exercised
jointly.'146  During voir dire, Turner passed three times and accepted
the jury panel as then constituted.1465 After one of Turner's co-defend-
ants had exercised one of his peremptories, Turner attempted to use a
peremptory challenge to excuse the new member of the panel. 1466 The
Ninth Circuit held that the refusal to permit Turner to exercise a per-
emptory challenge in that situation unduly restricted Turner's use of
his challenges.
1467
The Pimentel court distinguished Turner. 1468 It explained that in
Turner the treatment of the defendant's passes as waivers of perempto-
ries had prevented the defendant from exercising a peremptory against
a juror who had not been a member of the panel he had accepted.
1469
However, because Pimentel had the opportunity to exercise a peremp-
tory against each juror selected after his passes, the court considered
the system under Local Rule 326-1 fundamentally fair and consistent
with dicta in Turner. 1470
The court reaffirmed that although the peremptory challenge is
one of the most important rights of the accused, neither the number of
peremptory challenges nor the manner of their exercise is constitution-
ally guaranteed. 1471 It held, therefore, that Pimentel's constitutional
right to a fair trial had not been violated, and that his use of perempto-
states that if either party passes a peremptory challenge, that challenge shall be treated as if
it has been waived. N.D. CAL. R. 326-1.
1462. 654 F.2d at 540.
1463. Id (citing United States v. Turner, 558 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1977)).
1464. 558 F.2d at 536-37.
1465. Id at 537.
1466. Id
1467. Id at 538. The Turner court also noted, in dicta, that a defendant's pass of a per-
emptory challenge could not be characterized as a waiver of challenges to jurors not yet
placed on a panel. Id
1468. 654 F.2d at 540-41.
1469. Id at 541.
1470. Id See supra note 1467.
1471. 654 F.2d at 540 (citing Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919); Turner, 558
F.2d at 538).
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ries had not been unreasonably restricted.1472
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Pimentel, as well as those of other
circuits in similar cases,1 473 reflects a justifiable unwillingness to reverse
a conviction solely because the defendant did not exercise all the per-
emptories to which he was entitled by statute.1 474 The Ninth Circuit's
position permitting a defendant to exercise a peremptory challenge
only against jurors who were not panel members when the defendant
earlier waived a peremptory upholds the defendant's right to a fair trial
and permits local jurisdictions to establish their own rules governing
the manner in which a defendant may exercise peremptories.
c. overlapping venires
In United States v. Patterson, 1475 the Ninth Circuit considered
whether the trial judge's voir dire adequately explored the possibility of
prejudice against the defendant stemming from overlapping
venires. 1476 Patterson had been tried and acquitted of charges arising
from an alleged sale of phencycidine (PCP) to DEA agents.14 7 7 The
next day, he was tried for conspiracy to distribute cocaine and heroin,
possession of cocaine for distribution, and distribution of cocaine and
heroin. 47 ' He was found guilty on all counts.1 479 Patterson pointed
out that half of the jurors in his second trial had been members of the
1472. 654 F.2d at 541.
1473. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 562 F.2d 394, 396-97 (6th Cir. 1977) (no abuse
of discretion where, pursuant to local rule, trial court refused to permit defense to exercise
peremptory challenges to jurors whom it had previously accepted and to withdraw per-
emptories it had previously exercised); United States v. Mackey, 345 F.2d 499, 502-03 (7th
Cir.) (no abuse of discretion where trial court refused to allow either Government or defense
more than one opportunity to exercise peremptory challenge to each prospective juror, even
though defendant denied effective use of two challenges), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 824 (1965).
1474. The Ninth Circuit demonstrated this same unwillingness in United States v. Vallez,
653 F.2d 403 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 904 (1981). In Vallez, the Ninth Circuit consid-
ered whether denying defendants charged with first-degree murder the exercise of more than
16 peremptory challenges deprived them of 4 of the 20 challenges allowed for capital of-
fenses under FED. R. CuM. P. 24(b). The Ninth Circuit held that, because the Government
had agreed before trial not to seek the death penalty, and because rule 24(b)'s purpose was
to insure that the jury was not tainted by opinions about capital punishment, the rule did not
apply in this case. Id at 406 (citing United States v. Martinez, 536 F.2d 886, 890 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 907 (1976); Loux v. United States, 389 F.2d 911, 915 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 867 (1968)).
1475. 648 F.2d 625 (9th Cir.1981).
1476. Id at 629-30.
1477. Id at 628.
1478. Id
1479. Id
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venire in his previous trial.1480 He argued that, because evidence of his
prior arrest and indictment on narcotics charges would have been inad-
missible as direct evidence of his guilt,' 481 disclosing his prior arrest
and indictment to six jurors through overlapping venires was
prejudicial. 1482
The Government argued that the district court had conducted a
"vigorous" examination of the jury, negating any inference of
prejudice.148 3 The court of appeals, however, found that this "vigor-
ous" examination consisted solely of asking the jurors as a group if any
of them knew Patterson, if any of them knew anything about the case,
and if anyone had mentioned anything to them individually about Pat-
terson. 1484 The court did not ask any questions of the individual jurors
or any questions specifically addressed to the previous day's
experience.1
48 5
The Ninth Circuit determined that although Patterson had been
acquitted in his first trial, the jurors' knowledge during the second trial
of his prior arrest and indictment, combined with their possible igno-
rance of his acquittal and the short length of time between the two
trials, created a significant risk of prejudice.14 6 This risk of prejudice,
coupled with the failure to examine the jurors individually on voir dire,
and the possibility that the jurors did not understand that the court's
general questions referred only to the previous day's experiences, con-
vinced the Ninth Circuit that the voir dire had been inadequate to pro-
vide "'any reasonable assurances that prejudice would be discovered if
present.' ,1487
The Patterson court noted the Supreme Court's reversal of the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Leonard v. United States. 1488 The Leonard
1480. Id at 629.
1481. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
1482. 648 F.2d at 629.
1483. Id at 629-30.
1484. Id at 630.
1485. Id
1486. Id at 629.
1487. Id at 630 (quoting United States v. Baldwin, 607 F.2d 1295, 1298 (9th Cir. 1979)).
The court observed that the district court was apparently attempting to avoid tainting the
jury through questions that conveyed more information than the jurors already had, but that
in so doing, it failed to ask questions sufficiently specific in scope and direction. 648 F.2d at
630.
1488. 648 F.2d at 629 (citing 324 F.2d 914 (9th Cir. 1963), rev'd, 378 U.S. 544 (1964) (per
curiam)). In Leonard, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a defendant's conviction even though the
panel from which jurors were eventually selected to try a second charge against the defend-
ant was sitting in the courtroom when a guilty verdict on the first charge was returned
against him. The first charge against the defendant had been based upon forging and utter-
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court held that "[p]rospective jurors who have sat in the courtroom and
heard a verdict returned against a man charged with crime in a similar
case immediately prior to the trial of another indictment against him
should be automatically disqualified from serving at the second
trial."1489 While admitting the inevitability of prejudice when a de-
fendant's past guilt is conclusively established in the presence of pro-
spective jurors, or when prospective jurors have previously participated
in convicting the defendant, the Ninth Circuit limited the holding of
the Leonard court to factual situations in which (1) specific circum-
stances suggest a significant risk of prejudice and (2) examining or ad-
monishing the jurors fails to negate that inference. 1490 Thus, the Ninth
Circuit has implied that the existence of overlapping venires does not
automatically require reversal of a defendant's conviction.' 491 How-
ever, a court's refusal to reverse a defendant's conviction under these
hig Government checks, the second charge upon the transportation of a forged instrument in
interstate commerce. 324 F.2d at 914. Although the jurors who tried the second charge had
not been asked about possible prejudice from the prior exposure, the Ninth Circuit found
the defendant's conviction supported by "strong and convincing evidence." Id at 915.
1489. 378 U.S. at 545. Other circuits have relied on Leonard in reversing convictions be-
cause of overlapping venires. For example, in Donovan v. Davis, 558 F.2d 201 (4th Cir.
1977), the defendant was convicted of rape in a second trial by some of the same jurors who
had previously acquitted him of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. Id at 202. Although
the jurors common to both trials had acquitted the defendant in his first trial, the Fourth
Circuit held that prejudice still must have existed at his second trial because the evidence at
his first trial had demonstrated his strong attraction to women; the defendant had apparently
used vehicles from a used car lot to take women home, to take his girlfriend for rides, and to
take trips with other women. Id at 203-04. Similarly, in Virgin Islands v. Parrott, 551 F.2d
553 (3d Cir. 1977), the Third Circuit held that prejudice must have existed during a defend-
ant's second trial for murder and possession of an unlicensed firearm, because some jurors
had previously convicted the defendant for possession of an unlicensed firearm. Id at 554.
Finally, in Mottram v. Murch, 458 F.2d 626 (1st Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 409 U.S. 41
(1972), the defendant had been tried for car theft and subsequently for being an habitual
offender. During the first trial, the defendant took the stand, was confronted with evidence
of several prior convictions, and invoked his fifth amendment privilege. Id at 628. During
the second trial, the defendant did not testify. Id The First Circuit held that juror prejudice
must have existed during the second trial because the jurors common to both trials could
have called upon their recollection of the defendant as an uncooperative witness with a
history of criminal conduct. Id at 630-31.
1490. 648 F.2d at 629.
1491. For example, if the jurors who sat in a defendant's second trial acquitted him in his
first trial, and the charges against the defendant in both trials involved entirely different
offenses, and/or the length of time between trials was more than a few days, the defendant's
conviction would not automatically be reversed. The Patterson court compared this situa-
tion to the one in United States v. Splain, id (citing 545 F.2d 1131, (8th Cir. 1976)), in which
a witness made an oblique reference to the defendant's previous alleged crimes. 545 F.2d at
1133. The defendant argued that this constituted introduction of evidence of his past crimes.
Id The Splain court did not consider the witness's statement to be sufficiently prejudicial to
require a reversal of the defendant's conviction. Id
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circumstances is only justifiable if voir dire has established that each
juror who sat in the defendant's second trial was convinced of his or
her innocence in the first trial, and that no juror remaining from the
first trial received an unfavorable impression of the defendant.
d. pretrial publicity
In United States v. Mayo, 492 the Ninth Circuit considered whether
the trial judge's voir dire had been sufficient to uncover prejudice from
pretrial publicity. 14 93 Mayo was charged with mail and securities
fraud. 1494 The Government's allegations, as well as Mayo's two previ-
ous convictions of federal crimes, had been discussed in local newspa-
per articles. 14 95 The court asked the jurors if they had heard or seen
anything about the case in the media, and none of them responded
affirmatively. 1496 The court specifically found that each juror had re-
sponded negatively; thus, it declined to question the jurors individu-
ally. 1497 The Ninth Circuit held that because pretrial publicity had
been insubstantial, the trial court had not abused its discretion by fail-
ing to question the jurors individually.
1498
In United States v. Flores-Elias, 1 the Ninth Circuit again consid-
ered the extent of voir dire necessary in cases involving pretrial public-
ity. Flores-Elias was charged with smuggling and conspiring to
smuggle illegal aliens from El Salvador into the United States.11°°
During the smuggling, thirteen of the Salvadorans died in the Arizona
desert, and the incident received widespread media coverage.'150
The Ninth Circuit observed that the publicity in the case had fo-
cused mainly on the victims and their plight rather than on Flores-
1492. 646 F.2d 369 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Dondich v. United States, 454 U.S.
1127 (1981).
1493. Id at 373-74.
1494. Id at 371.
1495. Id at 373.
1496. Id
1497. Id
1498. Id at 374 (citing United States v. Polizzi, 500 F.2d 856, 880 (9th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1120 (1975)). The Polizzi defendants were charged with various gambling
offenses. 500 F.2d at 868. Certain newspaper articles had commented on the defendants'
alleged ties to the Mafia and on the prosecution's "skimming" allegations. Id at 878. The
judge limited his voir dire on these subjects to two questions addressed to the first panel of
prospective jurors and to two questions addressed to an individual juror selected later. Id at
879-80. The Ninth Circuit held that, because the pretrial publicity had been insubstantial,
the trial judge had not abused his discretion by so limiting his voir dire. Id at 880.
1499. 650 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 904 (1981).
1500. Id at 1150.
1501. Id
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Elias,150 2 and had been factual in nature rather than emotional or accu-
satory.1 50 3 Furthermore, only two of the jurors had read or heard any-
thing about the case, and both of them had assured the district court
that they could render an impartial verdict based on the evidence pro-
duced at trial. 5 04 Emphasizing that further questioning might have
only "fanned the embers of incipient prejudice by arousing curios-
ity,"' 5 5 the Ninth Circuit held that the trial judge had not abused his
discretion during voir dire.150 6
The Flores-Elias court additionally considered whether the district
judge had abused his discretion by rejecting Flores-Elias's challenges
for cause of two jurors who had read or heard something about his
case.'50 7 The court determined that, under the circumstances of the
case, Flores-Elias was unable to demonstrate either inherent or actual
prejudice from the pretrial publicity. 50 It held, therefore, that because
a defendant is not "entitled to a jury composed only of persons who
had no prior knowledge of. . . [the] case,"' 50 9 the trial judge had not
abused his discretion by rejecting Flores-Elias's challenges. 51
In United States v. Dufur, '"I the Ninth Circuit considered whether
the trial judge had abused his discretion by denying the defendant's
motions for a change of venue, exclusion of the press from pretrial pro-
ceedings, dismissal or sequestration of the jury, and interviews with the
1502. Id The publicity had focused to a small degree on the charges against Flores-Elias's
co-defendants, but it had referred to Flores-Elias only once by name. Id
1503. Id
1504. 650 F.2d at 1151.
1505. Id (citing Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 548 (1962); United States v. Geise, 597
F.2d 1170, 1182-83 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979 (1979)).
1506. 650 F.2d at 1151. The court indicated that it would reverse a conviction only if there
had been plain error, and if it were necessary to prevent a clear miscarriage of justice. Id
(citing United States v. Berry, 627 F.2d 193, 199 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113
(1981); United States v. Sims, 617 F.2d 1371, 1377 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Krasn,
614 F.2d 1229, 1235 (9th Cir. 1980)).
1507. 650 F.2d at 1151.
1508. Id
1509. Id (citing United States v. Ferreboeuf, 632 F.2d 832, 835 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. de-
nied, 450 U.S. 934 (1981)).
1510. 650 F.2d at 1151 (citing United States v. Sutton, 446 F.2d 916, 923 (9th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1025 (1972)). In Sutton, one of the prospective jurors admitted that
she might be a "little prejudiced" if it was shown during trial that the defendant, or the
witnesses on his behalf, had been connected with a rock concert. 446 F.2d at 923. She later
stated that such facts would not affect her as far as the evidence was concerned, that she
could evaluate the witnesses' testimony regardless of "what they did or didn't do prior to
that [testimony]," and that she could be fair. Id The Ninth Circuit held that the trial judge
had not abused his discretion by refusing to excuse this juror for cause. Id
1511. 648 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 925 (1981).
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jurors after the verdict. 512 Dufur was charged with murder.' 5 3 He
argued that the jurors had been exposed to pretrial publicity about him
and "significant details" of the crime. 5 14 The Ninth Circuit observed
that the trial judge had conducted extensive voir dire of the prospective
jurors, interviewing individually any who had been exposed to the
publicity.s 15 Furthermore, once the jury had been impaneled, the
judge had repeatedly admonished it to avoid exposure to publicity
about the case. 5 16 The Ninth Circuit held, therefore, that the trial
judge had not abused his discretion by denying any of Dufur's
motions. 15
17
The Ninth Circuit decisions regarding pretrial publicity are consis-
tent with the Supreme Court's position that juror exposure to informa-
tion about a defendant's prior convictions or to news accounts of the
crime with which the defendant is charged does not alone presump-
tively deprive him or her of due process. 51 s Accordingly, the Ninth
Circuit has adopted the position that a court's examination or admoni-
tion of jurors should be tailored to the nature and amount of publicity
surrounding the case.
Thus, in cases involving a substantial amount of pretrial publicity,
the Ninth Circuit has held that a trial judge is required to examine each
juror individually, out of the presence of the other jurors, to ascertain
what information the jurors have accumulated about the case, the
source of that knowledge, and the nature and strength of the opinions
they may have formed as a consequence. 519 In cases involving a
smaller amount of publicity (Mayo, Flores-Elias, and Dufur), the Ninth
1512. Id at 513.
1513. I1d
1514. Id
1515. Id
1516. Id
1517. Id (citing Frame v. United States, 444 F.2d 71, 72 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
942 (1971)). The Frame defendants were charged with manufacturing large quantities of
drugs. 444 F.2d at 71. The case had received substantial publicity. Id at 72. The Ninth
Circuit upheld the trial judge's denial of defense motions to sequester the jury and to inquire
every day about what media information the jurors had received. Id
1518. See Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975). In Murphy, some of the prospective
jurors revealed during voir dire that they vaguely recalled reading about the robbery with
which the defendant was charged. Id at 800. All of them had some knowledge of the
defendant's past crimes. Id The trial court found, however, that none of the jurors believed
the defendant's past to be relevant to the present robbery. Id The Supreme Court held that
this factor, combined with the absence of incensed community reaction, indicated that there
had not been any inherent prejudice in the trial setting or in the jury selection process. 1d at
803.
1519. See United States v. Silverthorne, 400 F.2d 627, 638-40 (9th Cir. 1968), a~'d after
retrial, 430 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1022 (1971).
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Circuit requires only that a trial judge question the jurors as a group
and then question individually those jurors who respond affirmatively
to the initial inquiries.1520 Finally, if a trial judge has conducted the
voir dire examination in a manner appropriate to the amount of public-
ity, the Ninth Circuit leaves to his or her discretion the question of
whether to allow challenges for cause (Fores-Elias).
2. Prejudicial events during trial
Juror prejudice not evident at the beginning of a trial may never-
theless appear during a trial because of the manner in which the trial is
conducted, or because of incidents which occur among the jurors them-
selves. The United States Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have
recently decided cases concerning the effect of these factors upon the
impartiality of the jurors and whether they resulted in the deprivation
of a fair trial.
a. live media coverage
In Chandler v. lorida, 15 21 the Supreme Court considered the con-
stitutionality of a state judicial canon permitting radio, television, and
still-photography coverage of a criminal trial, notwithstanding the ob-
jection of the accused. 522 The Chandler defendants were charged with
conspiracy to commit burglary, grand larceny, and possession of bur-
glary tools. 523 The case attracted the attention of the media, which fo-
cused on the identity of the defendants as policemen and the fact that
the star witness was an amateur radio operator who had accidentally
overheard and recorded conversations between the defendants over
their police walkie-talkies during the burglary1 52
4
By pretrial motion, the defendants sought to prevent electronic
coverage of the trial. 5' The trial court denied the motion, and the
Florida Supreme Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of the
1520. See also United States v. Geise, 597 F.2d 1170, 1183 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
979 (1979); United States v. Polizzi, 500 F.2d 856, 880 (9th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 419 U.S.
1120 (1975).
1521. 449 U.S. 560 (1981).
1522. Id at 562. The particular state canon involved was Canon 3A(7) of the Florida
Code of Judicial Conduct, which provides for the electronic coverage of trials "[s]ubject at
all times to the authority of the presiding judge to (i) control the conduct of proceedings
before the court, (ii) ensure decorum and prevent distractions, and (iii) ensure fair adminis-
tration of justice in the pending case."
1523. 449 U.S. at 567.
1524. Id
1525. Id
19821
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judicial canon. 526 During voir dire, each prospective juror was asked
if he or she would be able to be "fair and impartial," despite the pres-
ence of a television camera during the trial, and each responded affirm-
atively while a television camera recorded the voir dire. 1 27
The defendants then moved to sequester the jury because of the
television coverage. 528 The trial judge denied the motion, but admon-
ished the jurors not to watch or read anything about the case in the
media. 1529 During the trial, a television camera covered the testimony
of the radio operator and both closing arguments.15 30 No untoward
events occurred during the filming, except for the judge's request of a
cameraman to discontinue a movement that he apparently found dis-
tracting. 153' Only two minutes and fifty-five seconds of the trial was
broadcast, depicting only the prosecution's side of the case.1532 The
jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts.
5 33
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the defendants relied on a previ-
ous Supreme Court opinion, Estes v. Texas, 1534 to argue that televising
criminal trials is inherently a denial of due process, and that Estes es-
tablished a per se constitutional rule to that effect. 535 The Court noted
that only four Justices had joined in the Estes opinion and that four
Justices had dissented; thus, the opinion represented only a plurality of
the Court. 536 The Chandler Court, therefore, determined that it was
necessary to examine Justice Harlan's limited concurrence in Estes,
which provided the fifth vote supporting the judgment.
537
The Court emphasized Justice Harlan's observations that forbid-
ding televisions in the courtroom "'would doubtless impinge upon one
of the valued attributes of our federalism by preventing the states from
1526. Id
1527. Id
1528. Id
1529. Id
1530. Id at 568.
1531. Id
1532. Id
1533. Id
1534. 381 U.S. 532 (1965). Estes had been indicted for swindling, and massive pretrial
publicity had given the case national notoriety. Id at 535. A pretrial hearing on his motion
to prevent electronic coverage of the trial was carried live on television and radio. Id Some
of the jurors had seen or heard all or part of the broadcasts. Id at 551. Although live
telecasting was prohibited during most of the trial, videotapes without sound were made of
the whole proceeding, and film clips of the trial were shown on regularly scheduled news
programs. Id at 537.
1535. 449 U.S. at 570.
1536. Id at 570-72.
1537. Id at 571.
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pursuing a novel course of procedural experimentation,' 1538 but that,
"'at least as to a notorious criminal trial. .., the considerations against
allowing television in the courtroom so far outweigh the countervailing
factors advanced in its support as to require a holding that what was done
in this case infringed the fundamental right to a fair trial""1539 The
Court concluded that the Estes holding was limited to similar circum-
stances, and that the Estes Court had not announced a per se constitu-
tional rule banning electronic coverage of criminal trials.
540
The Court then considered whether it should promulgate such a
rule now.15 4 1 It reviewed the inherent dangers of televised trials and
specifically noted the psychological impact of the presence of cameras
in courtrooms. 1542 It observed, however, that changes in television
1538. Id. (quoting Estes, 381 U.S. at 587 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
1539. Id (emphasis added in Chandler).
1540. 449 U.S. at 573-74. Justices Stewart and White disagreed with the Court's opinion
that Estes did not announce a per se constitutional rule banning electronic coverage of trials,
but they favored overruling the opinion. Id at 587 (Stewart, J., concurring); id at 615-16
(White, J., concurring). Justice Stewart pointed out that even if Justice Harlan had limited
the banning of electronic coverage to "notorious" criminal trials, the Court itself described
the Chandler case as involving this type of trial. Id at 585 n.3 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Justice Stewart further noted that because Justice Harlan had stated he was "by no means
prepared to say that the constitutional issue should ultimately turn upon the nature of the
particular case involved," it was doubtful that Harlan had intended to limit his concurrence
at all. Id at 585-86 (quoting Estes, 381 U.S. at 590 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
Justice White added that the Court's opinion was inconsistent with Estes because, even
if the holding in Estes were limited to "notorious" cases, id at 587 (citing Estes, 381 U.S. at
591 (Harlan, J., concurring)), the Estes Court expressly stated that the defendants were not
required to show prejudice. Id at 587 (White, J., concurring). See Estes, 381 U.S. at 542.
The Chandler Court held, however, that "[a]bsent a showing of prejudice. . . to these de-
fendants," Florida's canon was not unconstitutional. 449 U.S. at 582-83. Because the Flor-
ida canon made no exception for the "notorious" case, Justice White reasoned that, under
Chandler, a defendant would be required to show prejudice even in a notorious case; he
concluded that such a requirement effectively eviscerates Estes. Id at 588 (White, J.,
concurring).
1541. Id at 574.
1542. Id at 575-80. The Court quoted Justice Harlan's comments in Estes-
[T]here is certainly a strong possibility that the timid or reluctant witness, for
whom a court appearance even at its traditional best is a harrowing affair, will
become more timid or reluctant when he finds that he will also be appearing before
a "hidden audience" of unknown but large dimensions. There is certainly a strong
possibility that the "cocky" witness having a thirst for the limelight will become.
more "cocky" under the influence of television. And who can say that the juror
who is gratified by having been chosen for a front-line case, an ambitious prosecu-
tor, a publicity-minded defense attorney, and even a conscientious judge win not
stray, albeit unconsciously, from doing what "comes naturally" into pluming them-
selves for a satisfactory television "performance?"
Id at 571-72 (quoting Estes, 381 U.S. at 591 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
The Court also noted the concern of Justices Warren and Harlan in Ester that covering
select cases "singles out certain defendants and subjects them to trials under prejudicial
conditions not experienced by others," thereby bringing public humiliation upon the ac-
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technology since the time of Estes rendered some of the more disrup-
tive factors of electronic coverage less substantial than they were in the
past. 5
43
The Court added that the states have established certain safe-
guards to protect witnesses who are children, victims of sex crimes, in-
formants, or just very timid from the glare of publicity and the tensions
of being "on camera."' 5 4 The Court further determined that empirical
data did not establish that the mere presence of the broadcast media
inherently affects trial participants adversely.1
545
The Court emphasized that the Florida canon requires that an ac-
cused's objections to broadcast coverage be heard and considered on
the record. 546 In addition to providing a record for appellate review,
this procedure allows the trial court to define the steps necessary to
lessen or eliminate risks of prejudice to the accused. 547 The Court
noted that the Chandler defendants had not requested an evidentiary
hearing to show adverse impact or injury. 548 It reiterated the showing
of impartiality during voir dire, the trial court's instructions that the
jurors not watch television accounts of the trial, and the lack of specific
defense evidence that any participant had been affected by the presence
of cameras in the courtroom.
15 4 9
Explaining that it lacked constitutional authority "to oversee or
harness state procedural experimentation,"'' 5 5 0 the Court emphasized
that "[t]he Florida program is inherently evolutional in nature . . .
provid[ing] guidance for. . . new canons. . . [that are] subject to con-
trol by the trial judge."' 551 The Court held that "there is no reason for
this Court. . . to invalidate Florida's experiment," unless the defend-
ant can show "prejudice of constitutional dimensions."'
' 55 2
cused with such randomness that it might violate due process. 449 U.S. at 580 (quoting
Estes, 381 U.S. at 565 (Warren, CJ., concurring); accordid at 587 (Harlan, J., concurring).
1543. 449 U.S. at 576. Justice Stewart noted, however, Justice Harlan's observation in
Estes that the use of television there was "relatively unobtrusive, with the cameras contained
in a booth at the back of the courtroom," id at 584 (Stewart, J., concurring) quoting Estes,
381 U.S. at 588 (Harlan, J., concurring), substantiating his opinion that the Estes Court
believed that any electronic coverage, no matter how subtle, violated the defendant's due
process rights). Id at 584 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citing Estes, 381 U.S. at 542-50).
1544. 449 U.S. at 577.
1545. Id at 578-79.
1546. Id at 577.
1547. Id
1548. Id
1549. Id at 581-82.
1550. Id at 582.
1551. Id
1552. Id
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The implication of Chandler is that electronic coverage of trials in
the federal court system will most likely increase. The Supreme Court
has held, however, that "there is no constitutional right to have...
[live witness] testimony recorded and broadcast,"' 1553 and that "the
guarantee of a public trial ... confers no special benefit on the
press."' 5 4 It has further stated that the guarantee of a public trial is for
the defendant's benefit alone and does not imply that the public has a
constitutional right of access to criminal trials.1
555
The Chandler Court recognized that "[i]nherent in electronic cov-
erage of a trial is the risk that. . . the contemplated broadcast may
adversely affect the conduct of the participants and the fairness of the
trial, yet leave no evidence of how the conduct or the trial's fairness
was affected." 1556 Although such a risk may not justify prohibiting all
electronic coverage of trials as unconstitutional, forcing defendants to
assume such a risk without their consent, while also shifting to them the
burden of proving resulting prejudice, arguably diminishes their due
process rights.
Furthermore, the contribution to society from electronic coverage
of trials, and the ensuing wider public acceptance and understanding of
decisions, 557 may not outweigh the cost to society of numerous trial
delays and appeals from such coverage. This cost could be reduced if
the Supreme Court were to exercise its supervisory authority over fed-
eral courts to require that defendants consent to electronic coverage of
their trials.
Regardless of the consent issue, however, it is unlikely that proper
electronic coverage of trials will violate a defendant's due process
rights. If trial judges adequately conduct voir dire examinations and
admonish jurors about the consequences of television coverage, and if
an effort is made to be aware of and to protect defendants and wit-
nesses from the unfavorable consequences of the presence of cameras
in the courtroom, it is likely that televised trials will be conducted with
the dignity and decorum necessary to ensure that the defendant re-
ceives a fair trial.
1553. Nixon v. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589, 610 (1977) (common law right of
access to judicial records not authority for releasing to broadcasters tapes of conversations
between defendants).
1554. Id
1555. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 392-94 (1979) (constitutional right of
press to attend criminal trials not violated by court orders excluding public and press from
pretrial suppression hearing).
1556. 449 U.S. at 577.
1557. Id at 565-66.
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b. juror misconduct
In United States v. Perez, 1558 the Ninth Circuit considered whether
dismissal of a juror during trial deprived the defendant of an impartial
jury. The Perez jury had listened to a witness whose testimony was
translated through an interpreter from Spanish into English.15 59 At the
end of the testimony, one of the jurors questioned the interpreter's
translation of one of the witness's words. 1560 When the interpreter pro-
tested that the juror should have been listening to the English rather
than to Spanish, the juror replied, "You're an idiot."' 56' The judge, not
hearing the juror's precise words, immediately requested that she raise
her question with the court, and after learning the basis of her confu-
sion, the interpretation problem was resolved by asking the witness ad-
ditional questions.
5 62
At the end of the day, the judge expressed concern to Perez and
both counsel about the form as well as the language of the juror's out-
burst. 563 He stated that he believed the juror had formed an opinion
about certain events at issue, and had developed anger for either Perez,
the prosecution, or the proceedings in genera1' 56 He then announced
his intention to dismiss the juror because he feared that her attitude
might influence the other jurors. 565 The next day, the judge inter-
viewed the juror in his chambers; although she told him that she had
actually stated "it's an idiom" rather than "you're an idiot," the judge
excused her.
566
Perez contended that the judge's cause for dismissing the juror was
insufficient, and that her dismissal inhibited the remaining jurors.
5 67
The Ninth Circuit, however, determined that regardless of the content
of the juror's statement, the judge was entitled to dismiss a juror be-
cause of his perception that she was angry and opinionated.5 68 It held,
1558. 658 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1981).
1559. Id at 662.
1560. Id
1561. Id
1562. Id at 663.
1563. Id
1564. Id
1565. Id
1566. Id
1567. Id
1568. Id (citing United States v. Berry, 627 F.2d 193, 197 (9th Cir. 1980), cerl. denied, 449
U.S. 1113 (1981); United States v. Avila-Macias, 577 F.2d 1384, 1387 (9th Cir. 1978)). In
Berry, the jury foreman informed the court that he had inadvertently read the first few lines
of a newspaper article which described the defendant as a disbarred attorney. 627 F.2d 197.
The judge questioned the foreman in his chambers, asking him whether he had continued to
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therefore, that the trial judge had not abused his discretion by dis-
missing the juror. 1
569
c. jury separation
In United States v. Diggs, 1570 the Ninth Circuit considered a ques-
tion of first impression: whether the separation of a jury during trial
constituted reversible error. 157 1 Because one of the jurors became ill,
the jury was recessed for eleven days between the close of the presenta-
tion of evidence and closing arguments.1572 Defendant Oliverez moved
for a mistrial, arguing that the separation of the jury prejudiced him in
three ways: (1) the memories of the jurors had probably become vague
during the separation; (2) some of the jurors might have commenced
deliberations among themselves during the separation; and (3) the ju-
rors might have felt pressured to return a quick verdict from concern
for the health of the recently ill juror.
1573
The Ninth Circuit, however, determined that Oliverez's alleged
prejudice was merely hypothetical. 5 74 It noted that the trial court had
taken several precautions to ensure that prejudice did not occur.
1575
Moreover, Oliverez was unable to show actual prejudice. 1576 The
read the article after realizing that it concerned the defendant (in which case he would have
learned the cause of the defendant's disbarment), and whether he had read anything that
might influence him. Id The foreman replied negatively to both questions. Id The Ninth
Circuit determined that although the information that the juror had learned about the de-
fendant may have unfavorably impressed him, the incident was not so prejudicial as to have
denied the defendant a fair trial. Id It therefore held that the trial judge had not abused his
discretion by refusing to grant the defendant a mistrial. Id
InAvila-Macias, the jury foreman sent a note to the court stating that one of the jurors
had passed by a bar in which some of the defendant's alleged drug offenses had occurred.
577 F.2d at 1387 (One of the witnesses had testified that while he was inside the bar, he had
seen the defendant, outside, transfer a packet of heroin to someone else.) Id The judge
asked both counsel whether they objected to the juror's action; both responded that it was
insignificant. Id After the jury returned its verdict, the judge asked whether the juror had
gone inside the bar, and the answer was in the negative. Id The Ninth Circuit held that
under these circumstances, the trial judge had not abused his discretion in determining the
probability of prejudice or in determining what action to take. Id
1569. 658 F.2d at 663.
1570. 649 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1981).
1571. Id at 737. The court stated that although the Ninth Circuit had decided cases in-
volving separation of the jury during deliberations, see, e.g., United States v. Eldred, 588 F.2d
746 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Menna, 451 F.2d 982 (9th Cir. 1971), it knew of no cases
involving separation of the jury during trial itself. 649 F.2d at 737.
1572. 649 F.2d at 737.
1573. Id at 737-38.
1574. Id at 738.
1575. Id
1576. Id The court observed that the circuits are virtually unanimous that to demonstrate
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Ninth Circuit held, therefore, that the trial judge had not abused his
discretion by refusing to grant Oliverez's motion for a mistrial.
1 577
The Ninth Circuit's decisions regarding juror misconduct and jury
separation reflect a policy of allowing the trial judge the discretion to
determine how such incidents affect a jury. This policy is based on the
sensible notion that the trial judge, with his or her first-hand knowledge
of both the jurors and the circumstances of the trial, is in the best posi-
tion to determine whether prejudice has actually occurred during the
trial. The judge's decision should, therefore, be reversed only for clear
abuse of discretion.
D. Prosecutorial Misconduct (During Trial)
While inequity resulting from prosecutorial misconduct in pretrial
proceedings may be rectified at the trial level, any unfairness resulting
from prosecutorial misconduct during trial can be remedied only on
appeal. The Ninth Circuit recently considered three decisions in which
a claim was raised that the prosecution had engaged in misconduct
during trial proceedings.
In United States v. Ellsworth, 1578 the prosecutor agreed to furnish
the defense with exculpatory evidence at trial, but waited until opening
statements before actually doing so. The defendant claimed that the
prosecutor's actions in delaying presentation of the evidence had
amounted to misconduct, and as such had violated his due process
rights and his right to fair trial.
1579
In rejecting the defendant's claim, the Ninth Circuit set forth the
reversible error defendants must show that they suffered actualprejudice from a jury separa-
tion. Id (citing United States v. Carter, 602 F.2d 799, 805-06 (7th Cir. 1979); United States
v. Almonte, 594 F.2d 261, 267 (Ist Cir. 1979); Blackmon v. United States, 474 F.2d 1125,
1126 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 912 (1973); United States v. Harris, 458 F.2d 670, 674-
75 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 888 (1972); United States v. Siragusa, 450 F.2d 592, 595
(2d Cir. 1971); United States v. Weiss, 431 F.2d 1402, 1407 (10th Cir. 1970); Sullivan v.
United States, 414 F.2d 714, 716 (9th Cir. 1969); Cardarella v. United States, 375 F.2d 222,
227-28 (8th Cir. 1967)).
The Diggs court emphasized that in this case the jurors had had ample opportunity to
refresh their memories by listening to tapes of testimony given during the trial and by reex-
amining exhibits. 649 F.2d at 738. The trial judge had, in addition, repeatedly admonished
the jurors not to discuss the case or to express any opinion about it until it was formally
submitted to them. Id He also ascertained that the juror who had been ill had fully recov-
ered before the beginning of deliberations to prevent any temptation to shorten the delibera-
tions out of concern over the juror's health. Id
1577. 649 F.2d at 738.
1578. 647 F.2d 957 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 2008 (1982).
1579. 1d at 959-60.
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guidelines for proper prosecutorial conduct. 1580 Based on an examina-
tion of these guidelines, the court concluded that the actions of the
prosecutor in the instant case neither denied the defendant a fair trial
nor constituted a denial of due process. 1581 According to the court, the
time for delivery of exculpatory evidence to the defense was a determi-
nation which fell within the prosecutor's discretion. 582  Finding no
abuse of discretion, the court, thus, upheld the defendant's
conviction.1
583
In United States v. Pimentel, 1584 the defendant was convicted of
illegal wiretapping. 1585 On appeal, Pimentel argued that the prosecutor
prejudiced the case by making improper statements during closing ar-
guments and by changing the order of the trials on separate counts of
the eight count indictment.
158 6
1580. 647 F.2d at 961.
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as com-
pelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he
is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of
which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with
earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard
blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from
improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every
legitimate means to bring about a just one.
Id (citing Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).
1581. 647 F.2d at 961. The Ellsworth court stated:
The evidence was not suppressed by the prosecutor here; it was tardily produced,
but it was produced before opening statements. No request was made for a recess,
continuance, postponement or mistrial. Only after defendant had taken his chance
with the jury was the issue raised. We find no error in such proceedings.
Id (emphasis in original). The court also relied on United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97,
107-10 (1976) and United States v. Baxter, 492 F.2d 150 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 801 (1974), for its holding that the defendant was not denied due process: "To establish
a violation of due process, the defendant must show (1) a request by the defendant for
favorable evidence possessed by the prosecutor, (2) suppression of evidence by the prosecu-
tor, (3) that the evidence suppressed is favorable to the defendant, and (4) that the evidence
is material." 647 F.2d at 691 n.8 (quoting United States v. Baxter, 492 F.2d at 173-74). See
also United States v. Smith, 609 F.2d 1294, 1303 (9th Cir. 1979) (no prejudice when infor-
mation received after testimony had begun); United States v. Ramirez, 608 F.2d 1261, 1264
(9th Cir. 1979) (no prejudice when defendant received information the morning of trial and
did not move for continuance); United States v. Burke, 506 F.2d 1165, 1168 (9th Cir. 1974)
(failure of defense counsel to read statement produced at close of Government's case not
prosecutorial error), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 915 (1975).
1582. 647 F.2d at 961.
1583. Id The court, nonetheless, did not condone the actions of the prosecutor because
they gave the appearance of unfairness. Id
1584. 654 F.2d 538 (9th Cir. 1981).
1585. Id at 539.
1586. Id at 542.
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Specifically, Pimentel asserted that in addressing the jury, the
prosecutor had made statements concerning Pimentel's failure to testify
on his own behalf which implied that Pimentel had the burden of pro-
ducing evidence. 1587 The Ninth Circuit, relyiig only upon the "cold
print of the record,"' 15 s8 accorded great deference to the trial judge's
conclusion that the prosecutor's statement, in context, "would not lend
itself to a clear invitation to a jury to hold the defense responsible for
not producing evidence."'5 8 9
As to Pimentel's claim that he was prejudiced by the prosecutor's
rearrangement of the trials, the court held that no proof of
prosecutorial misconduct existed. 5 90 Although the court recognized
that the change in trial order placed Pimentel in a strategically unfortu-
nate position, it accepted the prosecutor's stated concern for judicial
economy and found no proof of intent to prejudice Pimentel.'
591
In United States v. Dufur, 5 92 the defendant was convicted of the
first degree murder of a customs officer. 593 On appeal, Dufur con-
tended that the district court had committed reversible error by, inter
alia, denying his motion for a mistrial based on the prosecutor's com-
ments during closing arguments.
15 94
Here, as in Pimentel, the defendant contended that the prosecutor
had prejudiced his case by commenting indirectly on his failure to tes-
tify on his own behalf. 595 The court agreed that the prosecutor's state-
ments could reasonably be interpreted as an indirect reference to
Dufur's failure to testify, but determined that, taken as a whole, the
statements were not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a mistrial.'
5 96
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction.
597
1587. Id
1588. Id at 543.
1589. Id See United States v. Comfeld, 563 F.2d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 1977) (prosecutor's
comments must be such "that .the jury would naturally and necessarily take them to be
comments on the failure of the accused to testify."), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 922 (1978).
1590. 654 F.2d at 544-45.
1591. Id at 545.
1592. 648 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 925 (1981).
1593. Id at 513.
1594. Id
1595. Id at 515.
1596. Id The Dufur court, like the Pimental court, used the test enunciated in United
States v. Cornfeld, 563 F.2d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 1977). See supra note 1589 and accompany-
ing text.
1597. 648 F.2d at 515.
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E. Continuance
The grant or denial of a continuance lies within the trial court's
discretion and is rarely overturned on appeal. 5 98 A reviewing court,
however, may reverse the denial of a request for continuance upon a
showing of clear abuse of discretion by the trial judge5 99 and actual
prejudice to the defendant.1
600
The Ninth Circuit recently considered the denial of a continuance
in United States v. Veatch. 1601 In Veatch, the defendant was convicted
of transporting fraudulently obtained property in interstate com-
merce. 60 2 Near the end of the trial, one of the three defense attorneys
received word that his father had died. 60 1 Veatch moved for a contin-
uance so that the attorney could return home and make the necessary
funeral arrangements. 6 4 The district court denied the motion because
the case was not complex and there were "two competent counsel re-
maining" to defend Veatch.1605 The bereaved attorney ultimately de-
cided to remain in the trial and participate in closing arguments.
1 60 6
On appeal, Veatch asserted that the emotional strain on the attor-
ney caused by the death of his father had resulted in ineffective repre-
sentation during trial.16 7 The Ninth Circuit, however, determined that
1598. Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940). The Avery Court stated:
[Miany procedural questions necessarily arise which must be decided by the trial
judge in the light of facts then presented and conditions then existing. Disposition
of a request for continuance is of this nature and is made in the discretion of the
trial judge, the exercise of which will ordinarily not be reviewed.
Id at 446 (footnote omitted).
1599. United States v. Ortiz, 603 F.2d 76, 78 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1020
(1980); United States v. Mills, 597 F.2d 693, 698-99 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Rinn,
586 F.2d 113, 118 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 931 (1979); United States v. Michel-
son, 559 F.2d 567, 572 (9th Cir. 1977).
1600. United States v. Hernandez, 608 F.2d 741, 746 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Pet-
sas, 592 F.2d 525, 527 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 910 (1979).
1601. 647 F.2d 995 (9th Cir. 1981).
1602. Id at 996.
1603. Id at 1004.
1604. Id
1605. Id See United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 744 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1045 (1978); United States v. Mardian, 546 F.2d 973, 979 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("[A]
defendant's right to an attorney of his choice is 'not so absolute as to permit disruption of the
fair and orderly administration of justice when another competent attorney is available to
continue the defense.' ") (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 389 F. Supp. 917, 921 (D.D.C.
1975).
1606. 647 F.2d at 1004.
1607. Id at 1005. Veatch claimed that the ineffectiveness of counsel was a result of the
"severe emotional consequences of the death of an immediate family member." Id He
pointed to the brevity of the bereaved attorney's closing arguments as evidence of prejudice
resulting from the court's denial of his motion. Id
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Veatch had suffered no specific prejudice and that he had been ade-
quately represented by defense counsel.1 608 The court held, therefore,
that the trial judge's refusal to grant a continuance was not an abuse of
discretion. 1609
F Admission of Evidence
1. Competency to stand trial
Defendants who lack the capacity to understand the nature and
object of proceedings against them, to consult with counsel, or to assist
in preparing their defense, are considered mentally incompetent and
may not be subjected to trial. 6 10 Under 18 U.S.C. section 4244 the
accused, the prosecution, or the court may move for a judicial determi-
nation of competency.' 611 The defendant's first motion under section
4244 may not be denied unless the court "correctly determines that the
motion is frivolous or not made in good faith."'
1612
When a section 4244 motion is granted, the court must order a
psychiatric examination of the defendant.161 3 If the examination indi-
cates the defendant is incompetent, the court must hold a competency
hearing, at which evidence of the defendant's mental condition, includ-
ing the psychiatric report, may be introduced. 16 14 Conversely, if the
examination indicates the defendant is competent, the court need hold
1608. Id Veatch was unable to point to any specific prejudice other than the brevity of the
bereaved attorney's final summation. The Ninth Circuit noted that Veatch's other two attor-
neys also gave closing arguments and that there was no reason to believe "that all three
arguments [had] failed to fully explore all facts and issues related to the case." Id
1609. Id
1610. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975).
1611. 18 U.S.C. §4244 (1976) provides:
Whenever after arrest and prior to the imposition of sentence or prior to the expira-
tion of any period of probation the United States Attorney has reasonable cause to
believe that a person charged with an offense against the United States may be
presently insane or otherwise so mentally incompetent as to be unable to under-
stand the proceedings against him or properly to assist in his own defense, he shall
file a motion for a judicial determination of such mental competency of the ac-
cused. . . .Upon such a motion or upon similar motion in behalf of the accused,
or upon its own motion, the court shall cause the accused. . . to be examined as to
his mental condition by at least one qualified psychiatrist, who shall report to the
court. . . . If the report of the psychiatrist indicates a state of present insanity or
such mental incompetency in the accused, the court shall hold a hearing, upon due
notice, at which evidence as to the mental condition of the accused may be submit-
ted, including that of the reporting psychiatrist, and make a finding with respect
thereto.
1612. Chavez v. United States, 641 F.2d 1253, 1256 (9th Cir. 1981) (citations omitted).
1613. 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1976).
1614. Ad
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a competency hearing only if there is "substantial evidence""61 of the
defendant's incompetence, i.e., evidence which raises a reasonable
doubt about the defendant's competency. 61 6  Regardless of the
psychiatric findings, the court must make a final determination of the
defendant's fitness to stand trial. The court has discretion to grant or
deny any subsequent section 4244 motions.
1617
In United States v. Veatch, 1618 the first psychiatric examination
found the defendant competent to stand trial, and a hearing was not
ordered.1 619 Because eleven months elapsed between his first section
4244 motion and his first trial, Veatch again moved for a competency
hearing.1 620 The district court denied the motion, and Veatch appealed,
arguing that the district court, while not required to hold a competency
hearing, had erred in this case.
62 1
The Ninth Circuit, recognizing that the probative value of a prior
psychiatric report might diminish over time,162 2 ruled that the quality
of the evidence contained in a prior competency report must be reas-
sessed. 1623 The court reviewed the facts which had been before the dis-
trict court16 2 4 and those submitted by Veatch in an offer of proof. 62 5 It
1615. See Moore v. United States, 464 F.2d 663, 666 (9th Cir. 1972). "'Substantial evi-
dence' is a term of art. . . . Evidence is 'substantial' if it raises a reasonable doubt about the
defendant's competency to stand trial." Id
1616. Chavez v. United States, 641 F.2d at 1257. "This is true even if the psychiatrist's
report 'indicates' sanity or competence and thus would not require a hearing under
[§ 4244]." Id Moreover, "[t]he trial court must accept as true all evidence of possible in-
competence in deciding whether the evidence is substantial. It may find such evidence not
credible only after the actual, adversary competency hearing." 1d at 1258.
1617. United States v. Clark, 617 F.2d 180, 185 (9th Cir. 1980).
1618. 647 F.2d 995 (9th Cir.), mod#Fed, 674 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, - U.S.
-, 102 S. Ct. 2013 (1982).
1619. Id at 1000.
1620. Id
1621. Id at 1001.
1622. See United States v. Caplan, 633 F.2d 534, 539-40 (9th Cir. 1980).
1623. 647 F.2d at 1001 (citing United States v. Caplan, 633 F.2d 534, 539-40 (9th Cir.
1980)). The Caplan court stated:
[The court] should consider, inter alia, the detail and thoroughness of the prior
reports, the seriousness of illness reported, and the prognosis, if any, for future
recovery. . . . Besides past reports, other factors for consideration could include
the time elapsed for treatment, the opportunity to study the defendant during the
time of treatment or commitment, and the court's own observation of the defend-
ant ....
633 F.2d at 539-40.
1624. Facts which had been before the district court necessarily included the judge's per-
sonal observation of the defendant. The judge's study of the defendant during a case is very
important because "unusual behavior on the part of the defendant before and during his
trial may also reflect on his current mental competency." United States v. Clark, 617 F.2d
180, 186 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180 (1975)). Because the
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concluded that none of the new facts differed substantially from those
which had been before the psychiatric staff when it first declared
Veatch competent. 1626 The Ninth Circuit held, therefore, that because
Veatch's offer of proof failed to raise any reasonable doubt concerning
the continuing validity of the examining psychiatrists' report, the dis-
trict court did not abuse its discretion in denying Veatch's motion for a
second competency hearing.
1627
The Veatch court may have overlooked the standard for evaluat-
ing evidence of incompetency set foth.in Chavez v. United States. 1628
Considering the information contained in the psychiatric report sub-
mitted in Veatch's offer of proof, it is arguable that a reasonable doubt
about Veatch's competency was raised and a hearing was required.
2. Relevancy
The federal rules define relevancy in terms of the evidence's im-
pact on the probable truth of a consequential fact.1629 Determinations
of relevancy are entrusted to the broad discretion of the trial court.163
The degree to which the Ninth Circuit will scrutinize the trial court's
decision, however, is not always the same. This was demonstrated dur-
ing the survey period by two cases which used different standards to
evaluate the relevancy of expert testimony. In United States v. Bur-
reson, 1631 the Ninth Circuit indicated that in the absence of abuse it
court of appeals made no mention of any such behavior on Veatch's part, it can be surmised
that the district court judge did not observe any unusual behavior, and that this was ger-
mane to the district judge's conclusion that the July 1979 psychiatric report was still valid.
Cf. Chavez v. United States, 641 F.2d 1253, 1260 (9th Cir. 1981) (defendant's emotional
outbursts during trial one ground for court's decision that reasonable doubt about defend-
ant's competency had been raised).
1625. 647 F.2d at 1001. The offer was submitted on the invitation of the court of appeals,
and contained the defendant's long history of emotional and mental problems, the fact of his
incompetence to stand trial on at least one previous occasion, and a psychiatric report, based
on an examination conducted the day before trial began, that Veatch was incompetent to
stand trial. Id
1626. Id at 1002. The court noted that (1) Veatch's medical history was known to the
district court and to the examining psychiatrists who had submitted the first report; and (2)
the psychiatric report submitted by Veatch in his offer of proof was substantially similar to
previous reports which the examining psychiatrists and the trial judge had studied. Id
1627. Id
1628. 641 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1981). See supra notes 1615-16 and accompanying text.
1629. FED. R. EVID. 401 states: "'Relevant evidence' means any evidence having any ten-
dency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."
1630. United States v. Salazar-Gaeta, 447 F.2d 468, 469 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (up-
holding introduction of evidence of "rather tenuous" relevancy as being within wide discre-
tion of trial judge).
1631. 643 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 847 (1981).
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was within the trial court's discretion to permit expert testimony.1632 In
United States v. Smith, 1633 the Ninth Circuit held that it was error for
the judge to exclude "certainly relevant" expert evidence.
634
In Burreson, the Ninth Circuit held that testimony on the general
nature of mutual funds, restricted security investments for mutual
funds, and the fiduciary duties of fund management was relevant 1635 to
a case involving conspiracy to convert, manipulate, and engage in self-
dealing in mutual funds. 1636 The defendants, chairpersons of three mu-
tual funds, sought financing for their own corporations and investment
firms. 637 The Ninth Circuit relied on Hamling v. United States, 1638 for
the rule that abuse of discretion is the standard for the admissibility of
expert testimony and held that there was no abuse in admitting the
expert's testimony.
639
In United States v. Smith, 160 the Ninth Circuit reversed a trial
judge's determination that psychiatric testimony was not relevant to the
involuntariness of a bank robber's confession. "I The trial judge had
excluded the psychiatric testimony as being irrelevant on the basis that
it did not relate'to the "conditions under which the confession was
given, whether the defendant was mistreated, whether he was advised
of his rights, [and] whether he was given improper offers of re-
1632. Id. at 1349.
1633. 638 F.2d 131 (9th Cir. 1981).
1634. Id. at 134.
1635. The court considered the challenge to the evidence in terms of its being both irrele-
vant and prejudicial. 643 F.2d at 1349. The Ninth Circuit ruled on both in the same state-
ment: "We have examined the testimony and in our opinion permitting [the expert's]
testimony was within the court's discretion. There was no abuse here." Id at 1349 (citing
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974)). An offer of proof was required by the trial
judge as to the extent of the expert's anticipated testimony, and the judge cautioned the jury
on the proper use of that testimony. Id Such precautions no doubt buttressed the willing-
ness of the court to find no abuse.
1636. Id at 1346. The defendants were prosecuted for violations of the Investment Com-
pany and Investment Advisers Acts of 1940, securities fraud, mail fraud, under 15 U.S.C.
§§ 80a-l to 80a-52 and 80b-l to 80b-21, 77q, 1341 and for conspiracy, under 18 U.S.C.
§ 371.
1637. In the first of three fraudulent transactions, the president arranged for the chairper-
son's mutual funds.to loan money to one of the owner's companies. The owner used part of
the loan to buy a certificate of deposit. The certificate then became security for a bank loan
to one of the chairperson's investment adviser firms. In the second transaction, one of the
chairpersons invested in an outside company which loaned part of that money to the
chairperson. In the third, another chairperson's funds were invested in the owner's other
company, and the owner lent some of that money back to the chairperson.
1638. 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
1639. 643 F.2d at 124-27.
1640. 638 F.2d 131 (9th Cir. 1981).
1641. Id. at 134.
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ward. ' 1642 The Ninth Circuit however, characterized the testimony as
"certainly" relevant to the defendant's "mental condition," such as, the
absence or presence of free will, mental illness, or intoxication, and
ruled that it should have been admitted.' 3 The Smith court made no
mention of the Hamling rule that abuse of discretion is the standard for
the admissibility of expert testimony. 6" However, because the testi-
mony would have gone to the weight of the confession rather than its
admissibility, and because the evidence of guilt was overwhelming
without the confession, the conviction was upheld. 645 Although the
Burreson and Smith decisions appear to conflict, they can be reconciled
on the theory that trial judges have broader discretion to admit than to
exclude evidence of questionable relevancy.
3. Prejudice
a. jail cell informant context
In 1980 the Supreme Court ruled that the use of a jail cell inform-
ant may violate a suspect's sixth amendment right to counsel, even
when the informant is not instructed to elicit incriminating statements,
but merely to be "alert" to them.1 4 6 The Ninth Circuit, however, has
placed an important limitation on this rule. In Bagley v. United
States, 1647 the court held that a showing of prejudice at trial is neces-
sary to establish a violation of sixth amendment rights in the jail cell
informant context. 4" 8 Furthermore, the court ruled that no prejudice
arises when an informant merely relates to federal agents a suspect's
version of the charges against him or her. 649
1642. Id at 133.
1643. Id at 134.
1644. See 418 U.S. at 124-27.
1645. The Smith court found that the error regarding the exclusion was not "of a constitu-
tional" dimension. 638 F.2d at 133.
1646. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980). In Henry, an FBI informant who
shared the defendant's cell was told to "be alert" to possible incriminating statements, but
not to "initiate questioning" or conversation. Id at 266. At Henry's trial, the informant
testified to several incriminating statements. Id at 267. The Court held that the informa-
tion was "deliberately elicited" and was thus in violation of Massiah v. United States. Id at
271 (citing 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (indicted defendant's right to counsel violated where incrimi-
nating statements, deliberately elicited by co-defendant/police informant, used against
defendent at trial)).
1647. 641 F.2d 1235 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 942 (1981).
1648. Id at 1239. Although the Supreme Court had not ruled on this issue at the time of
the Bagley decision, the Bagley court determined that Henry did not affect the rule estab-
lished by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Glover, 596 F.2d 857, 862-64 (9th Cir.)
(prejudice essential to establish a Massiah violation), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 860 (1979).
1649. 641 F.2d at 1239. Moreover, the court determined that the debriefing of the inform-
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Appellant Bagley, a probationer, was charged with several counts
of illegal receipt, possession, and sale of firearms, and one count of
obstruction of justice. 650 His cellmate, McKenzie, an informant, con-
tacted the U.S. Attorney's Office and offered to provide state authorities
with information regarding Bagley's involvement in two unsolved
homicides in exchange for dismissal of federal probation revocation
proceedings.' 65 ' McKenzie did not provide the Government with any
new information about the firearms violations, and he did not testify at
Bagley's trial.1 612  Moreover, the Government had specifically in-
structed McKenzie not to attempt to elicit any information from Bagley
concerning the federal charges.
1653
b. extrajudicial information
In Bagley the appellant demanded a new trial because a note sent
to the jury in response to its question concerning the immunity of a
Government witness contained extrajudicial information.1654 He ar-
gued that the question indicated that some jurors doubted the credibil-
ity of the witness, and the answer may have assuaged those doubts.
655
The Ninth Circuit ruled that Bagley suffered no prejudice as a result of
the note because the testimony of the witness was "merely cumulative
to that of his business partner," with whom the witness had purchased
ant by federal agents did not prejudice Bagley at trial because none of the information was
given to the prosecution. Id
1650. Id. at 1237. Defendants were indicted for violations of 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202(a)
(1976), 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1) (1976), 18 U.S.C. § 922(h) (1976), and 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1976).
1651. Id at 1237-39.
1652. Id at 1239. Neither the transcript of the probation revocation hearing against Bag-
ley, held before McKenzie contacted the Government, nor the trial transcript revealed any
apparent changes in the Government's use of the evidence. Id
1653. Id at 1238-39. Cf. Henry, 447 U.S. at 226 (instruction to "be alert" created situation
conducive to incrimination in absence of counsel).
1654. 641 F.2d at 1240-41. When counsel for both sides agreed that the witness had not
been granted immunity, that information was given to the jury. Id at 1241. Subsequently
realizing that this answer gave the jury information not introduced as evidence during trial,
counsel contacted the judge, who instructed the jury to disregard the answer. Id See
United States v. Vasquez, 597 F.2d 192, 193 (9th Cir. 1979) (new trial granted because jury
had access to official court fle which contained suppressed evidence): "[W]e hold that the
appellant is entitled to a new trial if there existed a reasonable possibility that [the extrajudi-
cial] . . . material could have affected the verdict." Id at 193. The Second, Tenth, and
District of Columbia Circuits adhere to the view that reversal is required if there is the
"slightest possibility" that harm to the defendant could result from the conveyance of extra-
judicial information to the jury. See, e.g., United States v. Marx, 485 F.2d 1179, 1184 (10th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 986 (1974); Dallago v. United States, 427 F.2d 546, 560
(D.C. Cir. 1969); United States v. Adams, 385 F.2d 548, 550-55 (2d Cir. 1967).
1655. 641 F.2d at 1241.
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guns from Bagley.1656 In so holding, the court stated that it was adher-
ing to the rule that extrajudicial information prejudices a defendant
only when there is a "reasonable possibility" that the information af-
fected the verdict.
657
The dissent agreed with the reasonable possibility standard an-
nounced by the majority but argued that the note to the jury did affect
the verdict. 658 The dissent reasoned that although the court had cau-
tioned the jury not to consider the answer to the question, "the jury
deliberated for only two more minutes before returning a guilty ver-
dict."1659 The dissent concluded that "[w]here the jury's uncertainty
centered around the credibility of a key witness, the resolution of that
uncertainty could unquestionably have affected the verdict."'1
660
c. evidence later held to be inadmissible
In both Bagley and United States v. Escalante, 166 the Ninth Cir-
cuit reaffirmed the rule that any prejudice to a defendant resulting from
evidence subsequently found to be inadmissible may be cured by a cau-
tionary instruction to the jury. 6 62 In Bagley, the Ninth Circuit held
that reversible error did not result from the admission of prejudicial
testimony that defendant had killed his ex-girlfriend's cat because she
had talked to his probation officer. 663 The obstruction of justice count
had been dismissed when the court learned that the cat had been killed
prior to the girlfriend's conversation with the officer.' 6 4 The court thus
reasoned that any prejudice was cured by the trial court's instruction to
the jury to ignore all evidence supporting the obstruction of justice
count. 665 Moreover, the court found that any collateral prejudice on
the firearms counts that defendant suffered from the testimony was ne-
gated by other evidence which was more than sufficient to support a
1656. Id
1657. Id at 1240-41 (citing United States v. Vasquez, 597 F.2d 192, 193 (9th Cir. 1979)).
1658. 641 F.2d at 1242 (Fletcher, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
1659. Id The opinion does not state how long a period elapsed from the time the jury
received the answer to the time the curative instruction was given. Id at 1237.
1660. Id at 1242. Judge Fletcher felt that the majority had employed the corrrect stan-
dard, but had reached the wrong conclusion. Id
1661. 637 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 856 (1980).
1662. 641 F.2d at 1240; 637 F.2d at 1202-03 (citing United States v. McDonald, 576 F.2d
1350, 1356 n.8 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830 (1978)). See also United States v. Ken-
nedy, 564 F.2d 1329, 1334 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 944 (1978).
1663. 641 F.2d at 1240.
1664. Id
1665. Id The Ninth Circuit admitted that the story did not place the defendant in a "sym-
pathetic light." Id
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conviction. 166
Conversely, the Escalante court did not rely on curative jury in-
structions to negate the prejudice from testimony later held to be inad-
missible. The testimony, which concerned a prior heroin smuggling
venture, had been allowed on the condition that the prosecutor could
connect it to the conspiracy at issue by showing that the heroin smug-
gled had been used in the conspiracy. 6 67 When it became apparent
that none of the smuggled heroin was used in the conspiracy, defense
counsel moved for a mistrial. 1668 The district court denied the motion,
but struck the testimony and ordered the jury to disregard it.
1669
The Ninth Circuit noted that the prosecutor's lack of preparation
was "unfortunate,"' 167° and that the Government may have wished to
associate the defendant "with the aura of . . criminal activity."'1
67 1
Nevertheless, the court held that the testimony did bear on defendant's
intent to join the conspiracy.1672 The court reasoned that the district
court had struck the testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 1673
because its probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
16 7 4
The Ninth Circuit suggested, however, that had the district court ad-
mitted the evidence with proper instructions, the Ninth Circuit would
have sustained the admission6 7  under Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b) 67 6 as proof of a prior similar act. 1677 Thus, rather than weigh
probative value against prejudicial effect, the Ninth Circuit ruled that
1666. Id
1667. 637 F.2d at 1202.
1668. Id Prior to the inception of the conspiracy, an associate had sent to San Francisco
all the heroin that Escalante had smuggled. Id
1669. Id
1670. Id at 1204.
1671. Id at 1203.
1672. Id at 1203-04.
1673. FED. R. EvID. 403 states:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
out-weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or mislead-
ing the jury, or by consideration of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presen-
tation of cumulative evidence.
1674. 637 F.2d at 1204.
1675. Id
1676. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) provides in pertinent part that "[e]vidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts.. . may. . . be admissible. . . as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident."
1677. 637 F.2d at 1204. The court attempted to excuse the prosecution's failure properly to
present the evidence as proof of a prior similar act on the rationale that "the district judge
was not inclined to admit accounts of similar acts that did not tie directly to the conspiracy."
Id The Ninth Circuit thus stated that the trial judge may have been reluctant to admit the
evidence on the alternate theory of a prior similar act. Id
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the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial. 67" The
question raised by the Escalante decision is whether evidence which
fails to be sufficiently probative under Rule 403 may be rehabilitated
under some other rule. Until Escalante, Rule 403 operated as a check
on all evidence, including evidence admissible under Rule 404(b). 1679
d Rule 403
i. probative value versus prejudicial effect
While Escalante touched only tangentially on Rule 403's probative
value versus prejudicial effect standard, People v. Dela Rosa 6 8 0 and
United States v. Diggs'168 addressed the issue directly.
The Dela Rosa court held that photographs of bloody murder vic-
tims were not so prejudicial as to outweigh their probative value in
defendant's murder trial. 682 It also held that testimony regarding a
previous murder spree and the theft of a gun belonging to the victims'
relative was properly admitted because it tended to link the defendant
to a gun similar to the murder weapon. 683 Further, because the dis-
puted testimony did not specifically mention the previous murders
other than to corroborate testimony about the date on which the de-
fendant had come into possession of the gun, any prejudice from the
intimation of other crimes was deemed "speculative."'
1684
In Diggs, the defendant claimed that he was prejudiced by the ad-
1678. Id
1679. See United States v. Herrell, 588 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 964
(1979), where the Ninth Circuit stated:
In interpreting Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), this court has held:
Evidence of prior acts is admissible to demonstrate a defendant's criminal intent if
(1) the prior act is similar and close enough in time to be relevant, (2) the evidence
of the prior act is clear and convincing and (3) the trial court determines that the
probative value of the evidence outweighs any potential prejudice.
d at 714 (citing United States v. Brashier, 548 F.2d 1315, 1325 (9th Cir. 1976), cerl. denied,
429 U.S. 1111 (1977)).
1680. 644 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
1681. 649 F.2d 731 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 454 U.S. 970, (1981).
1682. 644 F.2d at 1261. "The bodies were not mutilated and did not appear to be sexually
abused; the only 'gruesome' feature was that the bodies were bloodied." Id
1683. Id at 1261-62.
1684. Id The Dela Rosa court, however, reversed the defendant's conviction because the
trial court failed to give a cautionary instruction about the credibility of a Government
witness who had been promised "unofficial" immunity. Id at 1259-60. The court reasoned
that because the witness' testimony was secured by a promise of immunity from a police
lieutenant, the witness might have been motivated to testify for personal gain. 1d At the
very least, the court concluded, the jury should have been cautioned about such a suspect
motivation so as to minimize "any unfairness" to the defendant. Id at 1260.
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mission of testimony concerning fictitious banking transactions.1 6 5
The Ninth Circuit held, however, that any resulting prejudice was out-
weighed by the testimony's probative value because the testimony
served to rebut the defendant's claim of entrapment by demonstrating
his predisposition to commit the crimes charged.1686 The testimony was
also probative both of the defendant's specific intent to defraud and his
knowledge and opportunity to do so because it showed that the ficti-
tious bank never had assets.
168
I. confusion
Under Rule 403, the district court has the discretion to exclude
relevant evidence if it is potentially confusing to the jury or cumulative
to facts already in evidence. 168 In United States v. Ness, 16 89 the Ninth
Circuit upheld the exclusion of a slide show that defendant wanted to
introduce. 1690 The defendant claimed that the show led him to believe
that he had no tax liability. 169' The court stated that the testimony of
the defendant and the show's lecturer was adequate to establish the
content of the show, and that further evidence was cumulative and po-
tentially confusing to the jury.
1692
4. Previous convictions
Evidence pertaining to a defendant's prior criminal activity is gen-
erally inadmissible because the jury may infer that the defendant pos-
sesses a character trait consistent with that activity. 1693 Evidence of
1685. 649 F.2d at 737. A witness testified that he never recovered several deposits made in
Diggs' fictitious bank. Id
1686. Id.
1687. Id
1688. See supra note 1673.
1689. 652 F.2d 890 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1126 (1981).
1690. Id at 893.
1691. Id
1692. Id See Cooley v. United States, 501 F.2d 1249, 1253-54 (9th Cir. 1974) (no abuse of
discretion in excluding letter appearing in Congressional Record, Internal Revenue Service
Training Manual, and Supreme Court opinions, despite defendant's claim that it did not
tend to prove a willful act in failing to file tax return), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1123 (1975).
1693. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) provides in pertinent part: "Evidence of other crimes, wrongs,
or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith."
The admission of evidence of other crimes can be highly prejudicial. When such evi-
dence lacks significant probative value, it is excludable under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.
FED. R. EvID. 609(a) also provides that in certain cases the court must specifically weigh the
probative value of the evidence of a witness' prior crimes against the prejudice to the de-
fendant when such evidence is admitted to impeach the witness. A claim that evidence of
past crimes is more prejudicial than probative cannot be raised for the first time on appeal
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predisposition is admissible, however, to rebut a defense of entrap-
ment, 1694 and prior criminal activity is relevant to predisposition when
such activity is similar to the offense charged.
1695
In United States v. Bramble, 1696 the Ninth Circuit held that a pre-
disposition to sell cocaine could not be inferred from an earlier convic-
tion for possession of marijuana, 1697 absent evidence that the marijuana
previously possessed was of a "commercial quantity."' 1698 Because evi-
dence of a commercial quantity had not been introduced, the Bramble
court held that admitting evidence of the marijuana conviction was re-
versible error per se.1699 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit instructed the
judge on retrial to weigh the probative value of the previous conviction
against its prejudicial impact if the amount of marijuana was found to
be of commercial quantity. 
17
1
Another exception to the general rule prohibiting the admission of
evidence pertaining to prior convictions is the admission of such evi-
dence to show identity or common plan. 170 1 Such evidence is admissi-
ble, however, only if it is "'so unusual and distinctive as to be like a
signature,' "1702 and a similar crime may not meet the requisite particu-
larity or identifying test contemplated by the identity or common plan
and an objection must be preserved for appeal. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 653 F.2d
384, 390 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1102 (1981) (pattern of conduct by defendant indi-
cating waiver of objection to prior conviction resulted in failure to preserve objection for
appeal).
1694. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932) (predisposition and criminal
design relevant to entrapment defense).
1695. See United States v. Segovia, 576 F.2d 251, 252-53 (9th Cir. 1978) (prior conviction
for selling marijuana admissible against entrapment defense to charge of selling cocaine);
De Jong v. United States, 381 F.2d 725, 726 (9th Cir. 1967) (evidence of prior crimes rele-
vant where defendant engaged in illegal operations similar to those charged).
1696. 641 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1981).
1697. Id at 682-83 (citing Enriquez v. United States, 314 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1963) (prior
conviction for possession of marijuana not admissible to establish intent to sell heroin)).
The court rejected any distinction between intent to sell and predisposition to sell. 641 F.2d
at 683 n.2.
1698. 641 F.2d at 683. The defendant's previous conviction involved the cultivation of 21
marijuana plants. Id The Bramble court explained that because it did not know if such an
amount was indicative of mere personal use or a full-scale commercial operation, it could
not take judicial notice of whether the prior conviction involved a commercial quantity. Id
1699. Id
1700. Id
1701. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) provides in pertinent part: "[Elvidence of other crimes...
may, however, be admissible ... as proof of.. .plan ... [or] identity ...." For author-
ities discussing the common law admissibility of evidence of other crimes, see United States
v. Phillips, 599 F.2d 134, 136 n.2 (6th Cir. 1979).
1702. United States v. Phillips, 599 F.2d 134, 136 (6th Cir. 1979) (quoting McCoRMICK,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 157 at 328 (1954)).
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exception.170 3 In United States v. Ezell, 1704 the Ninth Circuit held that
a description of how a bank robber performed an earlier bank robbery
was not admissible to show identity or common plan because the points
of similarity between the two robberies were "so common to most bank
robberies as to be entirely unhelpful."' 170 5  The error, however, was
harmless because other evidence overwhelmingly supported the de-
fendant's guilt.
170 6
Evidence of prior convictions is also admissible to show motive,
state of mind, or intent. 77 Such evidence, however, cannot be used to
prove the defendant's guilt or as evidence of his criminal character.
Consequently, as the Ninth Circuit acknowledged in United States v.
Mayo, 1708 statements about defendant's prior criminal record, which
may have been admissible against a co-defendant, could not be used
against the defendant. 7 0 9 A "strong case" against the defendant, how-
ever, coupled with limiting instructions, rendered the error
harmless. 
71 0
1703. Compare United States v. Phillips, 599 F.2d at 136-37 (general testimony that de-
fendant had committed other bank robberies not within intent and plan exception) with
Parker v. United States, 400 F.2d 248, 252 (9th Cir. 1968) (defendants' actions in previous
crime "identical" to those alleged in the indictment). The Phillps court stated: "Something
more than repeated performance of the same class of crimes is required. ... 599 F.2d at
136.
1704. 644 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1981).
1705. Id at 1306. The Ninth Circuit did not elaborate on the description of the earlier
robbery or its similarity to the robbery before the court. Id The court also declined to rule
on whether a passing reference by a hospital guard to the effect that he had been assigned to
guard appellant at the hospital four days before the robbery, violated the prohibition against
evidence of prior convictions. Id The court reasoned that "even if' the admission of the
testimony were error, it was harmless because it was improbable that the error materially
affected the jury's decision. Id at 1304-05 (citing United States v. Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d
911, 915-17 (9th Cir. 1977) (non-constitutional error resulted in reversal because it was
"more probable than not" that it materially affected the verdict; more stringent "reasonable
possibility" test reserved for constitutional error)).
1706. 644 F.2d at 1306. The defendant was positively identified by three eyewitnesses and
was photographed by a camera activated during the robbery. Id; see United States v. Mar-
ques, 600 F.2d 742, 750-51 (9th Cir.) (note found during co-defendant's arrest, defendant's
drug sale to DEA agents, and defendant's rental of truck in which large amounts of drugs
found, all "overwhelmed" wrongful admission of evidence that defendant had previously
bought drugs for personal use), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1019 (1979).
1707. FED. R. EviD. 404(b).
1708. 646 F.2d 369 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1127 (1981).
1709. Id at 372.
1710. Id Defendant had been convicted of mail and securities fraud related to a scheme
to market worthless debt securities of the Quimby Island Reclamation District No. 2090. Id
"The record contains substantial evidence that [he] made knowing and material misrepre-
sentations. . . [and] knowingly and deceitfully caused the District to transfer assets without
adequate consideration." Id
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5. Identifications
In 1969, the Ninth Circuit noted that hearings on "tainted" identi-
fication testimony must be held outside the jury's presence.'17 1  In con-
trast, the Supreme Court recently held, in Watkins v. Sowders, 1712 that
due process does not require that the admissibility of eyewitness identi-
fication testimony be determined in the jury's absence. 7 1 3 The Wat-
kins Court noted that federal courts, including the Ninth Circuit, have
"admonished" lower courts to hold hearings outside the jury's pres-
ence;17 14 consequently, the impact of Watkins will most likely be con-
1711. See United States v. Allison, 414 F.2d 407, 410 (9th Cir. 1969). In Allison, an alleged
bank robber moved to suppress the identification testimony of bank employees on the theory
that a photographic display before the employees constituted a line-up in the absence of
defense counsel. Id at 409. The Ninth Circuit upheld the trial judge's denial of the motion,
noting:
We agree that where a timely and sufficient motion is made to suppress identi-
fication testimony on the ground that it has been tainted by pretrial photographic
identification procedures, it must be heard and determined by the court outside the
jury's presence in the same manner as any other motion to suppress evidence al-
leged to be inadmissible because unlawfully obtained.
Id at 410. As of the end of the survey period, no Ninth Circuit case has citedAlison for this
proposition.
1712. 449 U.S. 341 (1981). For a discussion of Watkins, see 67 A.B.A.J. 341 (1981); Note,
Fourteenth Amendment-The Last Gasp of Due Process Requirements on Eyewitness Identjm-
cations: 2he Admissibility of Identifcation Evidence May Be Determined in the Jury's Pres-
ence, 72 J. CiAm. L. 1410 (1981) (noting with approval the dissent's position on the
unreliability of eyewitness identifications) [hereinafter cited as Fourteenth Amendment].
1713. Watkins was a consolidation of two cases presenting constitutional claims asserted in
both state and federal court proceedings. Id at 342. The first case arose out of a line-up and
a show-up following a liquor store robbery and shooting. Watkins v. Kentucky, 565 S.W.2d
630, 631 (1978) (refusal to conduct suppression hearing not error, identification procedure
not impermissibly suggestive), af'd sub nom. Watkins v. Bordenkircher, 608 F.2d 247 (6th
Cir. 1979). The second case arose out of a photographic selection viewed by the victim of a
rape three days after the offense. Summitt v. Kentucky, 550 S.W.2d 548, 550 (1977) (holding
a hearing outside jury's presence to determine admissibility of identification evidence pre-
ferred, but not constitutionally required), af'd, 608 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1979).
1714. 449 U.S. at 345. A review of the cases cited by the Watkins Court reveals no compel-
ling authority requiring hearings outside the jury's presence. See United States v. Mitchell,
540 F.2d 1163, 1166-67 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1099 (1977) (defendant could
have requested hearing outside jury's presence); United States v. Cranson, 453 F.2d 123, 128
(4th Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (at a minimum defendant must demonstrate pretrial identifica-
tion before court will consider motion for evidentiary hearing outside jury presence) (dictum
because defendant could not show pretrial identification); Haskins v. United States, 433 F.2d
836, 838 n.2 (10th Cir. 1970) (hearing outside presence of jury would be "better practice")
(dictum because identification had independent source); United States v. Ranciglio, 429
F.2d 228, 230 (8th Cir. 1970) (upholding trial court's determination, outside presence ofjury,
that "in-court identifications had independent origins and were not influenced by tainted
lineup") (dictum because jury presence not at issue); United States v. Allison, 414 F.2d 407,
410 (9th Cir. 1969) (motion to suppress identification testimony "must be heard and deter-
mined" outside jury's presence) (dictum because jury presence not at issue); United States v.
Broadhead, 413 F.2d 1351, 1354 (7th Cir. 1969) (upholding pretrial hearing on identification
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fined to state court proceedings. 715 Although the Watkins Court stated
that outside hearings are "advisable,"1716 the case is significant because
it reflects a substantial shift in Supreme Court attitudes toward eyewit-
ness identification testimony. Whereas the Court had previously
viewed such testimony with considerable suspicion, 17 7 Watkins implic-
itly held that such testimony is not inherently unreliable.
1718
Specifically, the Watkins Court refused to apply Jackson v.
Denno, 1719 which may require outside hearings to determine the volun-
tariness of confessions, 720 to situations involving challenges to identifi-
cation testimony.' 72' The Court distinguished between confessions and
eyewitness identifications by noting that involuntary confessions are
inadmissible because of "special considerations": (1) unreliability of
the confession and (2) social repugnance to "wring[ing]" a confession
out of the accused. 722 Conversely, the Court reasoned that "[w]here
identification evidence is at issue, no such special considerations justify
a departure from the presumption that juries will follow instruc-
tions." 7  Moreover, the Court found that juries could evaluate,
"under the instruction of the trial judge," the reliability of "admitted"
eyewitness identification testimony. 724 The Court did not reconcile a
jury's duty to weigh "admitted" identification testimony with the viola-
testimony) (dictum because of independent basis for identification); Clemons v. United
States, 408 F.2d 1230, 1237 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (en banc) (court should rule on challenged in-
court identification based on "facts elicited outside the presence of a jury") (dictum because
jury presence not at issue). See 449 U.S. at 345 n.2.
The Watkins Court cited only one case requiring an outside hearing in some circum-
stances. 449 U.S. at 345 n.2 (citing United States ex rel Fisher v. Driber, 546 F.2d 18 (3d
Cir. 1976)). Fisher mandates that a state trial court grant an outside hearing if the challenge
to the identification testimony is not frivolous. 546 F.2d at 22-23.
1715. Given the absence of compelling authority for outside hearings, however, see supra
note 1714, the circuits may find in Watkins some latitude to permit identification hearings in
the jury's presence.
1716. 449 U.S. at 349.
1717. Id at 347. Eg., Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 111-12 (1972); United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967) ("The vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known
1718. 449 U.S. at 345.
1719. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
1720. See Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 1712, at 1415 n.50: "The Jackson Court
never explicitly held that the jury must be excluded from the presentation of evidence on the
voluntariness of a confession before the judge's initial determination of admissibility." The
Watkins Court assumed that the Jackson Court had made such an explicit determination.
449 U.S. at 345-46 n.2.
1721. 449 U.S. at 347.
1722. Id
1723. Id
1724. Id
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tion of due process that results from the jury's exposure to inadmissible
identification testimony. Rather, the Court reasoned that because ju-
ries must evaluate the reliability of admissible identification testimony
and because cross-examination would allow the defendant to dispel
any prejudice arising from the jury's exposure to that testimony, a jury
could be trusted to disregard inadmissible identification testimony.
1 725
The practical effect of such a rule, however, is that "almost all identifi-
cation evidence will be allowed to make an impression upon the
jury.'
1726
Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion, argued that identifica-
tion evidence does implicate the "special considerations" of Jackson v.
Denno and should, like confessions, be considered outside the jury's
presence.172 7 These "special considerations" were the "inherent unreli-
ability" of the challenged testimony and its "powerful" impact on the
jury. 1728 Justice Brennan reasoned that juries could not be trusted to
disregard inadmissible identification testimony. 1729 Neither cross-ex-
amination nor jury instructions could dispel the impact of an inadmis-
sible identification.
1 730
6. Scope of examination
a. generally
In United States v. Sefert, 1731 the Ninth Circuit clarified the cir-
cumstances under which a non-party witness may invoke the fifth
amendment privilege to refuse to answer questions during cross-exami-
1725. Id at 350 n.l. The Court's use of the word "admitted" is problematic. Admission
implies that the evidence has already met threshold standards of reliability. See Manson v.
Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1972) (jury should not hear eyewitness testimony which does
not exhibit "aspects of reliability").
1726. See Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 1712, at 1422, which suggests that, after Wat-
kins, there is no way to keep unreliable identification testimony from making an impression
on the jury, with the exception of testimony tainted by line-ups held in the absence of de-
fense counsel. See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 269-74 (1967). The article further
argues that because "almost any" identification testimony may now come before a jury,
"many innocent defendants" will be convicted in the wake of Watkins. Fourteenth Amend-
ment, supra note 1712, at 1424. Such an assertion presumes that juries will find it difficult to
distinguish admissible from inadmissible identification evidence.
1727. 449 U.S. at 349 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1728. Id at 352.
1729. "The powerful impact that much eyewitness identification evidence has on juries,
regardless of its reliability, virtually mandates that when such evidence is inadmissible, the
jury should know nothing about the evidence." 449 U.S. at 449-50 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
1730. Id
1731. 648 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 1980).
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nation. Seifert, Ehrlich, and Peres were indicted on nineteen counts of
interstate transportation of property obtained by fraud and one count
of conspiracy. 1732 The three opened a retail video store and induced
their suppliers to sell them large amounts of merchandise on credit.
The defendants then shipped the merchandise out of state without pay-
ment to the creditors. 173 3 Saka, a prosecution witness, testified that he
had purchased merchandise from Seifert and Ehrlich with borrowed
money. 173 4 On cross-examination, Saka testified at length but refused
to provide the name of his lender for fear of his life.173 5 In response to
the Government's objection to the question, Seifert made an offer of
proof setting forth the defense's theory that it was Saka who had
financed the business in which he and Peres were partners. 1736 The
court then allowed the defense, outside the presence of the jury, to ask
Saka for the identity of the lender. Saka again refused to answer, as-
serting the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
1737
On appeal, the defendants first claimed that Saka should have
been required to assert the privilege before the jury. 7 38 The Ninth Cir-
cuit agreed, reasoning that, in light of his other testimony, Saka's re-
fusal to answer the one question would have been a form of
impeachment. 7 3 9 Accordingly, the court distinguished the rule an-
nounced in prior Ninth Circuit decisions that bars calling a co-defend-
ant1740 or non-party witness 174 1 for the sole purpose of eliciting the
1732. Id at 559. Peres pled guilty to one count in a plea bargain and testified against the
other two defendants.
1733. Id
1734. Id at 559-60.
1735. Id at 560.
1736. Id
1737. Id
1738. Id
1739. Id at 560-61. The court cited dictum from United States v. Gay, 567 F.2d 616, 620
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 999 (1978) and J. WEINSTEIN AND M. BERGER, 3 WEIN-
STEIN'S EvIDENCE § 611(04), at 611-49 (1978), for the proposition it announced, making this
issue one of first impression in the Ninth Circuit. 648 F.2d at 560. However, because Seifert
and Ehrlich had ample opportunity to impeach Saka's testimony through the examination of
other witnesses and on cross-examination, forcing Saka to answer before the jury for this
purpose would have been "merely cumulative." Id at 561.
1740. E.g., United States v. Espinoza, 578 F.2d 224, 228 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. de-
nied, 439 U.S. 849 (1978). InEspinoza, the co-defendant in an alien smuggling case claimed
he was denied the right to confront the defendant Espinoza, who validly asserted the fifth
amendment privilege. The Ninth Circuit held that "[i]t is clearly established that a defend-
ant cannot call a co-defendant to the stand if the co-defendant will merely be invoking his
Fifth Amendment right not to testify." Id at 228 (citing United States v. Virgil, 561 F.2d
1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1977)).
1741. E.g., United States v. Licavoli, 604 F.2d 613, 624 (9th Cir. 1979) (non-party wit-
nesses in receipt of stolen goods would refuse to testify if called; defendant could not call
1982]
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assertion of the privilege before the jury.1742 The court observed that
the jury would not give undue weight to a selective assertion of the
privilege as it might if a witness refused to answer all questions.
1 743
Moreover, requiring a non-party witness to assert the privilege before
the jury does not burden the witness because the assertion is not being
used against him or her in the instant proceeding nor can it be so used
in a subsequent prosecution.' 7"
The court next rejected defendants' contention that Saka had
waived his privilege as to the lender's name by his testimony on direct
examination.1745 In so doing, it adhered to the settled rule that a non-
party witness may refuse to answer additional questions as to matters
about which he or she has already testified, even if the prior testimony
was incriminating, provided the answers would tend to incriminate him
or her further. 1746
The court found no error in the trial court's denial of the defense
motion to strike Saka's testimony because cross-examination had been
restricted. 1747 All or a portion of the testimony of a witness who rightly
claims the privilege on cross-examination need be stricken only if the
assertion forecloses examination as to matters that are "direct" rather
than "collateral."' 1748 Noting the trial court's broad discretion to deter-
mine whether testimony must be stricken, 1749 the Ninth Circuit framed
the questions on appeal as "'whether the defendant has been deprived
them for sole purpose of forcing them to refuse to testify in the presence of the jury), cer.
denied, 446 U.S. 935 (1980).
1742. Id at 560.
1743. Id at 561.
1744. Id at 560-61.
1745. Id at 561.
1746. Id (citing In re Master Key Litigation, 507 F.2d 292, 294 (9th Cir. 1974) (witness'
refusal to answer questions in oral deposition during course of civil antitrust suit upheld
although he had testified to some facts tending to implicate him in conspiracy: "an ordinary
witness may. . . refuse to answer any questions about a matter already discussed, even if
the facts already revealed are incriminating, as long as the answers sought may tend to
further incriminate him." (citation omitted) (emphasis in original)); Shendal v, United
States, 312 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1963) (grand jury witness who had already allegedly
incriminated himself by admitting he collected certain money at request of employer could
invoke fifth amendment as to quantity collected because answer might well "provide a link
not already provided" by his previous testimony).
1747. 648 F.2d at 561-62.
1748. Id at 561.
1749. Id at 562. See United States v. Star, 470 F.2d 1214, 1217-18 (9th Cir. 1972) (cross-
examination of a witness about his long-term use of drugs was subject to a claim of privilege
and withstood a motion to strike despite defense counsel's offer of proof that drug use can
impair memory. The court did not abuse its discretion in finding that jury had ample oppor-
tunity to assess witness' memory through his other testimony).
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of his right to test the truth of the direct testimony,'. . . and whether
answers to the particular questions 'would. . . have undermined the
government's case.' "175 The court concluded that the source of Saka's
money was unimportant to the defense theory which had been ade-
quately presented in closing argument and in the course of trial.
1751
b. impeachment
The Federal Rules of Evidence permit witness' credibility to be
supported or attacked by evidence of: (1) the reputation of a witness'
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness; (2) an opinion regarding a
witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness; or (3) spec 'c in-
stances of conduct demonstrating a witness' character for truthfulness
or untruthfulness.1 752 Evidence that attacks a witness' credibility is
said to "impeach" that witness. It includes evidence showing a witness'
bias or demonstrating that a witness' prior statements are inconsistent
with his or her present testimony. 1753 The reputation of, or an opinion
concerning, a witness' character for truthfulness is generally proved ex-
trinsically, through the testimony of someone other than the witness.
The Federal Rules of Evidence, however, expressly forbid extrinsic
proof of specific instances of conduct; such instances are proved
through cross-examination of the witness whose impeachment is
sought. 1754
The Ninth Circuit has recently considered cases in which convic-
tions have been attacked based on the admission of Government evi-
dence that either supports the credibility of Government witnesses or
attacks the credibility of defense witnesses. For example, in United
States v. Green, 1155 the Ninth Circuit considered whether it is proper
for the prosecution to offer extrinsic evidence of specific instances of
the defendant's conduct for impeachment purposes. The defendants
were convicted of conspiring to (1) obstruct justice, (2) make false state-
ments, and (3) violate citizens' civil rights. The defendants had agreed
with a private investigator to "plant" drugs on the premises of a drug
1750. 648 F.2d at 562 (citations omitted).
1751. Id The court observed that only by "the most extended and poorly supported set of
inferences" would the answer to the disputed question have shown that Saka had been the
original investor and that he had not purchased the video equipment as he claimed. Id
1752. FED. R. EvID. 608.
1753. See G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 79 (1978).
1754. See FED. R. EVID. 608(b). FED. R. EvID. 609 creates an exception to this "extrinsic
evidence" rule, whereby a witness' conviction of a crime may be proved by extrinsic
evidence.
1755. 648 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1981).
19821
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manufacturing company. The agreement was an effort by the defend-
ants to provide the state prosecutor with information about illegal drug
manufacturing activities in exchange for the prosecutor's dropping
charges against them for conspiring to manufacture and distribute
LSD. 17 56 At trial, the defendants testified and, on rebuttal, the Govern-
ment presented a handwritten formula for LSD belonging to one of the
defendants, and the testimony of several witnesses concerning specific
instances of the defendants' previous drug activities. 75 7 The defend-
ants argued that the introduction of this evidence violated Federal Rule
of Evidence 608(b).1
758
The Ninth Circuit first noted that it was within the trial court's
discretion to determine the purpose for the introduction of the evi-
dence. It agreed that there was an adequate basis for concluding that
the LSD formula and the testimony of certain witnesses were admissi-
ble to prove aspects of the Government's case other than attacking the
defendant-witnesses' credibility. 1759 The court, however, found that the
testimony of two other Government witnesses was so unrelated to the
issues in the case that its use was obviously designed to impeach the
defendants. 1760 The court held, therefore, that admitting this evidence
1756. Id at 591.
1757. Id at 596.
1758. FED. R. EVID. 608(b) provides in pertinent part: "[s]pecific instances of the conduct
of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility ... may not be
proved by extrinsic evidence."
1759. 648 F.2d at 596. Federal Rule of Evidence 402 provides that "fe]vidence which is
not relevant is not admissible." The LSD formula and the testimony relating to the defend-
ants' past drug activities were not directly relevant to whether they conspired to obstruct jus-
tice, to make false statements, or to violate citizens' civil rights. To be relevant, the evidence
would have to have been used for either impeachment purposes or for purposes stated in
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b): "proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." The court stated that the LSD
formula and the particular testimony involved could have been used by the Government to
demonstrate "capacity"; presumably, this referred to the defendants' opportunity to commit
the alleged crimes. Ascribing any other logical meaning to the term "capacity," such as the
defendants' propensity for committing the alleged crimes, would necessarily require the evi-
dence to be excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b): "Evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he
acted in conformity therewith."
1760. 648 F.2d at 596. During cross-examination, one of the defendants testified that she
had never seen LSD or ergotamine tartrate (an LSD precursor) from 1972 to 1974 and had
never delivered ergotamine tartrate to anyone intending to process it into LSD. The other
defendant testified that the only time he had ever made LSD was during 1965 to 1966,
pursuant to a government contract.
On rebuttal, one of the Government witnesses testified that she had received ergotamine
tartrate from the first defendant two or three times during 1972 and had received LSD from
the second defendant at least five or six times during 1971. The other Government witness
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directly violated Rule 608(b), constituting reversible error. 17 6 1
In United States v. Dunn, 1762 the Ninth Circuit considered the pro-
priety of the prosecution's offer of evidence, for impeachment of a de-
fense witness, that members of the witness' family had been convicted
of criminal offenses. The defendant in Dunn had been convicted of
conspiring to counterfeit United States currency. At trial, a defense
witness testified that Dunn had known nothing of the conspiracy.
1763
On cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned the witness about her
brother's criminal convictions. The Government contended that this
questioning was incidental to a showing that the witness was biased
against a key Government witness, who was an associate of her brother
and had revealed her part in the same conspiracy to the police.1
71'
The Ninth Circuit held that the Government's method of im-
peachment had been "wholly irregular and prejudicial."' 1765 The court
noted that if the Government had intended to show that the witness
was biased against her brother's associate, it could have elicited his be-
trayal of her, rather than the wholly irrelevant information of her
brother's crimes. The court viewed the Government's tactic as an at-
tempt to create guilt by association and held that to permit such ques-
tioning constituted error. 1766 The court concluded that the error could
not be declared harmless 1767 because the jury might have believed the
testified that the second defendant had worked for him between 1963 and 1966, and at no
time during that period had that defendant made LSD for the government. Id
1761. Id at 597. The Government argued against construing Rule 608(b) in this manner
because witnesses could then commit perjury without fear of rebuttal. The court, however,
stated that such an argument would be persuasive only if a witness' statements were volun-
teered on either direct or cross-examination. Because the statements in this case were direct
responses to questions during cross-examination, the court referred the Government to Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 608(b), permitting the impeachment of a witness through cross-exami-
nation. Id at 596 n.12 (citing United States v. Chew Kam Tom, 640 F.2d 1037, 1039-40 (9th
Cir. 1981)).
1762. 640 F.2d 987 (9th Cir. 1981).
1763. Id at 988. The defense witness had been living with the defendant at the time of his
arrest and had herself pled guilty to participating in the conspiracy. Id The only evidence
connecting the defendant with the conspiracy was the testimony of one of the counterfeiters
who had been caught in the act of manufacturing money and who was granted immunity for
testifying against the defendant. Id at 987. For conviction, the Government relied on the
long standing Ninth Circuit rule that a conviction may be based on "the uncorroborated
testimony of an accomplice. . .[if it] 'is not incredible or unsubstantial on its face.'" Id at
987 n.1 (quoting United States v. Sigal, 572 F.2d 1320, 1324 (9th Cir. 1978); see also United
States v. Turner, 528 F.2d 143, 161 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 996 (1975); United States
v. Bagby, 451 F.2d 920, 930 (9th Cir. 1971)).
1764. 640 F.2d at 987-88.
1765. Id at 989.
1766. Id
1767. Id The court was reluctant to declare the district court's error prejudicial because
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witness if the Government had questioned her properly. The case,
therefore, was remanded for a new trial.
1768
In United States v. Harrington, 1769 the Ninth Circuit considered
whether it was proper for the prosecution to impeach a defendant-wit-
ness with evidence of his failure to inform authorities that his criminal
conduct occurred under duress. Harrington was convicted of transport-
ing illegal aliens in his van. At trial, he testified that a man with a knife
coerced him into transporting the aliens. 1770  During cross-examina-
tion, the prosecutor asked whether Harrington told the police officer
who stopped him, or the border patrol agent who later arrested him,
that he was transporting the aliens under threat. 17 7' Harrington admit-
ted that he had not, and argued on appeal that the prosecutor had vio-
lated his constitutional rights by inquiring about his post-arrest
silence. 1
772
The Ninth Circuit first observed that the prosecutor's questions
were clearly probative of the defendant's credibility: "[i]t would seem
natural that if [the defendant] had been threatened with a weapon, he
would have blurted that [fact] out to the police officer as soon as he was
the improperly questioned witness had been only one of two witnesses who testified for the
defendant. To convict the defendant, the jury had to disbelieve both the defense witnesses,
not just the one impeached by improper cross-examination.
1768. In remanding the case for new trial, the court reflected more than just a concern
about the Government's improper impeachment of a defense witness. The district court had
also refused to postpone sentencing to allow a new defense attorney to obtain a transcript
and to familiarize himself with the record. Id at 988. Furthermore, the prosecution's evi-
dence of the defendant's guilt appeared to be extremely weak. The court noted that al-
though the defendant had known the other alleged counterfeiters and had lent them certain
items such as chairs and a hotplate, Secret Service surveillance had failed to observe the
defendant inside the print shop or with the counterfeiters while they were engaged in any-
thing illegal. Id at 988-89. The court concluded that the prosecution's lack of evidence,
coupled with the above mentioned two marginally prejudicial irregularities, required a new
trial. Id at 989.
1769. 636 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1980).
1770. Id at 1184. The defendant had been driving a van through Arizona when he was
stopped by a police officer and a border patrol agent. Border patrol agents had previously
observed the defendant stopping in Douglas, Arizona, at several areas known to be alien
pick-up spots. The defendant testified that he had been en route to see a female friend in
Texas, but stopped in Douglas to try to get some marijuana. He further testified that shortly
after leaving Douglas, he stopped to pick up some hitchhikers. Id According to the defend-
ant, the male hitchhiker threatened him with a knife and forced him to transport the aliens,
warning him that the alien behind him in the van also had a weapon. Id The court noted
that the defendant, upon being stopped by the police officer, got out of his van and met the
officer at the rear. Id The border patrol agent then informed the defendant that he was an
immigration officer and that he was going to check the van. He discovered seventeen illegal
aliens inside. Id
1771. Id at 1185.
1772. Id
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a safe distance away from the van."'1773 However, because the prosecu-
tor's questions referred both to when the defendant alighted from the
van (before the arrest), and to when the aliens were removed from the
van (after the arrest), the questions may have violated Harrington's
constitutional rights.'7 74 The Ninth Circuit, however, held that it was
harmless error to have permitted questioning on Harrington's post-ar-
rest silence, because the questions focused primarily on the pre-arrest
period, and Harrington's credibility had already been challenged by
other evidence.
1775
In United States v. Halbert,1776 the Ninth Circuit considered
whether it was proper for the prosecution to support its witness' credi-
bility with evidence of a co-defendant's guilty plea to the same offense
for which the defendant was standing trial. Halbert and two co-de-
fendants were indicted on sixteen counts of mail fraud. Both co-de-
fendants pled guilty, then testified against Halbert at his trial. During
direct examination, the prosecutor asked the co-defendants about their
pleas, and over the defendant's objection, both were allowed to tell the
jury that they had pled guilty to the same conspiracy for which Halbert
was being tried. Moreover, the prosecutor reiterated information about
one co-defendant's plea on redirect examination, briefly referred to
both pleas in closing argument, and introduced into evidence copies of
the co-defendants' plea agreements.
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that although the guilty plea of a co-
defendant may not be offered as substantive evidence of another de-
1773. Id at 1187 (citing Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980)). Defendant Jenkins
testified that he had stabbed and killed the victim in self-defense. The Supreme Court held
that the prosecutor had not violated Jenkins' constitutional rights during cross-examination
by asking whether he had reported the stabbing to anyone, suggesting that Jenkins would
have done so if he had truly killed in self-defense. The Court reasoned that by deciding to
testify, Jenkins exposed himself to impeachment because of his prior silence, which had not
been induced by the police through, e.g., Miranda warnings. Id at 238.
1774. 636 F.2d at 1187 (citing Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976) (unconstitutional to
cross-examine defendant on his post-arrest silence)).
1775. 636 F.2d at 1187. Harrington's credibility had already been challenged when, re-
sponding to a question, he admitted that the hitchhiker who allegedly coerced him into
transporting the aliens had not entered the van with him. The aliens also testified that they
did not know of anyone having a knife, and the police officer testified that the defendant had
alighted from the van voluntarily at least twice after picking up the aliens (suggesting that
the defendant was not being forced to drive the van by threat of violence). Id The court
concluded that these facts contributed so much strength to the Government's case that there
could be no doubt as to the validity of the verdict. Id (citing Bradford v. Stone, 594 F.2d
1294, 1296-97 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Wycoff, 545 F.2d 679, 682 (9th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1105 (1977)).
1776. 640 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1981).
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fendant's guilt,17 77 it may be offered as evidence of a witness'
credibility, 778 regardless of whether the Government or the defense is
the proffering party. 1779 The court held that the guilty pleas had been
properly admitted because they had been offered only as evidence of
the witnesses' credibility. 78 0 Halbert's conviction was reversed, how-
ever, because the jury instructions failed to apprise the jury that they
could consider the pleas for this purpose only.
178 1
7. Hearsay - co-conspirator exception
The co-conspirator hearsay exception is an evidentiary rule per-
mitting the use of certain out-of-court statements by one conspirator to
be used against a co-conspirator. 178 2 All co-conspirators' statements,
however, are not made admissible by this exception. Admissibility
hinges on the existence of certain foundational requirements: (1) the
1777. Id at 1004 (citing Baker v. United States, 393 F.2d 604, 614 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 836 (1968)).
1778. 640 F.2d at 1004 (citing United States v. King, 505 F.2d 602, 607 (5th Cir. 1974);
Isaac v. United States, 431 F.2d 11, 15-16 (9th Cir. 1970)).
1779. 640 F.2d at 1004 (citing United States v. Whitehead, 618 F.2d 523, 529 (4th Cir.
1980); United States v. Romeros, 600 F.2d 1104, 1105 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam), cer.
denied, 444 U.S. 1077 (1980); United States v. Veltre, 591 F.2d 347, 349 (5th Cir. 1979):
United States v. Anderson, 532 F.2d 1218, 1230 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 429 U.S. 839 (1976);
United States v. Bryza, 522 F.2d 414, 424-25 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 912
(1976); United States v. King, 505 F.2d 602, 607 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Binger, 469
F.2d 275, 276 (9th Cir. 1972); Isaac v. United States, 431 F.2d 11, 15 (9th Cir. 1970); Baker v.
United States, 393 F.2d 604, 614 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 836 (1968)).
1780. 640 F.2d at 1005.
1781. Id
1782. Numerous Ninth Circuit cases have applied the co-conspirator exception, which is
codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) as a form of non-hearsay admission. See,
e.g., United States v. Sandoval-Villalvazo, 620 F.2d 744, 746-47 (9th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 767-72 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981 (1978); United
States v. Testa, 548 F.2d 847, 851-52 (9th Cir. 1977); Carbozo v. United States, 314 F.2d 718,
735-38 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964). The exception, however, has not
been particularly favored by the courts, perhaps because the Supreme Court has warned that
it will "view with disfavor attempts to broaden the already pervasive and wide-sweeping
nets of conspiracy prosecutions." Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 404 (1957).
As noted by the Supreme Court, "the limits of this hearsay exception have simply been
defined by the Court in the exercise of its rule-making power. . . . [T]he limited scope of
the hearsay exception in federal conspiracy trials is a product, not of the Sixth Amendment,
but of the Court's 'disfavor' of 'attempts to broaden the already pervasive and wide-sweep-
ing nets of conspiracy prosecutions."' Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 82 (1970) (quoting
Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391,404 (1957)). Acknowledging that the exception is
well settled but disfavored, the Supreme Court has stated: "There are many logical and
practical reasons that could be advanced against. . . [the] rule .... But however cogent
these reasons, it is firmly established that where made in furtherance of the objectives of a
going conspiracy, such statements are admissible as exceptions to the hearsay rule." Krule-
witch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 443 (1949).
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declaration must be made in furtherance of the conspiracy; (2) the dec-
laration must be made during the course of the conspiracy; and (3)
there must be independent proof of the conspiracy's existence and of
the connection of the declarant and the defendant to it. 1783 Recent liti-
gation in the Ninth Circuit has focused on these foundational require-
ments for the admissibility of co-conspirator hearsay.
In United States v. Perez, 784 the defendant had been convicted of
both conspiracy to distribute and distribution of cocaine. 785 The de-
fendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence of the conspiracy
and his connection with it.1786 The charges against him arose out of a
series of meetings between other defendants and a Government agent
and informant. Although the defendant was not at any of these meet-
ings, he was named as the source of the drugs which were ultimately
sold to the agent. At one of the meetings, his co-defendants made tele-
phone arrangements with the defendant for transporting cocaine, and
on two other occasions, he spoke by phone with the Government agent
regarding the proposed drug sales.178 7 The trial court admitted the co-
conspirators' statements naming the defendant as the source of the ille-
gal drugs.
1788
On appeal, the defendant argued that there was insufficient evi-
dence of the conspiracy and of his involvement with it. 1789 Considering
this claim, the Ninth Circuit outlined the test to determine the existence
of a conspiracy under the co-conspirator hearsay exception. First, a
prima facie case must be established "through the introduction of sub-
stantial independent evidence other than the contested hearsay," al-
though the evidence "need not compel a finding of conspiracy beyond a
reasonable doubt." 1790 The court next noted that "[c]ircumstantial evi-
dence is often sufficient to establish the existence of a conspiracy," and,
once a conspiracy has been established, "only 'slight evidence' is neces-
sary to connect a co-conspirator to the conspiracy."' 1791 The court held
1783. See United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 768 (9th Cir.), cerl denied, 439 U.S. 981
(1978). As early as 1949, the Supreme Court noted that these requirements had been "scru-
pulously observed by federal courts." Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 443-44
(1949).
1784. 658 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1981).
1785. Id at 656.
1786. Id
1787. Id at 657.
1788. Id at 658.
1789. Id at 656, 658.
1790. Id at 658.
1791. Id See United States v. Calaway, 524 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
967 (1976), where the Ninth Circuit noted that a conspiracy may be proved by evidence that
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that there was abundant independent evidence presented at trial to es-
tablish the existence of the conspiracy. 1792 The court found that the
two telephone conversations between the defendant and the Govern-
ment agent, 1793 the defendant's return call to a co-conspirator during a
meeting between the co-conspirator and agent, and the co-conspirator's
acknowledgement of the call from the defendant 179 4 were sufficient, by
themselves, to establish the conspiracy. 1795 Furthermore, the telephone
calls between the defendant and his co-conspirators that were wit-
nessed by the Government agent, and the telephone conversations be-
tween the defendant and the agent, were deemed sufficient
"[s]ubstantial independent evidence" to prove "the critical nexus" be-
tween the defendant and the conspiracy.
1796
In United States v. Miranda- Uriarte, 1797 the Ninth Circuit consid-
ered the nature and amount of independent evidence necessary to es-
tablish a conspiracy. 17 98 The defendant, Uriarte, was charged with
conspiracy to distribute heroin. At trial, the Government presented ev-
idence of meetings from March 18 through March 27, 1980 between
various co-conspirators and a Government agent. Although Uriarte
was not present at the meeting on March 18, he was named as the her-
oin source for the proposed sale, as well as the source of the heroin
sample for the agent. At subsequent meetings attended by Uriarte and
the other conspirators, further samples were supplied and negotiations
continued. On March 27, Uriarte delivered a package of heroin to the
agent in exchange for $14,000. The defendants were then arrested.
1799
On appeal, Uriarte challenged the admission of the March 18 co-
conspirators' statements naming him as the source of the first heroin
sample and as the source for the proposed heroin sale. Is°° He argued
is entirely circumstantial, and items of circumstantial evidence must be viewed collectively,
not in isolation. Id at 612. "Slight evidence" has been defined as "of the quality which will
reasonably support a conclusion that the particular defendant... wilfully participated in
the unlawful plan with the intent to further some object or purpose of the conspiracy."
United States v. Freie, 545 F.2d 1217, 1222 (9th Cir. 1976), cerl. denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977).
1792. 658 F.2d at 659.
1793. Id The court characterized these conversations as "admissions to the conspiracy
under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(A)." Id
1794. Id The court characterized the acknowledgement as "an implied assertion and ad-
missible as nonassertive conduct under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(a), (c)." Id
1795. Id Additional substantial evidence of the conspiracy had also been presented such
as meetings to exchange cocaine and the actual exchange of, and payment for, the cocaine.
1796. Id at 659-60.
1797. 649 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1981).
1798. Id at 1349-50.
1799. Id
1800. Id at 1350.
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that the evidence was inadmissible because the Government had failed
to present sufficient independent evidence of the existence of a conspir-
acy as of March 18, and of his participation in the conspiracy as of that
date. 1801 The court acknowledged that there was "no direct evidence,
apart from the challenged statements," establishing a conspiracy or
Uriarte's participation in it as of March 18.1802 The court, however,
determined that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to support
the finding. 803  The court noted that the testimony of events from
March 20 through March 27 provided "abundant" and "overwhelm-
ing" evidence that Uriarte was the source of the heroin and that he was
a key participant in the conspiracy.' 8°  This evidence, in turn, sup-
ported an inference that the conspiracy had existed as of the first meet-
ing and that Uriarte was connected to it. 80  Thus, the first meeting was
part of a "chain of events" and the subsequent meetings constituted
circumstantial evidence linking Uriarte to the conspiracy from its in-
ception. 80 6 Although the court considered the challenged hearsay to
be cumulative, it was direct evidence of Uriarte's participation in the
conspiracy from March 18.1807
1801. Id
1802. Id
1803. Id (emphasis added). See also supra note 1791.
1804. 649 F.2d at 1350. The court noted that the evidence of the events from March 20
through March 27 indicated that Uriarte was the "bellwether of the entire plan." Id The
court specifically referred to testimony that Uriarte "controlled the negotiations." Id
1805. I. As for the requirement that there be proof of the defendant's connection with
the conspiracy, the court noted that "[o]nce the existence of the conspiracy has been clearly
established, independent evidence is necessary to show prima fade the defendant's connec-
tion with the conspiracy, even f the connection [as opposed to the evidence establishing that
connection] is slight." Id at 1349 (emphasis added). The Miranda-Uriarte court cited
United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 769 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981 (1978), as
authority for this formulation. In setting out essentially the same precept, the Weiner court
cited United States v. Dunn, 564 F.2d 348, 357 (9th Cir. 1977), for a discussion of the "slight
evidence" rule as it related to the question of the sufficiency of the evidence. 578 F.2d at 769
n.7. In Dunn, the court "[correctly] restate[d] the slight evidence rule... as [it was] reason-
ably certain that [its] predecessors intended it," thereby establishing the rule as follows:
Once the existence of a conspiracy is establishdd, evidence establishing beyond a
reasonable doubt a connection of a defendant with the conspiracy, even though the
connection ir slight, is sufficient to convict him with knowing participation in the
conspiracy. Thus, the word "slight" properly modifies "connection" and not "evi-
dence." It is tied to that which is proved, not to the type of evidence or the burden
of proof.
564 F.2d at 357 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). See supra inote 1791 for a compar-
ison of the Freie court ruling, which considered "slight" to modify evidence rather than
connection.
1806. 649 F.2d at 1350.
1807. Id
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In United States v. Fielding, 108 the Ninth Circuit elaborated upon
the "in furtherance" requirement for the admission of co-conspirator
hearsay. Fielding challenged the admission of statements made by two
co-defendants implicating him in a marijuana importation conspir-
acy.180 9 The statements, which included a claim that Fielding had
failed to pay for a previous shipment of marijuana and descriptions of
prior activities of the conspirators, were made during an initial meeting
between a Government agent and Fielding's co-defendants. The co-
defendants also made general statements about the conspiracy and dis-
cussed possible methods of collecting the money they claimed Fielding
owed them. 810 The trial court admitted the co-defendants' statements
because they were made during the course of the conspiracy and con-
cerned payments for a drug shipment "encompassed by the charged
conspiracy."'
18 11
The Ninth Circuit found the challenged statements inadmissible
under the co-conspirator exception because they were not made in fur-
therance of the conspiracy. 8 1 2 The court reaffirmed the "in further-
ance" requirement, 8 1 3 and then reviewed the types of statements that
have not met this requirement. For example, casual admissions of cul-
pability, confessions or admissions of a co-conspirator, mere conversa-
tion between conspirators, or narrative declarations are not admissible
under the co-conspirator exception. These types of declarations do not
"further the common objectives of the conspiracy."'8 11 4 In contrast,
statements intended to set transactions in motion, recruit members, ob-
tain the acquiescence or silence of others, or otherwise assist the con-
spirators in achieving their objectives are considered "in furtherance"
of the conspiracy.
8 15
1808. 645 F.2d 719 (9th Cir. 1981).
1809. Id at 725.
1810. Id at 724-25.
1811. Id at 725.
1812. Id at 727.
1813. Id at 725-26. The Fielding court noted that the Ninth Circuit had emphasized "that
the 'in furtherance of' requirement remained 'viable, and we believe that this is as it should
be. "The agency theory of conspiracy is at best a fiction and ought not to serve as a basis for
admissibility beyond that already established." Advisory Committee's Note to Proposed
Fed.R.Ev[id]. 801(d)(2)(E)."' Id (quoting United States v. Moore, 522 F.2d 1068, 1077 n.5
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1049 (1976)). The agency theory of conspiracy refers to
the concept that conspirators are partners in crime and the law should regard them as agents
of one another, acting and speaking on each other's behalf within the scope of their author-
ity. See Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 218-19 n.6 (1974).
1814. 645 F.2d at 726 (citing United States v. Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513, 520 (9th Cir. 1979)
(per curiam)).
1815. 645 F.2d at 726-27.
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The court described the co-conspirator statements in Fielding as
"[g]eneral statements" concerning-the defendant's business relationship
which "in no way advanced" the charged conspiracy. 81 6 The court
also found that the statements were made to impress the Government
agent in an effort to initiate a new transaction that would not have
involved Fielding. 8 7 By referring to cases that hold that viable objec-
tives must still exist for there to be a continuing conspiracy, the court
concluded that the "in furtherance" requirement cannot be satisfied by
statements made after the conspiracy has degenerated or the common
purpose has deteriorated. 8 1 8 Noting that the conspirators' aims were
in conflict, the court found that the claims of Fielding's co-defendants
for payment were only "tangentially related" to the underlying objec-
tive of the conspiracy, and did not meet the "in furtherance" test.' 8' 9
The court, therefore, held that the trial court erred in admitting the
statements. 18
20
8. Expert opinion
The district court has wide discretion in the admission or exclusion
of evidence, "particularly ... in the case of expert testimony."'
1821
Qualification as an "expert" entitles the witness to give his or her opin-
ion18 22 on matters involving specialized areas.1823 Because experts tes-
tify to matters not within their personal knowledge, their testimony is
1816. Id. at 727.
1817. Id
1818. The Fielding court cited cases where the charged conspiracy was "yet in being" or
where the conspirators were still united by common objectives. These cases were contrasted
to the conspiracy in Fielding, which was described as having "degenerated into after-the-fact
internecine quarrels and beliefs of betrayal." Id Similarly, the Supreme Court held that
statements made to conceal essentially achieved or failed conspiracies are not "in further-
ance of" the main conspiracy. See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 444 (1949).
A key element of the "in furtherance" requirement is an ongoing conspiracy. This ele-
ment indicates that the contours of the "in furtherance" requirement significantly overlap
the requirement that the declaration be made during the course of the conspiracy.
1819. 645 F.2d at 727.
1820. Id at 728."
1821. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 108, 126-27 (1974) (district court did not
abuse discretion in refusing to admit comparable nonobscene materials in obscenity case
where court was willing to allow experts to discuss materials).
1822. E. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 13 (2d ed. 1972) ("An
observer is qualified to testify because he has firsthand knowledge.. . .The expert has
something different to contribute. This is a power to draw inferences from the facts which a
jury would not be competent to draw.").
1823. See FED. R. EVID. 702 which allows expert opinion, but confines such testimony to
"scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge."
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allowed under a hearsay exception. 1 82 4 Expert testimony is also an ex-
ception to the opinion rule 8 25 which limits the opinions of laypersons
to those inferences which are: (1) rationally based on their percep-
tion 18 26 and (2) helpful to clarify their testimony or to determine a fact
in issue. 827 Under these exceptions, expert opinion could conceivably
allow more testimony into evidence than lay opinion where the expert
has first hand knowledge. 8 28  For example, lay opinion testimony
could be excluded where the witness has no personal perception of the
facts. The same testimony, however, would be admissible if delivered
by an expert witness.
The logical relationship between the two exceptions was briefly
addressed by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Maher. 1829 The
Maher court held that the admission of evidence as lay opinion is
harmless error when the witness could have qualified as an expert.'8 30
The testimony of the witness, an agent of the Drug Enforcement Ad-
ministration experienced in "surveillance and countersurveillance tech-
niques in narcotics operations," concerned the modus operandi of
persons who attempt to evade surveillance and its similarity to defend-
ant's activities.18 3 1 Because the testimony was admissible as expert
opinion, "any alleged error" in admitting it under the rubric of lay
opinion was harmless.
83 2
An expert's qualifications to testify about a given field may be
challenged, but the matter depends upon the "judge's discretion[,] re-
viewable only for abuse."'18 33 One such challenge has been to apsychol-
1824. See supra note 1822.
1825. The opinion rule for federal courts is found in FED. R. EvID. 701.
1826. FED. R. EviD. 701 advisory committee notes.
1827. See Allen v. Matson Navigation Co., 255 F.2d 273, 275, 278 (9th Cir. 1958) (testi-
mony that floor was "slippery" by one who walked on it admissible). Commentators have
severely criticized the exclusion of lay opinion because of the problem of separating "infer-
ence and reflection" from "observation and memory." E. McCoRMICK, supra note 1822, at
§ 1 I; J. WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 1974 (1940) ("The exclusionary rulings here abound partic-
ularly in absurdities and quibbles.").
1828. See E. MCCORMICK, supra note 1822, at 30 (expert's "knowledge may in some fields
be derived from reading alone").
1829. 645 F.2d 780, 783-84 (9th Cir. 1981).
1830. Id at 784. FED. R. EVID. 702 defines expert as one "qualified. . .by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education."
1831. 645 F.2d at 784.
1832. Id Because of the logical relationship between the allowance of expert opinion and
the limited allowance for lay opinion in cases where the layperson is also an expert with
firsthand knowledge, see supra text accompanying note 1828, there could have been no error
based on a rule excluding opinion testimony, as defendant contended. See id at 783.
1833. E. MCCORMICK, supra note 1822, at 30. Moreover, "[r]eversals for abuse are rare."
Id
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ogist testifying as to a defendant's sanity, on the theory that mental
disease is the province ofpsychiatry. 1834 Psychology has withstood the
challenge; psychologists can testify about sanity when they have suffi-
cient education and experience in mental disease." 35
Conversely, psychiatrists have been challenged when they rely on
psychological test results. 836 In United States v. Bilson, 837 the Ninth
Circuit held that a psychiatrist may testify as to a defendant's sanity
when the psychiatrist's opinion is based on psychological test re-
suits.18 38 Bilson, the defendant, pled insanity to charges of attempted
aircraft piracy and using a firearm in the commission of a felony'
839
In holding that a prosecution psychiatrist was qualified to express an
opinion, the court stated that the defendant's counsel had ample oppor-
tunity on cross-examination to obtain testimony regarding any lack of
the witness' qualifications.1
840
9. Law of the case
The doctrine of "law of the case" provides that a court's ruling on
a legal issue constitutes the law which must be applied whenever that
issue recurs in the same case.' 8 4' This doctrine is predicated upon a
notion of judicial economy "842 and is applicable unless: (1) the origi-
nal ruling was clearly erroneous, 84 3 or (2) the issue arises in a subse-
quent proceeding which presents a change in relevant cir-
1834. See Jenkins v. United States, 307 F.2d 637, 643 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (district court ex-
cluded psychologists' opinions on ground they lacked medical training).
1835. Id at 645. The Jenkins court said completion of a graduate training program ap-
proved by the American Psychological Association plus experience in the "treatment and
disagnosis [sic] of [mental] disease in association with psychiatrists or neurologists" would
qualify a psychologist to testify on an individual's sanity. Id
1836. See id at 640-41.
1837. 648 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
1838. Id at 1239.
1839. Id
1840. Id
1841. See In re Staff Mortgage & Inv. Corp., 625 F.2d 281, 283 (9th Cir. 1980) ("The law
of the case concerns the continued application of a rule of law previously determined in that
same case."). The doctrine applies to principles of law enunciated by both trial and appel-
late courts. See Petition of United States Steel Corp., 479 F.2d 489, 493 (6th Cir. 1973)
("law of the case" doctrine applicable when issue on which appellate court ruled is consid-
ered by trial court on remand); Petersen v. Federated Dev. Co., 416 F. Supp. 466, 474
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) ("law of the case" doctrine applicable when issue on which trial court ruled
is considered by court of coordinate jurisdiction). See generally 1B J. MooRE AND T. CUR-
RIER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.404[1],[4],[10] (2d ed. 1982).
1842. See White v. Murtha, 377 F.2d 428, 431 (5th Cir. 1967) ("The 'law of the case' rule is
based on the salutary and sound piblic policy that litigation should come to an end.").
1843. Kimball v. Callahan, 590 F.2d 768, 771-72 (9th Cir.) ("law of the case" doctrine not
applicable when initial decision clearly erroneous), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 826 (1979).
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cumstances.1845
In United States v. Estrada-Lucas, 1845 the Ninth Circuit considered
whether a trial court had violated the "law of the case" by altering at
retrial its initial ruling regarding the admissibility of polygraph exami-
nation results.
1846
Defendant Acevedo 18 47 was charged with importing undeclared
merchandise in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 545.1848 In her defense,
she asserted that the merchandise had been orally declared to United
States customs agents stationed at the Mexican border. 1849 Seeking to
enhance her credibility on this point, Acevedo submitted to and passed
a polygraph examination, the results of which were held inadmissible
because the test questions had not been sufficiently specific.
850
Acevedo subsequently took and passed a second polygraph examina-
tion which was structured to conform to the trial judge's specificity re-
quirements. 1851 Her motion to admit these results into evidence was
granted. 1
852
At Acevedo's initial trial,1853 she inadvertently revealed the exist-
ence of the first polygraph test during direct examination. 185 4 In re-
sponse to the Government's argument that the defense had opened the
door to questioning regarding this test, the trial court ruled that the
1844. See id ("law of the case" doctrine not applicable when evidence in subsequent trial
substantially different from that presented in first trial); United States v. Bettenhausen, 499
F.2d 1223, 1229-30 (10th Cir. 1974) ("law of the case" doctrine no bar to trial judge altering
ruling on jury instructions when evidence at first trial rebutted sanity presumption but evi-
dence at second trial was insufficient to achieve this result).
1845. 651 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1980).
1846. Id at 1263-64.
1847. Acevedo was indicted under her maiden name, Blanca Estrada-Lucas. At trial, how-
ever, she moved to omit her maiden name from the indictment and requested that she be
referred to by her married name, Blanca Acevedo. Id at 1262 n.1.
1848. Id at 1262. 18 U.S.C. § 545 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
Whoever knowingly and willfully, with intent to defraud the United States,
smuggles, or clandestinely introduces into the United States any merchandise
which should have been invoiced, or makes out or passes, or attempts to pass,
through the customhouse any false, forged, or fraudulent invoice, or other docu-
ment or paper...
Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both.
1849. 651 F.2d at 1262.
1850. Id at 1262-63.
1851. Id at 1263.
1852. Id
1853. The defendant was tried twice. Her first trial resulted in a hung jury. Upon retrial,
however, she was convicted of the offense charged. Id at 1262.
1854. 651 F.2d at 1263. It is iot entirely clear whether this revelation was actually inad-
vertent. The circuit court characterized it as "apparently inadvertent." Id at 1264.
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results of the first test were admissible for the limited purpose of im-
peaching the results of the second.' 85  The court, in addition, specified
that Acevedo would be allowed, for rehabilitative purposes, to testify
that she had passed the first examination.
856
At retrial, the Government elicited information regarding the
existence of the first test for impeachment purposes. 857 Defense coun-
sel subsequently sought to introduce the results of this test into evi-
dence in order to minimize the effects of the impeachment. 8 5 8 Relying,
however, on his pretrial ruling that the results of the first polygraph
were inconclusive, the trial judge refused to admit these results.
8
1
9
On appeal, Acevedo argued that the trial court had abused its dis-
cretion in refusing to admit the results of the first polygraph examina-
tion at her second trial. 8 60 The Ninth Circuit accepted this argument,
noting that the lower court had unjustifiably departed from the "law of
the case" by denying admission of the test results after previously ad-
mitting them at defendant's original trial.18 6 ' According to the court,
the departure was untenable because neither of the exceptions to the
"law of the case" doctrine was established. The trial court's initial rul-
ing regarding admissibility of the first test was well reasoned and not
"clear error,"'1862 and the second trial did not present a "change in rele-
vant circumstances."'1
863
G. Voluntariness Hearing
In Jackson v. Denno, 1864 the Supreme Court established that a
hearing to determine the voluntariness of a defendant's confession
must be held out of the presence of the jury. 18 65 Thereafter, Congress
1855. Id at 1263.
1856. Id
1857. Id
1858. Id
1859. Id
1860. I.d
1861. Id at 1264-65.
1862. Id The appellate court reached this conclusion after noting that the results of the
first polygraph examination were reflective of Acevedo's credibility. Id
1863. Id The court observed that while slight differences existed, the defense sought at
both trials to admit the results of the first polygraph examination in order to rebut the Gov-
ernment's attack on the validity of the second examination. Id
1864. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
1865. Id at 394. The defendant in Jackson, while in pain and awaiting surgery in a hospi-
tal, confessed to shooting a policeman. The confession was admitted into evidence at the
defendant's trial, and the jury was allowed to hear conflicting testimony regarding the cir-
19821
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codified the decision by providing that a confession is admissible only
if voluntary, and that before such confessions are received into evi-
dence, the trial judge is to "determine any issue as to voluntariness"
outside of the jury's presence.
1 8 66
In United States v. Maher, '867 the Ninth Circuit considered
whether a defendant's failure to make a timely motion to determine the
voluntariness of his statement constitutes a waiver of his right to ex-
clude involuntary statements.' 6 8 Maher was convicted of conspiracy
and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.18 69 At the time of
his arrest, Maher made certain incriminating statements denying own-
ership of a BMW automobile.8 7 0 On appeal, Maher argued that the
trial court committed reversible error by refusing to hold a hearing on
the voluntariness of the statements.'
8 7'
The Ninth Circuit noted that Maher's attorney had been notified
before trial of the defendant's statements. Nevertheless, the voluntari-
ness issue was not raised in pretrial motions or at trial, nor was the
admissibility of the statements objected to until the close of the trial, at
which time Maher's attorney requested a hearing on their voluntari-
ness.8 72 The court held that because of the untimeliness of the defense
motion, the trial court was correct in refusing to hold a voluntariness
hearing.1
87 3
The holding in Maher is consistent with Ninth Circuit prece-
dent "'74 and with that of other circuits.18 75 There was no mention in
cumstances surrounding the confession. The prosecution, for example, denied the veracity
of the defendant's claim that he was denied water until he confessed. The jury was then left
to determine the voluntariness of the confession. Id at 370-74. In holding that such proce-
dure violated the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution, the
Court stated that "it is both practical and desirable that in cases to be tried hereafter a
proper determination of voluntariness be made prior to the admission of the confession to
the jury which is adjudicating guilt or innocence." Id at 395.
1866. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (1976).
1867. 645 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1981).
1868. Id at 183. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(f) provides that "[tjailure by party to raise defenses
or objections or to make requests which must be made prior to trial ... shall constitute
waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant relief from the waiver."
1869. 645 F.2d at 781.
1870. Id at 783. DEA agents suspected that the BMW was one of two cars used by the
defendant and his co-defendants in the drug trafficking. Id
1871. Id
1872. Id
1873. Id
1874. In Jacobson v. California, 431 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1970), the court upheld the de-
fendant's murder conviction, rejecting the argument that his confessions were improperly
admitted into evidence because no hearing was held to determine the voluntariness of the
confessions. "Only where there is an objection to a confession on the grounds it is involun-
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Maher, however, of the reason for the defendant's delay in requesting a
voluntariness hearing. The court, therefore, did not discuss the trial
judge's discretionary power to permit such a hearing when good cause
is shown.
876
H. Jury Instructions
Jury instructions are the principal means used by trial courts to
apprise jurors of the legal bases upon which their verdict is to rest.
18 77
It is, therefore, essential that these instructions be "clear, concise, accu-
rate and impartial statements of the law[,] written in understandable
language and delivered in conversational tone ... 1.78 Instructions
which lack these characteristics often result in misapplication of rele-
vant legal principles and, consequently, may constitute grounds for re-
versal."8 79 The Ninth Circuit expressly addressed the subject of jury
instructions in twelve recent decisions.
1. Standard of review
In United States v. Dacus,1880 the Ninth Circuit defined and ap-
plied the standard of review customarily utilized in determining the
propriety of jury instructions. Defendant Dacus, the owner of numer-
ous land developments in Nevada, was indicted and convicted on thir-
teen counts of selling unregistered lots from a "subdivision" in
tary or where there is present in the record evidence tending to show such involuntariness,
need there be held the special hearing out of the presence of the jury provided for in Jackson
v. Denno ... ." Id at 1019.
Similarly, in United States v. Yamashita, 527 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam), the
Ninth Circuit held that "18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) requires a hearing 'only if the issue of volunta-
riness is raised.'" Id at 955 (citations omitted).
1875. In United States v. Gresham, 585 F.2d 103 (5th Cir. 1978), the defendant requested a
voluntariness hearing late in the trial. The Fifth Circuit held that, "[a]ssuming that such a
request was sufficient to raise the issue, .. the court was not required to grant the request
at the time it was made." Id at 108.
In United States v. Stevens, 445 F.2d 304 (6th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
945 (1971), the defendant argued that his conviction should be overturned despite his receipt
of Miranda warnings, because he did not sign the accompanying acknowledgment and a
hearing was not held to determine the voluntariness of his confessions. The Sixth Circuit
disagreed, however, and held that "a hearing is required only if the issue of voluntariness is
raised." Id at 305.
1876. See supra note 1868.
1877. 3 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 100 (2d ed. 1980).
1878. Devitt, Ten Practical Suggestions About Federal Jury Instructions, 38 F.R.D. 75, 79
(1966).
1879. Id
1880. 634 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1980).
1982]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15
violation of the Interstate Land Sales Act. 1881 For purposes of this Act,
the term "subdivision" is defined in accordance with 15 U.S.C. section
1701(3) as "any land, located in any State or in a foreign country,
which is divided or proposed to be divided into fifty or more lots,
whether contiguous or not, for the purpose of sale or lease as part of a
common promotional plan .... 1882
On appeal, Dacus argued that the district court had erred in giving
a detailed instruction to the jury defining the term "common promo-
tional plan."'' 183 Noting that the standard of review was whether an
1881. Id. at 442-43 n.l. Dacus was specifically charged with violating 15 U.S.C. §
1703(a)(1) (1976). This section, as amended by 15 U.S.C. § 1703(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980),
provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any developer or agent, directly or indirectly, to make
use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate
commerce, or of the mails -
(1) to sell or lease any lot in any subdivision unless a statement of record with
respect to such lot is in effect in accordance with section 1706 of this title and a
printed property report, meeting the requirements of section 1707 of this title,
is furnished to the purchaser in advance of the signing of any contract or
agreement for sale or lease by the purchaser.
1882. 15 U.S.C. § 1701(3) (1976) amendedby 15 U.S.C. § 1701(3) (Supp. IV 1980) (empha-
sis added). The term "common promotional plan" is left essentially undefined by § 1701(3).
This section does, however, provide that such a plan is presumed to exist when "subdivided
land is offered for sale or lease by a single developer or developers acting in concert, and
such land is contiguous or is known, designated or advertised as a common unit or by com-
mon name." Id
The district court determined that Dacus had acted pursuant to a common promotional
plan based on the fact that the lots in question were: (1) known collectively by one or two
common names, (2) offered for sale in aggregate newspaper advertisements, and (3) eventu-
ally sold through one office by individuals who had authority to negotiate land sales from
any of the defendant's developments. 634 F.2d at 444.
1883. 634 F.2d at 445. Dacus specifically contended that the instruction impermissibly
broadened the scope of the term beyond the intent of Congress. The disputed instruction
provided:
Even if you do not find both of these elements [supporting a presumption of a
common promotional plan] you must still find that a common promotional plan
existed if you find a sufficient number of the following to convince you beyond a
reasonable doubt that the sale of the lots in the various parcels of land were being
made as part of a common enterprise; [Tihey are that the defendant developers
acted through common sales agents. That defendant developers acted through
common sales facilities such as a common sales office or offices with a common
telephone number. That the sales activities were directed by a common sales man-
ager. That the sales in the various parcels were made with the same developer
executing the contract of sale. That common advertising was used for the various
subdivisions. That the lots were treated by defendants as part of a common
inventory.
Id at n.7.
Dacus also argued on appeal that the district court had erred in failing to instruct the
jury that specific intent is a necessary element of a § 1703(a)(1) violation. Id at 446. The
Ninth Circuit held that the district court's refusal to give a specific intent instruction was
proper. Id In so holding, the court observed that the "Interstate Land Sales Act [had been]
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instruction was "misleading or represented a statement inadequate to
guide jury deliberations,"' 884 the Ninth Circuit held that the district
court's instruction did not constitute reversible error. 1885 According to
the court, it was clear, structured in accordance with evidence
presented in the case, and did not appear unfair or prejudicial to the
defendant. 188
6
2. Defendants' ability to control the content of instructions
In United States v. Buras, 1887 the Ninth Circuit considered whether
a trial court was required to adopt verbatim the text of a defendant's
proposed jury instruction. Defendant Buras, a free-lance truck driver,
was indicted on four counts of willful failure to file income tax returns
in violation of 26 U.S.C. section 7203.1888 At the close of his trial, he
requested that the district court: (1) instruct the jury that the Govern-
ment could avail itself of the civil remedy of assessing Buras' taxes
under 26 U.S.C. sections 6020(b)(1) and (2) without filing criminal
charges, 1889 and (2) instruct the jury on the meaning of "willfulness" as
modeled [after] the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et. seq.)." Id See also Schen-
ker v. United States, 529 F.2d 96, 97 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 818 (1976). The court
then reasoned that because specific intent is not an element of registration requirements
under the Securities Act, United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 396-97 (1933), it could not
be considered an element of registration requirements under § 1703(a)(1). 634 F.2d at 446.
1884. 634 F.2d at 446.
1885. Id.
1886. Id To the extent that the review standard articulated in Dacus contains no require-
ment that a disputed instruction be examined as a whole, it is inconsistent with prior rulings
of both the United States Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit. See, e.g., United States v.
Park, 421 U.S. 658, 674-76 (1975) (standard of review is whether instruction, viewed as a
whole, was misleading or contained a statement of law inadequate to guide jury's determina-
tion); United States v. Grayson, 597 F.2d 1225, 1230 (9th Cir.) ("Standard of review is
whether instruction taken as a whole was misleading or represented a statement inadequate
to guide jury deliberations."), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 873 (1979) (emphasis added). See also
Stoker v. United States, 587 F.2d 438, 440 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Brashier, 548
F.2d 1315, 1328 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1111 (1976). The Dacus case should not,
however, be regarded as an actual departure from precedent. The court unquestionably
applied the established standard of review when it evaluated the entire text of the challenged
instruction prior to rendering its decision. 634 F.2d at 445-46.
1887. 633 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1980).
1888. Id at 1358. 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
Any person required under this title to pay any estimated tax or tax, as re-
quired by this title or by regulations made under authority thereof to make a return
...willfully fails to pay such estimated tax or tax. . . at the time or times re-
quired by law or regulations, shall ...be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon
conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more
than 1 year, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.
1889. 633 F.2d at 1360. 26 U.S.C. §§ 6020(b)(1) and (2) (1976) provide in pertinent part:
[i]f any person fails to make any return. . . the Secretary [of the Treasury]
shall make such return from his own knowledge and from such information as he
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used in section 7203.1890 The court rejected both instructions and gave
instead an alternative instruction defining the term "willfulness." This
instruction was similar in content to that proposed by Buras.1
891
On appeal, Buras contended that the district court's refusal to util-
ize his requested instructions constituted reversible error.1892  The
Ninth Circuit disagreed holding that the district court had not erred in
refusing to instruct the jury that the Government could pursue the civil
remedy of assessment. 1893 The court reasoned that the "availability of
a civil remedy is irrelevant to the issue of criminal liability,"'1894 and
that "[s]uch an instruction would serve only to confuse the jury.'
1895
The Ninth Circuit ruled, in addition, that the district court had not
erred in refusing to give Buras' proposed instruction on "willfulness."
According to the court, "[a] defendant has no right to have the jury
instructed in the precise language he may desire."' 1896 It was, therefore,
sufficient, the court concluded, that the district court gave an "alterna-
tive instruction that covered the substance of Buras' proposed
instruction." 1
897
In United States v. Kenny, 1898 decided two months after Buras, the
Ninth Circuit reached a similar conclusion. Defendant Kenny and
three others were convicted of conspiring to defraud the government in
violation of 18 U.S.C. section 371.1899 On appeal, the defendants ar-
can obtain through testimony or otherwise. Any return so made and subscribed by
the Secretary shall be prima facie good and sufficient for all legal purposes.
1890. 633 F.2d at 1360.
1891. Id at 1359-60.
1892. Id at 1360. Buras also argued on appeal that the district court had erroneously
instructed the jury that wages constitute income. In upholding the district court's instruc-
tion, the Ninth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's ruling in Stratton's Independence, Ltd.
v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415 (1913) (income defined as the gain derived from labor), and
on Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(a)(1) (1954) (wages and salaries classified as income for taxation
purposes). 633 F.2d at 1361.
1893. 633 F.2d at 1360.
1894. Id
1895. Id The First and Tenth Circuits have established similar rulings. See United States
v. Borque, 541 F.2d 290, 296 (1st Cir. 1976); United States v. Merrick, 464 F.2d 1087, 1093
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1023 (1972).
1896. 633 F.2d at 1360.
1897. Id
1898. 645 F.2d 1323 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 920 (1981).
1899. Id at 1327. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976) provides:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the
United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any man-
ner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the
object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both.
If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the conspir-
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gued that the district court had erred in refusing to utilize a proposed
instruction distinguishing multiple conspiracies from the single con-
spiracy charged in the indictment. 190°
The Ninth Circuit held that while a "jury must be instructed as to
the defense theory of the case,. the exact language proposed by the
defendant need not be [employed] .... ,1901 The court concluded that
because the district court's own instructions on multiple and single con-
spiracies were sufficient to enable a jury to understand the distinctions
between these offenses, that court did not err in rejecting the defend-
ants' proposed instruction. 1902
acy, is a misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed
the maximum punishment provided for such misdemeanor.
1900. 645 F.2d at 1336-37. The defendants raised two additional arguments on appeal.
First, they contended that the district court's instructions failed to specifically delineate the
unlawful nature of the conspiratorial agreement. According to the defendants, this rendered
the instructions inadequate to guard against a finding of "guilt by association." Id The
Ninth Circuit rejected this claim, holding that the instructions given were sufficient to pre-
vent the jury from reaching any such finding. Id at 1337.
Second, the defendants contended that the district court should have ordered a dismis-
sal of their indictment because the "grand jury did not receive any instructions as to the
applicable law... ." Id at 1347. Noting that Kenny sought to introduce into grand jury
proceedings an analogue to petit jury instructions, the Ninth Circuit located no authority
which would justify such an undertaking. Consequently, this contention was similarly re-
jected. Id See Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956), in which the Court
stated that the "work [of grand juries is] not [to be] hampered by rigid procedural or eviden-
tial rules." See also United States v. Kennedy, 564 F.2d 1329, 1337 (9th Cir. 1977) (" 'The
function of a grand jury is investigative. Its proceedings are not adversary in nature, but
rather consist of inquiries conducted by laymen without resort to the technicalities of trial
procedure.' ") (quoting United States v. Ruyle, 524 F.2d 1133, 1135 (6th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976)), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 944 (1978).
1901. 645 F.2d at 1337.
1902. Id. The Ninth Circuit noted that the instructions given by the district court specifi-
cally provided that "'proof of several separate conspiracies is not proof of the single, overall
conspiracy charged in the indictment."' Id The court further observed that "[t]he instruc-
tions... directed the jury to acquit any defendant not found a member of the conspiracy
charged ... ." Id
The position adopted by the Buras and Kenny courts regarding a defendant's ability, or
rather relative inability, to control the content of jury instructions is consistent with that
previously articulated by the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit. See Sugarman v.
United States, 249 U.S. 182, 185 (1919). In Sugarman, the defendant was convicted of vio-
lating the Espionage Act by willfully causing or attempting to cause insubordination in
United States military forces. His conviction resulted from words spoken at a Socialist Party
meeting which was attended by draft registrants. The defendant appealed, arguing that the
district court had erred in refusing to give a requested instruction on the extent to which an
individual's freedom of speech is protected by the first amendment. The Supreme Court
held that the lower court was not obliged to adopt the exact instruction requested by the
defendant. It was sufficient, the Court implied, that the district court had given an alterna-
tive instruction which adequately apprised the jury of the constitutional protections afforded
speech. See also United States v. Witt, 648 F.2d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1981) (district court not
obliged to use defendant's instruction on reasonable doubt and presumption of innocence if
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3. Instructions in conspiracy cases
In United States v. Diggs, ' 9o3 the Ninth Circuit considered whether
evidence of a defendant's criminal activity is admissible to prove the
existence of an unrelated conspiracy when accompanied by an appro-
priate limiting instruction. Defendant Diggs was convicted of conspir-
ing to commit mail and wire fraud in the course of operating a fictitious
bank.' 9 4 His conviction expressly resulted from the issuance of false
certificates of deposit and letters of credit on behalf of bank clients.
The clients, in turn, used this negotiable paper to obtain legitimate
bank loans for which they otherwise did not qualify because of insuffi-
cient collateral. 90 5 At trial, a Government witness testified that Diggs
had also used the bank to obtain money fraudulently from third par-
ties. 19o The district court admitted this testimony over the defendant's
objection. 190 7
On appeal, Diggs argued that the testimony was inadmissible
under: (1) Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) because it proved only his
criminal propensities, 908 and (2) Federal Rule of Evidence 403 be-
cause, while it may have proved something other than his criminal
propensities, its probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial ef-
fect.' 90 9 Alternatively, Diggs asserted that even if the testimony were
court's instruction adequate); United States v. Collom, 614 F.2d 624, 632 (9th Cir. 1979)
(refusal to utilize defendant's specific intent instruction not error when court's instruction
adequately charged jury as to meaning of that term), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 923 (1980).
The remaining federal circuit courts have established similar rulings. See, e.g., United
States v. Brake, 596 F.2d 337, 339 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Irwin, 593 F.2d 138, 140
(1st Cir. 1979) (per curiam); United States v. Southers, 583 F.2d 1302, 1306-07 (5th Cir.
1978); United States v. Westbo, 576 F.2d 285, 289 (10th Cir. 1978); United States v. Jackson,
569 F.2d 1003, 1009 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 907 (1978); United States v. Rosa, 493
F.2d 1191, 1195 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 850 (1974); United States v. Bobo, 477 F.2d
974, 988 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 909 (1975); United States v. Blair, 456 F.2d
514, 520 (3d Cir. 1972); Carter v. United States, 427 F.2d 619, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1970); United
States v. Blane, 375 F.2d 249, 252 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 835 (1967).
1903. 649 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1981).
1904. Id at 734. Diggs specifically violated 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1341, and 1343. Id
1905. Id
1906. Id The witness stated that he had made three deposits in Diggs' bank totalling
$16,500 and had never recovered any of the funds. Id at 737.
1907. Id at 737.
1908. Id FED. R. EVID. 404(b) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the char-
acter of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
1909. 649 F.2d at 737. FED. R. EviD. 403 provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
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admissible, the district court had erred in failing to give the jury a lim-
iting instruction. 9 10
The Ninth Circuit held that Rule 404(b) did not preclude admis-
sion of the witness' testimony.191' The court rejected the argument that
the testimony proved only the defendant's criminal propensities, noting
that it would be useful in determining his motive and intent, as well as
the existence of a conspiracy. 1912 According to the court, the signifi-
cance of the testimony in establishing such factors as motive and intent
also demonstrated that its probative value outweighed its prejudicial
effect. Consequently, the court similarly held that Rule 403 did not
preclude its admission.
91 3
The Ninth Circuit ruled, in addition, that the district court had
provided the jury with an adequate limiting instruction. 19 14 It was suf-
ficient, the court observed, that the district court had admitted the wit-
ness' testimony and simultaneously instructed the jury to consider it
only as evidence of the defendant's intent or as evidence of the pres-
ence of a conspiracy. 915
In United States v. Burreson,1916 the Ninth Circuit considered
whether the defendants were entitled to a jury instruction defining mul-
tiple conspiracies. Defendant Burreson and two co-defendants were
convicted of conspiring to violate the Investment Company and Invest-
ment Advisors Acts of 1940.1'17 They appealed contending that they
had been prejudiced at trial because "the jury was not given an instruc-
tion on separate conspiracies and. . . was therefore precluded from
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.
1910. 649 F.2d at 737.
1911. Id.
1912. Id Since Diggs raised the defense of entrapment, however, see id, the circuit court
would probably have admitted the testimony even if it had shown nothing but his criminal
propensities. See United States v. Reynoso-Ulloa, 548 F.2d 1329, 1341 (9th Cir. 1977) (evi-
dence of defendant's criminal propensity and predisposition admissible to rebut entrapment
defense).
1913. 649 F.2d at 737.
1914. Id
1915. Id Accord United States v. Nichols, 534 F.2d 202, 205 (9th Cir. 1976) (evidence of
defendant's prior criminal activity admissible when court instructs jury to use it only as
proof of defendant's intent). Cf. United States v. Aims Back, 588 F.2d 1283, 1285-87 (9th
Cir. 1979) (evidence of defendant's additional criminal activities inadmissible when district
court's limiting instruction did not specify purpose for which the evidence was being admit-
ted, but instead provided that it could be accepted by the jury "for what value it may have in
... establishing the whole pattern of the evening.").
1916. 643 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1981).
1917. Id The defendants specifically violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-36, 80a-17, 80b-6 and 18
U.S.C. §§ 1342 and 371. Id
19821
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finding that the proof established. . . [such] conspiracies."'' 9 " The de-
fendants argued that an instruction of this type was required by Kol-
teakos v. United States. 1919
The Ninth Circuit held that the district court had not erred in re-
fusing to give a multiple conspiracy instruction. 1920 The court dist-
inguished Kotteakos, noting that the defendants were connected in that
case solely on the basis of fraudulent loans obtained from the same
individual. 1921 In contrast, the defendants in Burreson were directly
connected through interrelated financial transactions.
1922
The Ninth Circuit was faced with a similar issue in United States v.
Mayo. 1923 Defendant Mayo and a co-defendant were indicted for con-
spiring to commit mail and securities fraud. The indictment specifi-
cally charged that the defendants had engaged in a single conspiracy to
induce the public to purchase worthless securities. 1924 Following their
convictions, the defendants appealed, arguing that the district court's
refusal to instruct the jury on multiple conspiracies had created a preju-
dicial variance between the indictment and the proof.'
9 25
The circuit court held that the district court's failure to give a mul-
tiple conspiracy instruction did not create a prejudicial variance.
1926
The court reasoned that while the evidence demonstrated that the de-
1918. 643 F.2d at 1348. The defendants raised two additional challenges to the district
court's jury instructions. First, they argued that the jury had been improperly instructed on
the elements of knowledge, willfulness, and unlawfulness. Id at 1350. Noting that these
terms had been defined and repeated in connection with different counts, the circuit court
determined that these instructions, considered as a whole, were satisfactory. Id Second,
they contended that the jury had been improperly instructed on the Investment Company
and Advisors Acts. Id. The circuit court, however, summarily dismissed this contention.
.d.
1919. 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
1920. 643 F.2d at 1348.
1921. Id In Kotteakos, thirty-two defendants were charged with a single conspiracy to
violate the National Housing Act. No connection between the defendants was established,
however, other than that each had obtained a fraudulent loan from an individual named
Brown. The Government conceded that the proof established several conspiracies, and the
Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's determination that the failure to give a multi-
ple conspiracy instruction was not prejudicial. 328 U.S. at 769-71.
1922. 643 F.2d at 1346. It was established at trial that each defendant had been involved
in at least three fraudulent transactions involving mutual funds. Id at 1349. Cf United
States v. King, 472 F.2d 1, 12 (9th Cir.) (trial court's refusal to instruct on multiple conspira-
cies not error when evidence indicated that majority of co-conspirators knew each other and
participated in an illegal plan to distribute controlled substances), cer. denied, 414 U.S. 864
(1973).
1923. 646 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1981).
1924. Id at 374.
1925. Id
1926. Id
1982] CRIMINAL LAW SUR VEY
fendants had made several sales of securities to different members of
the public, the jury could still have rationally concluded that they had
combined in a single conspiracy for the unifying purpose of "bilking
the unsuspecting public by foisting worthless stock upon it.'
1 927
4. Instructions permitting a jury to make inferences or
presumptions
In addition to that issue previously discussed, 19 28 the Mayo court
also considered whether the Supreme Court's ruling in Sandstrom v.
Montana 1929 prohibited delivery of an instruction allowing the jury to
infer that the defendant intended the natural and probable conse-
quences of his acts.
1930
The circuit court held that Sandstrom was distinguishable and,
1927. Id The Mayo court's ruling is consistent with prior decisions of the Ninth, Fifth,
and Second Circuits. See, e.g., United States v. Lutz, 621 F.2d 940, 942-43 (9th Cir. 1980)
(prejudicial variance did not result from district court's failure to instruct on multiple fraud
schemes when jury could rationally have determined that defendants had engaged in unitary
fraud scheme); United States v. Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513, 517-18 (9th Cir. 1979) (prejudicial
variance did not result from district court's failure to instruct on multiple conspiracies when
jury could rationally have found that defendants had engaged in a single conspiracy);
United States v. Ashley, 555 F.2d 462, 467-68 (5th Cir. 1977) (prejudicial variance did not
result from district court's failure to instruct on multiple conspiracies when jury could ra-
tionally have found that defendants had engaged in a single conspiracy); United States v.
Perry, 550 F.2d 524, 531 (9th Cir.) (prejudicial variance did not result from district court's
failure to instruct on multiple conspiracies when jury could rationally conclude that there
was one general conspiracy), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 918 (1977); United States v. Finkelstein,
526 F.2d 517, 521-22 (2d Cir. 1975) (prejudicial variance did not result from district court's
failure to instruct on multiple conspiracies when jury could rationally have concluded that
defendants' activities manifested unifying purpose to defraud public), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
960 (1976).
1928. See supra notes 1923-27 and accompanying text.
1929. 442 U.S. 510 (1979). In Sandstrom, "he trial court instructed the jury that "[tihe law
presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts." Id at 513
(emphasis added). The Supreme Court concluded that because the jury could have inter-
preted this "presumption" as conclusive, the instruction violated the fourteenth amend-
ment's requirement that a State prove every element of a criminal offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. The Court was clear in pointing out, however, that an instruction which
allowed the jury to infer the intent of a criminal defendant was constitutionally permissible.
Id at 517-24.
1930. 646 F.2d at 375. The disputed instruction specifically provided:
Intent ordinarily may not be proved directly because there is no way of fathoming
or scrutinizing the operations of the human mind. But you may infer the defend-
ant's intent from the surrounding circumstances. You may consider any statement
made and done or omitted by the defendant, and all other facts and circumstances
in evidence which indicate his state of mind. You may consider it reasonable to
draw the inference and find that a person intends the natural and probable conse-
quences of acts knowingly done or knowingly omitted. As I have said, it is entirely
up to you to decide what facts to find from the evidence.
Id (emphasis added).
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therefore, did not prohibit use of such an instruction. 1931 Specifically,
the court noted that the Sandstrom instruction had been condemned
because it allowed the jury topresume rather than infer that a person
intended the ordinary consequences of all voluntary acts. 1932 The in-
struction challenged by Mayo, however, allowed only an inference of
intent. 1
933
In United States v. Tunnel, '93 the Ninth Circuit considered a
somewhat related issue. Defendant Tunnell was convicted of receiving,
concealing and facilitating the transportation of marijuana known to
have been illegally imported in violation of 21 U.S.C. section
176(a). 1935 On appeal, Tunnell challenged the district court's use of an
instruction which allowed the jury to presume that an individual pos-
sessing marijuana also knew of its unlawful importation. 1936 Specifi-
cally, Tunnell asserted that such presumptions had been declared
unconstitutional in Leary v. United States. 1937
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the Leary Court had par-
tially invalidated the challenged presumption. 1938  In addition, the
court noted that Leary had been given full retroactive effect in United
States v. Scott. 1939 The court was careful to emphasize, however, that
1931. Id
1932. Id See supra note 1929.
1933. 646 F.2d at 375.
1934. 650 F.2d 1124 (9th Cir. 1981).
1935. Id at 1124-25. 21 U.S.C. § 176(a) was repealed by Pub. L. No. 91-513, Title III,
§ 1101(a)(2), (9), 84 Stat. 1291, 1292 (1970). It provided in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, whoever knowingly, with intent
to defraud the United States, imports or brings into the United States marihuana
contrary to law, or smuggles or clandestinely introduces into the United States ma-
rihuana which should have been invoiced, or receives, conceals, buys, sells, or in
any manner facilitates the transportation, concealment, or sale of such marihuana
after being imported or brought in, knowing the same to have been imported or
brought into the United States contrary to law, or whoever conspires to do any of
the foregoing acts, shall be imprisoned ....
Whenever on trial for violation of this subsection, the defendant is shown to
have or to have had the marihuana in his possession, such possession shall be
deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction unless the defendant explains
his possession to the satisfaction of the jury.
1936. 650 F.2d at 1125.
1937. Id In Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969), the Supreme Court held that the
presumption in § 176(a) constituted a denial of due process and therefore violated the fifth
amendment. Id at 37. The Court noted, however, that the inference or presumption would
be permissible when it appeared "on the basis of the available materials that the [possessor
of marijuana was aware of the] high rate of importation or [was] aware that [the particular]
marijuana was grown abroad." Id at 46-47.
1938. 650 F.2d at 1125.
1939. Id In United States v. Scott, 425 F.2d 55, 59 (9th Cir. 1970), the court concluded
that "the decision in Leary partially invalidating the presumption is fully retroactive."
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neither Leary nor Scott resulted in the presumption's complete invalid-
ity. 940 Thus, while an instruction containing the presumption usually
required reversal of a defendant's conviction, this was unnecessary in
instances when "giving. . . the instruction under the circumstances of
the case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."'
1941
Applying the principles enunciated in Leary and Scott, the circuit
court reversed the district court's judgment of conviction. 1942 Noting
that Tunnell had been found guilty solely on the basis of testimony
given by a Government agent, 1943 the court stated that this testimony
did not unequivocally demonstrate the defendant's possession of mari-
juana, as well as his knowledge of its illegal importation.' 944 Even as-
suming that the jury believed the agent's testimony regarding Tunnell's
possession, it still needed to reconcile the agent's assertion that Tunnell
knew of its unlawful importation with his own assertion that he lacked
such knowledge. 1945 Since it was impossible to ascertain whether the
jury had resolved this credibility issue in favor of the Government or
had relied on the presumption in the instruction, the court concluded
that it could not determine whether the instruction was harmless be-
yond a reasonable doubt.194
1940. 650 F.2d at 1125.
1941. Id The Ninth Circuit has consistently taken this approach. See United States v.
Tapia-Lopez, 521 F.2d 582, 583 (9th Cir. 1975) (defendant entitled to reversal of conviction
in a § 176(a) action unless presumption instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt). See also United States v. Mahoney, 427 F.2d 658, 661 (9th Cir. 1970).
1942. 650 F.2d at 1125-27.
1943. Id at 1125. The Government agent, Lusardi, testified that he arranged to purchase
from Tunnell and another individual a quantity of marijuana represented to have been im-
ported from Lebanon. Id Lusardi further testified that when he met Tunnell later that day
to consummate the purchase, Tunnell handed him the marijuana. Id Tunnell subsequently
took the stand and flatly denied: (1) making any statement to Lusardi regarding the sale of
imported marijuana, and (2) possessing the marijuana in question. Id at 1125-26.
1944. Id at 1126. Contra Feldstein v. United States, 429 F.2d 1092 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 920 (1970), discussed infra note 1946.
1945. 650 F.2d at 1126.
1946. Id Accord United States v. May, 431 F.2d 678, 683 (9th Cir. 1970) (presumption
instruction in a § 176(a) action not harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt when
defendant flatly contradicted testimony of Government agents regarding discovery of mari-
juana).
The Ninth Circuit has reached a different conclusion, however, when: (1) the same
testimony establishes both the fact of possession and the fact of importation, Feldstein v.
United States, 429 F.2d 1092, 1095 (9th Cir.) (presumption instruction harmless error when
same testimony demonstrated the defendant's constructive possession of marijuana as well
as his knowledge of its illegal importation), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 920 (1970), or (2) the
defendant was apprehended with undeclared marijuana while in the process of crossing, or
after having just crossed the United States border. United States v. Teran, 434 F.2d 605, 607
(9th Cir. 1970) (presumption instruction harmless error because "the knowing possession of
undeclared marihuana found in an automobile which the defendant has just driven across
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5. Surplus instructions
In United States v. DeFiipis, '9 47 the Ninth Circuit considered
whether the presence of surplus instructions (ie., instructions unneces-
sary to resolve the pertinent issue) affected the outcome of a decision.
Defendant DeFilippis was indicted on eight counts of passing1948 and
uttering 1949 altered United States obligations with the intent to de-
fraud.1950 The indictments resulted from a scheme created by DeFilip-
pis and her husband, whereby altered one-dollar bills were used to
swindle local merchants. 1951
At the close of her trial, DeFilippis requested that the district court
strike any portions of the proposed jury instructions pertaining to the
offense of uttering. 1952 The Government agreed, conceding that there
was no evidence to support a conviction for that offense. 953 The dis-
trict court, nevertheless, instructed the jury that they could convict the
defendant if they determined that she had passed or uttered altered
the border establishes actual knowledge that the marihuana was illegally imported, without
reference to any presumpifon. ") (emphasis added). See also Zaragoza-Almeida v. United
States, 427 F.2d 1148, 1149 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Simon, 424 F.2d 1049, 1050 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 827 (1970).
1947. 637 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir. 1981).
1948. The offense ofpassing altered United States obligations is generally defined as "put-
ting them off in payment or exchange." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1289 (4th rev. ed. 1968).
The term "obligations," in turn, signifies any "bonds, certificates of indebtedness, national
bank currency, Federal Reserve notes, Federal Reserve bank notes, coupons, United States
notes, Treasury notes, gold certificates, silver certificates, fractional notes, certificates of de-
posit, bills, checks, or drafts for money, drawn by or upon authorized officers of the United
States, stamps, [or] other representatives of value, of whatever denomination, issued under
any Act of Congress." 18 U.S.C. § 8 (1976).
1949. The offense of uttering altered United States obligations is generally defined as in-
tending to pass or offering to pass them, coupled with a declaration that they are "good."
BLACK'S LAW DiCTIONARY 1716 (4th rev. ed. 1968). For a definition of the term "obliga-
tions," see supra note 1948.
1950. 637 F.2d at 1372.
1951. The DeFilippis' scheme operated in the following manner: "[Defendant DeFilippis
and her husband] would enter a store and make a small purchase, paying with a twenty-
dollar bill. The store would usually return change of a ten, five and several one-dollar bills,
The DeFilippises would then walk away from the counter, exchange the good ten-dollar bill
for a previously prepared one-dollar bill with the end of a ten-dollar bill taped over it, and
return to the counter claiming that the clerk had mistakenly given them the altered bill." In
most instances, the clerk would exchange the altered bill for a genuine ten. Id at 1374.
Although the DeFilippises were forced to partially destroy a ten-dollar bill each time
they altered a one-dollar bill, the ten-dollar bills remained valid. See Treas. Reg. § 100.5
(1980) (note worth face value if at least one-half intact). Thus, the DeFilippises were able to
defraud a merchant out of nine dollars every time they successfully executed their scheme.
637 F.2d at 1374.
1952. 637 F.2d at 1374.
1953. Id
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United States obligations.1 954 DeFilippis was convicted on six of the
original eight counts charged in the indictment. 1955
On appeal, she argued that the district court's refusal to strike the
uttering instruction may have caused the jury to convict her on a le-
gally insufficient ground.1 956 The Ninth Circuit held that despite the
presence of the uttering instruction, the jury could not have concluded
on the facts presented that DeFilippis was guilty of that offense.
19 57
Passing was the only logical basis for the jury's conviction.1958  The
court, therefore, reasoned that any error in including the uttering in-
struction was harmless and did not necessitate reversal.
959
6. Admissibility of co-defendants' guilty pleas
In United States v. Halbert, 1960 the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed that
guilty pleas of co-defendants are admissible at a defendant's trial if ac-
companied by an adequate limiting instruction. Defendant Halbert
1954. Id at 1373. The court specifically instructed the jury that "the first element of a
section 472 violation was satisfied if the defendant 'passed or uttered an altered United
States Federal Reserve Note .... "' Id The court then defined passing as "'putting [a
note] off in payment or exchange,"' and uttering as " 'requiring an intent or offer to pass a
note, coupled with a declaration that it is good."' Id
1955. Id at 1372.
1956. Id
1957. Id at 1373-74. The court based its holding on the ground that, contrary to the defi-
nition of uttering, see supra note 1949, the evidence established: (1) that DeFilippis had
passed the one-dollar bills, rather than intended or offered to pass them, and (2) that she
made no declaration that the bills were genuine.
1958. Id at 1374.
1959. Id at 1375. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a). This ruling is consistent with previous
Ninth Circuit decisions, as well as the decisions of other circuit courts. See, e.g., United
States v. Baker, 611 F.2d 961, 963-64 (4th Cir. 1979) (harmless error for court to instruct on
"using facilities of interstate commerce" with intent to promote prostitution when evidence
only supported an instruction for "traveling in interstate commerce" with intent to promote
prostitution); United States v. Clavey, 565 F.2d 111, 116 (7th Cir. 1977) (harmless error for
court to instruct jury on "taxable stktus of political campaign funds diverted to personal use"
when no evidence implicated defendant in such diversion), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 954 (1978);
United States v. Pyle, 424 F.2d 1013, 1016 (9th Cir. 1970) (harmless error for court to in-
struct jury on "constructive possession" of marijuana when evidence only supported a find-
ing of "actual possession"); United States v. Mont, 306 F.2d 412, 417 (2d Cir. 1962)
(harmless error for court to instruct jury on "selling and facilitating a sale of narcotics" when
facts of case only supported a finding that defendants had "received and concealed narcot-
ics").
But see United States v. Talkington, 589 F.2d 415 (9th Cir. 1978). In Talkingon, the
jury was instructed that it could base a finding of guilt on any one of five false statements
made by the defendant in an Interstate Commerce Commission filing. Because three of the
falsehoods were immaterial and the jury might have convicted on a legally insufficient
ground, the court held that the instruction constituted reversible error. Id at 417-18.
1960. 640 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1981).
1982]
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and two co-defendants were indicted on sixteen counts of mail
fraud.1961 The co-defendants pleaded guilty to the charges and testified
against Halbert at his trial. 962 Over Halbert's objection, the district
court permitted both co-defendants to inform the jury that they had
pleaded guilty to the offense for which Halbert was being tried. A con-
viction subsequently resulted.
1963
On appeal, Halbert argued that: (1) the trial court had erred by
allowing the prosecution to introduce his co-defendants' guilty
pleas,19 4 and (2) the trial court had erred by failing to instruct the jury
that a mail fraud conviction can result only when a defendant has
made material misrepresentations.1
9 61
The Ninth Circuit initially noted that while the guilty plea of a co-
defendant may not be offered as substantive evidence of the guilt of
those on trial, 1966 it may, under proper instructions, be considered by
the jury for the limited purpose of evaluating the co-defendant's credi-
bility as a witness.1967 The court concluded, however, that the district
court had failed to instruct the jury adequately on the limited use of the
1961. Id at 1003.
1962. Id at 1004.
1963. Id
1964. Id at 1003-04.
1965. Id at 1007. Halbert was charged with making six misrepresentations. He also ar-
gued on appeal that his conviction should be reversed because the court's instructions raised
the possibility that the jury could have based its verdict on one of the misrepresentations
which Halbert alleged was unsupported by the evidence. Id at 1008. In dictum, the court
noted that in a mail fraud prosecution, the Government need not prove every misrepresenta-
tion charged in the indictment. "Even if the Government had not established one or more
of the six acts of misrepresentation involved in this case, sufficient proof of even one of the
acts would have been enough to support Halbert's conviction for mail fraud." Id
1966. Id at 1004. This principle is well established in federal circuit courts. See, e.g.,
United States v. Whitehead, 618 F.2d 523, 529-30 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. Weisle,
542 F.2d 61, 62 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Bryza, 522 F.2d 414, 425 (7th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 912 (1976); United States v. King, 505 F.2d 602, 607 (5th Cir. 1974);
Baker v. United States, 393 F.2d 604, 614 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 836 (1968); Freije
v. United-States, 386 F.2d 408, 411 (1st Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 859 (1969); United
States v. Restaino, 369 F.2d 544, 545 (3d Cir. 1966); Aron v. United States, 306 F.2d 946, 947
(10th Cir. 1962); United States v. Crosby, 294 F.2d 928, 949-50 (2d Cir. 1961), cerf. denied,
368 U.S. 984 (1962); Payton v. United States, 222 F.2d 794, 796 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
1967. 640 F.2d at 1004. The Ninth Circuit, as well as a number of other circuits, recog-
nizes that when accompanied by adequate cautionary instructions, the guilty pleas of co-
defendants may be utilized by the jury in assessing witness credibility. United States v.
Whitehead, 618 F.2d 523, 529-39 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. Romeros, 600 F.2d 1104,
1105 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam), cer. denied, 444 U.S. 1077 (1980); United States v. Ander-
son, 532 F.2d 1218, 1230 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 839 (1976); United States v. Bryza,
522 F.2d 414, 424-25 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 912 (1976); Issac v. United States,
431 F.2d 11, 14-15 (9th Cir. 1970); Baker v. United States, 393 F.2d 604, 614 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 836 (1968).
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guilty pleas.1968 This failure constituted reversible error.1969
The Ninth Circuit also held that because the evidence clearly
demonstrated that Halbert's misrepresentations were material, the dis-
trict court's failure to instruct on materiality was not erroneous.1 970
7. Informant, addict, and eyewitness identification instructions
In People v. Dela Rosa, 19 7 1 the Ninth Circuit considered whether
the district court had erred by refusing to give the defendant's proposed
informant, addict, and eyewitness identification instructions. Defend-
ant Dela Rosa was indicted and convicted on three counts of robbery,
two counts of murder, and one count of attempted murder. 1972 The
prosecution's primary witness was an acquaintance of Dela Rosa's
named Anthony Gumataotao. 1973 Gumataotao testified that Dela Rosa
had admitted committing the crimes in question. 1974
At the close of his trial, Dela Rosa requested that the district court
give his proposed informant, accomplice, informant-addict, and eye-
witness identification instructions. 197 He argued that these instructions
were supported by the evidence and were necessary to caution the jury
regarding Gumataotao's reliability. 1976 The trial court refused to give
the informant instruction on the ground that Gumataotao was neither
1968. 640 F.2d at 1006. The district court's only instruction regarding the use of co-de-
fendants' guilty pleas read: "[The] disposition of [the co-defendants]... should not control
or influence you in your verdict with reference to the remaining defendant, Mr. Halbert.
You must base your verdict as to him solely on the evidence presented to you in this court-
room." Id
The Ninth Circuit concluded that this instruction was insufficient to apprise the jury
that it could use the pleas only as evidence of the co-defendant's credibility. Id In addition,
the court noted that the most effective practice would have been to instruct the jury when
evidence of the plea was admitted and again in final instructions. Id at 1006-07. In any
event, the jury should have been told in unequivocal language that the plea may not be
considered as evidence of a defendant's guilt. Id
1969. Id at 1007.
1970. Id at 1008. The Ninth Circuit has reached a similar conclusion in previous deci-
sions. See United States v. Valdez, 594 F.2d 725, 728-29 (9th Cir. 1979) (failure to instruct
jury on materiality of false statements not erroneous considering clear proof of their materi-
ality); United States v. Kostoff, 585 F.2d 378, 380 (9th Cir. 1978) (failure to instruct jury on
materiality of misrepresentations not erroneous considering clear proof of their materiality).
1971. 644 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
1972. Id at 1258.
1973. Id at 1259. Gumataotao was, in fact, an accessory to the offenses committed by
Dela Rosa. He had helped Dela Rosa hide the murder weapon and the property stolen from
the victims. Id
1974. Id
1975. Id
1976. Id
19821
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paid nor received official immunity for his testimony. 1977 The court
also refused to give the informant-addict and accomplice instructions,
but did, however, give a general instruction on eyewitness iden-
tification. 1
978
On appeal, Dela Rosa argued that the superior court of Guam had
erred in refusing to instruct the jury in the manner requested. 1979 The
Ninth Circuit held that the superior court's refusal to deliver the de-
fendant's proposed informant instruction constituted reversible er-
ror. 980  The court reasoned that the definition of an informant
included persons who provided evidence against a defendant for some
personal advantage or vindication, as well as for pay or immunity. 198'
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on: (1) Federal Jury Prac-
tice and Instructions, section 17.02 1982 and (2) Steinmark v. Parat. 1983
The circuit court also held that while the evidence demonstrated
that Gumataotao was an accessory after the fact, the superior court
need not have given a separate accomplice instruction. 98 4 The court
stated that an informant instruction would have sufficed had the cir-
cumstances regarding Gumataotao's connection with the crime been
incorporated therein. 985
1977. Id Gumataotao was instead promised by law enforcement authorities that he
would not be prosecuted. Id
1978. Id at 1259, 1261.
1979. Id at 1259.
1980. Id at 1260.
1981. Id at 1259.
1982. DEVITT & BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS (3d ed. 1977).
Section 17.02 provides:
The testimony of an informer who provides evidence against a defendant for pay,
orfor immunityfrom punishment, orforpersonal advantage or vindication must be
examined and weighed by the jury with greater care than the testimony of an ordi-
nary witness. The jury must determine whether the informer's testimony has been
affected by interest, or by prejudice against defendant.
(emphasis added).
1983. 427 F. Supp. 931, 935 (D. Neb. 1977). In Steinmark, the defendant attacked his
conviction for delivery of a controlled substance by petitioning the court for a writ of habeas
corpus. The primary basis for this conviction had been the testimony of an undercover drug
purchaser who was paid for his services by the Nebraska State Patrol. The district court
classified this individual as an informant since he had provided "evidence against a defend-
ant for pay or some other personal advantage." Id at 935 n.4.
The Dela Rosa court's adoption of this definition, however, is entirely inconsistent with
the only previous Ninth Circuit opinion on point. See United States v. Hoyos, 573 F.2d
1111, 1116 (9th Cir. 1978). In Hoyos, the Ninth Circuit held that "'[t]o be an informer the
individual supplying the information generally is either paid for his services, or, having been
a participant in the unlawful transaction, is granted immunity in exchange for his testi-
mony.'" (quoting United States v. Miller, 499 F.2d 736, 742 (10th Cir. 1974)).
1984. 644 F.2d at 1261.
1985. Id
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With regard to the defendant's proposed addict instruction, the
court noted that although the Ninth Circuit had not specifically de-
cided whether such an instruction was required, 1986 recent cases indi-
cated its appropriateness in certain circumstances. 1987 The court thus
concluded that, on retrial, an addict instruction should be given if evi-
dence could be established demonstrating Gumataotao's addiction to
heroin. 1988
Finally, the court summarily concluded that the superior court had
not erred in rejecting Dela Rosa's detailed eyewitness identification
instruction.1989
8. Definition of "reasonable doubt" and "presumption of
innocence" in instructions
In United States v. Witt, 1990 the Ninth Circuit considered whether
the district court had committed reversible error by failing to define for
the jury the terms "reasonable doubt" and "presumption of inno-
cence." Defendant Witt was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. section
10141991 as a result of making false representations to the Alaska Fed-
eral Credit Union. 1992 On appeal, he raised two arguments: (1) that
the district court had erred by refusing to instruct the jury on the mean-
ing of "reasonable doubt"' 1993 and (2) that the district court had erred
by refusing to instruct the jury on the meaning of "presumption of
innocence." 
1994
1986. See United States v. Cook, 608 F.2d 1175, 1182 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1034 (1980).
1987. 644 F.2d at 1261. See United States v. Bernard, 625 F.2d 854, 858-59 (9th Cir. 1980)
(advisable to incorporate addict charge in instructions given at defendant's retrial when in-
formant admitted drug addiction at trial); United States v. Tousant, 619 F.2d 810, 812 (9th
Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (addict instruction should be given when informant's drug addiction
is evident).
1988. 644 F.2d at 1261.
1989. Id The court's ruling that a general eyewitness instruction is sufficient comports
with previous Ninth Circuit decisions, as well as the decisions of other circuit courts. See,
e.g., United States v. Lone Bear, 579 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Kava-
nagh, 572 F.2d 9, 13 (1st Cir. 1978); United States v. Trejo, 501 F.2d 138, 140 (9th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1150-51 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Evans, 484
F.2d 1178, 1187-88 (2d Cir. 1973).
1990. 648 F.2d 608 (9th Cir. 1981).
1991. Id at 609. 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Whoever knowingly
makes any false statement or report.., for the purpose of influencing in any way the action
of.. .a Federal credit union.. . shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not
more than two years, or both.'
1992. 648 F.2d at 609.
1993. Id
1994. Id Although the district court did not attempt to define "reasonable doubt" or de-
1982]
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Witt's initial argument raised a question of first impression for the
Ninth Circuit. 1995 After noting that a number of other circuits were
divided on the issue, 1996 however, the court held that the decision to
define the term was discretionary. 1997 It then concluded that the lower
court had not abused its discretion. 1998 Inexplicably, Witt's second ar-
gument was never properly addressed.1999 The court merely observed
that, although it was appropriate to instruct the jury on the existence of
the presumption in some cases,2000 an instruction was not always
mandatory.2001 The court, in fact, even failed to specify whether such
an instruction was required by the facts as presented. 2
9. The Allen charge
In United States v. Moore,2 °°3 the Ninth Circuit considered
scribe the "presumption of innocence," it did give the following instruction: "The law does
not require a defendant to prove his innocence. He is presumed by law to be innocent. This
means the government must prove all of its case against the defendant. The government
must prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Id at 610.
1995. Id in United States v. Robinson, 546 F.2d 309, 313-14 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 918 (1977), the Ninth Circuit reviewed a jury instruction defining "reasonable
doubt." After concluding that the instruction did not constitute reversible error, the court
stated in dictum that an instruction defining that term must convey its meaning accurately.
It did not, however, consider whether a trial court must, upon request, define "reasonable
doubt."
1996. Compare United States v. Lawson, 507 F.2d 433, 439-44 (7th Cir. 1974) (failure to
give instruction defining "beyond a reasonable doubt" no basis for reversing a trial other-
wise fairly conducted), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1004 (1975) with Blatt v. United States, 60 F.2d
481, 481 (3d Cir. 1932) (failure to give instruction defining reasonable doubt resulted in
prejudicial error) and Nanfito v. United States, 20 F.2d 376, 378-79 (8th Cir. 1927) (failure to
define reasonable doubt constituted prejudicial error) and Schenks v. United States, 2 F.2d
185, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1924) (failure to give instruction defining reasonable doubt resulted in
reversible error).
1997. 648 F.2d at 611. This ruling was based in part on a statement made by the Supreme
Court in Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954) ("[A]ttempts to define the term
'reasonable doubt' do not usually result in making it any clearer to the minds of the jury.").
1998. 648 F.2d at 611.
1999. Id
2000. Id See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 490 (1978) (defendant's right to fair trial
violated by failure to instruct on presumption of innocence when trial court's instructions
were skeletal and prosecutor's improper suggestions made it likely that jury would convict
on the basis of extraneous considerations).
2001. See Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 788 (1979) (per curiam) ("While this Court
in Taylor reversed a conviction resulting from a trial in which the judge had refused to give
a requested instruction on the presumption of innocence, the Court did not there fashion a
new rule of constitutional law requiring that such an instruction be given in every criminal
case.").
2002. 648 F.2d at 611. The Ninth Circuit simply concluded that the district court's instruc-
tion, apprising the jury of the existence of the presumption, was adequate. Id
2003. 653 F.2d 384 (9th Cir. 1981).
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whether the district court had acted properly in delivering an Allen
charge to the jury.2° 4 Defendant Moore was indicted for soliciting
money in exchange for his promise not to testify at the trial of an-
other.2c °5 After the jury had deliberated for slightly over a day and a
half, it notified the court of a deadlock.c° 6 In response, the court gave
a modified Allen charge.2 ° °7 Following two more hours of deliberation,
the jury rendered a guilty verdict. °°8
On appeal, Moore argued that use of the Allen charge constituted
reversible error.2 °°9 The Ninth Circuit, however, rejected this conten-
tion,20 10 noting that the charge was proper because it had not served to
coerce the jury.20 1' The court's holding apparently rested on a combi-
nation of four factors: (1) the jury's indication of a deadlock prior to
receiving the charge,0 12 (2) the period of deliberation following the
charge, which the court reasoned was sufficient for each juror "to reach
a. . . decision based on his own perception of the evidence and the
2004. Id at 390. In Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501-02 (1896), the Supreme
Court approved auxiliary instructions given by the district court to encourage a jury verdict.
The instructions essentially admonished the jurors to reach a verdict if they could conscien-
tiously do so, and instructed minority jurors to consider the reasonableness of their views.
Use of the Allen charge has been expressly approved by the Ninth Circuit, especially
when given in response to a jury's request, United States v. Seawell, 550 F.2d 1159, 1163 (9th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied 439 U.S. 991 (1978), or when given in response to a jury deadlock.
United States v. Peterson, 549 F.2d 654, 659 (9th Cir. 1977). At least three circuits, however,
have refused to utilize the instruction in its traditional form. See United States v. Silvem,
484 F.2d 879, 882-83 (7th Cir. 1973) (en banc); United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177, 1187
(D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 420 (3d Cir. 1969).
2005. 653 F.2d at 385.
2006. Id at 390.
2007. Id
2008. Id
2009. Id
2010. 653 F.2d at 390. Accord United States v. Beattie, 613 F.2d 762, 764-66 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 982 (1980). In Beattie, the court upheld use of theAllen charge when it
had been given after an eight-hour deliberation without indication of deadlock. The court
noted that the three and one-half hours of deliberation following the charge were sufficient
to permit jury members to reach a verdict, based on their own perceptions of the evidence
and law. Cf. United States v. Contreras, 463 F.2d 773, 774 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam). In
Contreras, the Ninth Circuit concluded that use of the charge was premature and coercive
when the jury had deliberated for eight hours, had given no indication that it was dead-
locked, and had reached a verdict within thirty-five minutes after the instruction was given.
2011. Id See Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445, 446 (1965) (per curiam) (Allen charge
proper when in its context and under all the circumstances of the case the instruction was
not coercive); United States v. Beattie, 613 F.2d 762, 764 (9th Cir.) ("[T]o determine the
propriety of the trial court's use of an Allen charge. . . we must examine the instruction 'in
its context and under all the circumstances' to see if it had a coercive effect upon the jury."),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 982 (1980) (quoting Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. at 446).
2012. 653 F.2d at 390.
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law, '20 13 (3) the absence of any evidence indicating that the judge or
jury had expressed frustration at failing to reach a verdict,2014 and (4)
the absence of any evidence indicating that the judge had given minor-
ity jurors the impression that the charge was directed at them.01 5
V. POST-CONVICTION PROCEEDINGS
A. Double Jeopardy
1. Post-conviction prosecutions
The double jeopardy clause bars successive prosecutions for the
same offense after conviction.20 16 However, if the crime charged in a
second prosecution arose from a criminal act or set of facts completely
distinct from the original conviction, the second prosecution does not
violate the double jeopardy clause. For example, in United States v.
Mayo, 2017 two conspiracies involved "different co-conspirators, differ-
ent victims, different purposes, different timespans, different locales,
and different sections of the United States Code. '20 18 The Ninth Cir-
cuit considered the two conspiracies to have arisen from distinct sets of
facts, thus permitting a subsequent prosecution.2019
In Mayo, defendant Dondich was convicted of securities fraud for
his involvement in a scheme to market worthless debt securities. Four
years earlier, he had been convicted of conspiring to induce the sale of
sugar futures contracts. The only element common to the two convic-
tions was his use of a Colombian ranch as a financial asset to entice
purchasers. 020 Nevertheless, he argued that both convictions involved
"one giant" conspiracy and that the second prosecution violated the
double jeopardy clause.20 2' The Ninth Circuit found the securities
fraud charge to be completely distinct from the earlier conspiracy.0 22
2013. Id
2014. Id
2015. Id
2016. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969); In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176
(1889).
2017. 646 F.2d 369 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1127 (1981).
2018. Id at 372-73.
2019. Id at 373. See also Rogers v. United States, 609 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir. 1979) (1977
mail fraud conviction and 1979 mail fraud conviction considered factually distinct crimes,
involving different development schemes, different offenses, and partially different time
frames).
2020. 646 F.2d at 373.
2021. Id at 372.
2022. In determining whether the securities fraud charge of the second prosecution and the
earlier conspiracy charge were the same offense for double jeopardy purposes, the Mayo
court applied the test stated in Arnold v. United States, 336 F.2d 347, 349 (9th Cir. 1964),
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A more difficult double jeopardy issue concerns charges that could
have been joined in a prior prosecution but were not. Faced with such
a situation in United States v. Brooklier,2023 the Ninth Circuit consid-
ered whether the Blockburger test224 was applicable to post-conviction
prosecutions. The Blockburger test provides that multiple offenses aris-
ing from the same criminal act are separately punishable when each
offense requires proof of a different element. If the charges had been
joined originally in a single indictment, Blockburger would determine
whether .double jeopardy bars multiple punishment for those
charges.2°2- In cases of successive prosecutions, however, a school of
thought led by Justice Brennan favors the "same transaction" test,20 26
cert. denied, 380 U.S. 982 (1965): "is proof of the matter set out in a second indictment
admissible as evidence under the first indictment, and could a conviction have been properly
sustained on such evidence?" 646 F.2d at 372.
2023. 637 F.2d 620 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 980 (1981).
2024. In Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), the Supreme Court articulated
a test for determining when a defendant may be prosecuted and punished for multiple statu-
tory offenses arising from a single criminal act or transaction: "The applicable rule is that
where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions,
the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether
each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not." Id at 304.
The Blockburger test is a rule of statutory construction, focusing on the elements of an
offense. It determines congressional intent to impose cumulative punishment for the viola-
tion of multiple offenses. See Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 691 (1980). If each
statutory offense for which the defendant is prosecuted requires proof of an element not
required by the others, then the test is satisfied and multiple punishment is permissible
under the double jeopardy clause.
2025. See infra note 2083. The Brooklier court noted that a defendant may be charged in a
single prosecution with both conspiracy to violate RICO and a substantive RICO offense.
637 F.2d at 622. See United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 569-71 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980).
2026. As characterized in Brooklier, the "same transaction" test means that "[c]harges aris-
ing from a single transaction would have to be brought in a single prosecution; those omitted
would be waived." 637 F.2d at 622. In Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959), Justice
Brennan wrote:
Thus to permit the Government statutorily to multiply the number of offenses re-
sulting from the same acts, and to allow successive prosecutions of the several of-
fenses, rather than merely the imposition of consecutive sentences after one trial of
those offenses, would enable the Government to "wear the accused out by a multi-
tude of cases with accumulated trials."... Repetitive harassment in such a man-
ner goes to the heart of the Fifth Amendment protection.
1d at 199-200 (footnote and citations omitted). For a list of cases in which Justice Brennan
has supported the "same transaction" test in concurring or dissenting opinions, see Thomp-
son v. Oklahoma, 429 U.S. 1053, 1054 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of cert.).
Many commentators support the "same transaction" test. E.g., J. SIGLER, DOUBLE
JEOPARDY 222-23 (1969); The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. Rnv. 70, 106-07
(1977); Note, Double Jeopardy: A Protection or an Empty Promise, 25 U. FLA. L. REv. 838,
842-43 (1973). Cf. Note, The Double Jeopardy Clause as a Bar to Reintroducing Evidence, 89
YALE L.J. 962, 967-69 (1980) (variant of "same transaction" test proposed). The "same
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which requires joinder of all charges arising from a single act or trans-
action.2027 Although the Brooklier court preferred the "same transac-
tion" test,2"2" Ninth Circuit precedent required application of the
Blockburger doctrine to post-conviction prosecutions. 02 9
In Brooklier, the defendants had been convicted in 1975 of violat-
ing the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,
(RICO),20 30 one charge of which was conspiracy to extort money from
Sam Farkas, a bookie.203' The actual extortion from Farkas was cited
as an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. Four years later, the
defendants were charged with the actual extortion of money from Far-
kas.2"32 The defendants moved to dismiss this charge on double jeop-
ardy grounds, claiming that both the 1979 charge and the 1975 charges
related to a single incident of extortion. Applying the Blockburger test,
the Ninth Circuit concluded that the second prosecution was not barred
transaction" test has also been adopted in the American Bar Association Criminal Justice
Standards, STANDARDS RELATING TO JOINDER AND SEVERANCE § 1.3(c) (1967).
2027. Under the "same transaction" test, there are exceptional circumstances when all
charges against a defendant that grow out of a single criminal act would not be required to
be joined in one trial. Such exceptions exist when a defendant tactically causes separate
trials or when the crime charged in a second prosecution is discovered only after the first
prosecution. 637 F.2d at 622 n.4. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 453 n.7 (1970) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring).
2028. Id at 623-24.
2029. Id at 623. Two Ninth Circuit decisions have applied the Blockburger test to post-
conviction prosecutions. In United States v. Solano, 605 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir. 1979), cer.
denied, 444 U.S. 1020 (1980), the defendants claimed that their RICO convictions had sub-
jected them to double jeopardy, because seven months earlier they had been convicted of
drug offenses which formed the basis of the subsequent RICO charges. In rejecting this
argument, the Ninth Circuit stated that "[tihe traditional test to be applied in determining
whether successive prosecutions are permissible was stated in Blockburger." Id at 1144.
Similarly, in United States v. Snell, 592 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 944
(1979), the Ninth Circuit applied the Blockburger test to uphold a post-conviction prosecu-
tion. Snell was originally convicted of attempted extortion and conspiracy to commit a bank
robbery. After the extortion conviction was reversed on appeal, the Government brought a
new charge of attempted bank robbery. Although both the conspiracy and attempted bank
robbery charges arose from the same transaction, the Blockburger test pertiitted the second
prosecution. The court expressly refused to adopt Justice Brennan's "same transaction" test,
because neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit had adopted this standard. Id at
1085.
2030. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976).
2031. Conspiracy to extort money is prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1976), which pro-
vides that "[ilt shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions
of.. . this section."
2032. Extortion of money is prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976), which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to con-
duct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs
through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
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by double jeopardy. 0 33
The court questioned, however, the scope of Blockburger0 34 and
its application to post-conviction prosecutions. 20 35 The court appeared
to favor the "same transaction" test,2 36 for it promotes judicial econ-
omy and satisfies the underlying principles of the double jeopardy
clause by protecting the accused from the psychological and financial
burdens of repeated trials and by preventing the prosecution from re-
serving potential charges.20 37 The Brookier case presented the Ninth
Circuit with the opportunity to adopt the "same transaction" test, be-
cause the 1979 extortion charge arose from the same set of facts as the
1975 conviction and the Government was aware of the extortion charge
at the time of the prior prosecution. However, the court felt that it did
not have "free rein" to adopt this test.
20 38
2033. 637 F.2d at 624. Blockburger is not the only double jeopardy mechanism that pre-
cludes successive prosecutions; criminal collateral estoppel may bar a second prosecution
even though the Blockburger test is satisfied. Collateral estoppel applies when a second
prosecution requires relitigation of factual issues resolved in a prior adjudication. Applica-
tion of collateral estoppel to criminal prosecutions is exceptional, because the basis of a
jury's general verdict of innocent or guilty can rarely be traced to specific factual issues. See
Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970) (when acquittal for robbing participant in a poker
game established that defendant was not one of the criminals, collateral estoppel applied to
bar a subsequent prosecution for robbing another participant).
2034. Blockburger involved a single criminal act that violated two distinct statutory provi-
sions. In a single proceeding, Blockburger was convicted of both offenses and given consec-
utive sentences. The Brooklier court hinted that Blockburger could be limited in application
to cases involving the imposition of multiple punishment in a single prosecution. 637 F.2d
at 622. See Note, The Double Jeopardy Clause as a Bar to Reintroducing Evidence, 89 YALE
L.J. 962, 965-67 (1980).
2035. The Supreme Court in Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 416 (1980), and the Ninth
Circuit in United States v. Solano, 605 F.2d 1141, 1144 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1020 (1980), and United States v. Snell, 592 F.2d 1083, 1085 n.2 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 944 (1979), relied on Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977), to apply the Blockburger
doctrine to successive prosecutions. The Brooklier court disagreed with such an application.
In Brown, the defendant was convicted ofjoyriding and, upon completion of his 30 day jail
sentence, was charged and convicted of automobile theft. The Supreme Court applied
Blockburger in finding automobile theft and joyriding to be the same offense within the
meaning of the double jeopardy clause. The Court reasoned that since the Blockburger
doctrine would bar prosecution ofjoyriding and automobile theft in a single indictment, the
test would also bar successive prosecutions. The Brooklier court interpreted Brown as lim-
ited to circumstances in which conviction of a lesser included offense precludes subsequent
prosecution for the greater offense. 637 F.2d at 623.
2036. Id at 623-24.
2037. Id at 622. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 454 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
However, one problem with the "same transaction" test is the difficulty of adequately defin-
ing "a single criminaf act, occurrence, episode, or transaction." Id at 454 n.8.
2038. The Brooklier court stated: "[w]e also recognize many advantages of the same trans-
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2. Retrials
a. after mistrial
i. on defendant's motion
When a defendant moves for mistrial based on trial error, re-
prosecution is generally permissible under the double jeopardy clause.
There is an exception, however, when the defendant's motion is
prompted by prosecutorial or judicial overreaching.20 39 Courts have
found overreaching when the prosecutor or judge has deliberately and
in bad faith provoked the defendant's mistrial request.
2040
In United States v. Roberts,2 e1 the Ninth Circuit determined that
the prosecutor's comments during closing argument were not deliber-
ately intended to provoke a mistrial.2t 42 In May of 1978, the defen-
dants were convicted for attempting to bomb a federal building in
Arizona. The Ninth Circuit reversed the convictions on the ground
that the prosecution committed reversible error by attempting to bolster
its chief witness' credibility with evidence not on the record.2° 3 After a
retrial was scheduled, the defendants moved to dismiss on double jeop-
ardy grounds.
Although Roberts involved appellate reversal for prosecutorial
action test espoused by Justice Brennan and might well be moved to adopt it if we had free
rein." 637 F.2d at 623-24 (footnote omitted).
In addition to considering itself bound by Ninth Circuit precedent, the Brooklier court
also considered the Supreme Court to have "tacit[ly] endors[ed]" the application of Block-
burger to "all post-conviction prosecutions," in Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410 (1980). 637
F.2d at 624. In Vitale, the defendant struck and killed two children while driving his auto-
mobile. He pled guilty to the traffic violation of failing to reduce speed to avoid an accident,
and was fined. The following day, he was charged with involuntary manslaughter. The
Vitale Court interpreted Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977), as establishing Blockburger as
"the principal test for determining whether two offenses are the same for purposes of barring
successive prosecutions." 447 U.S. at 416. The Court further stated that the two offenses
would be the same only if the manslaughter by automobile charge incorporated the driver's
failure to reduce speed. It then remanded the case to the state court for a determination of
the relationship between the two statutory offenses. Id at 421.
2039. See United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 (1976).
2040. In DMitz, the Supreme Court stated:
The Double Jeopardy Clause does protect a defendant against governmental
actions intended to provoke mistrial requests and thereby to subject defendants to
the substantial burdens imposed by multiple prosecutions. It bars retrials where
"bad-faith conduct by judge or prosecutor," threatens the "fh]arassment of an ac-
cused by successive prosecutions or declaration of a mistrial so as to afford the
prosecution a more favorable opportunity to convict" the defendant.
Id at 611 (citations omitted).
2041. 640 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1981).
2042. Id at 228.
2043. United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530, 535 (9th Cir. 1980).
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misconduct rather than a successful defense motion for mistrial, the
Ninth Circuit applied mistrial principles in concluding that double
jeopardy did not bar retrial.2°44 The court found that even though the
prosecutor's comments during closing argument were intentional and
harmful to the defendant's case, there was no proof that they were in-
tended toprovoke a mistrial 2"I The Ninth Circuit explicitly refused to
extend double jeopardy protection to cases involving prosecutorial
"gross negligence without the intent to provoke a mistrial."2° 6
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Norris asserted that the prosecutor's
flagrant and intentional misconduct constituted prosecutorial over-
reaching which should bar retrial, regardless of a showing of intent to
provoke a mistrial.2 "7 The dissent pointed out that both Supreme
Court2" 8 and federal court decisions2 049 do not suggest the narrow in-
2044. The dissent found the issue of whether retrial is barred after appellate reversal for
intentional prosecutorial overreaching to be a question of first impression. The general rule,
stated as dictum in Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1978), is that appellate reversal
for trial error does not bar retrial. However, the Supreme Court has not addressed whether
the prosecutorial overreaching exception, which precludes retrial after a defendant's success-
ful mistrial motion, applies equally to appellate reversal. The Roberts dissent posed several
doctrinal considerations in support of expanding double jeopardy protection to appellate
reversal for intentional prosecutorial misconduct. See 640 F.2d at 230-31.
2045. Id at 228. For cases where the prosecutorial or judicial error was not deliberately
intended to force the defendant to move for mistrial, see, e.g., Divans v. California, 434 U.S.
1303 (1977) (denial of application for stay of defendant's second state trial); Lee v. United
States, 432 U.S. 23 (1977) (prosecutor failed to allege knowledge or intent in the informa-
tion; court denied motion to dismiss before jeopardy had attached); United States v. Dinitz,
424 U.S. 600 (1976) (trial judge's expulsion of defendant's attorney for repeated misconduct
during opening statement not done in bad faith); United States v. Calderon, 618 F.2d 88 (9th
Cir. 1980) (portions of prosecutor's opening statement were later ruled inadmissible under
complex co-conspirator hearsay exception); United States v. Gamble, 607 F.2d 820 (9th Cir.
1979) (prosecutor continually gave personal assurance that certain facts at issue were true),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1092 (1980); Moroyoqui v. United States, 570 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1977)
(prosecutor unintentionally elicited prejudicial information during direct examination), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 997 (1978).
2046. 640 F.2d at 228.
2047. Id (Norris, J., dissenting). The dissent considered the issue not to be whether the
prosecutor's comments were either intentional or grossly negligent, but whether there must
be deliberate provocation of a mistrial request or simply an intent to harass or prejudice the
defendant. Id. at 230 n.3.
2048. See Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 33-34 (1977) ("only if the underlying error was
'motivated by bad faith or undertaken to harass or prejudice' would there be any barrier to
retrial") (citations omitted); United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 611 (1976) (retrial barred
when prosecutorial or judicial error committed "in bad faith in order to goad the respondent
into requesting a mistrial or to prejudice his prospects for an acquittal."); United States v.
Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485 n.12 (1971) ("where a defendant's mistrial motion is necessitated by
judicial or prosecutorial impropriety designed to avoid an acquittal, reprosecution might
well be barred.").
2049. Several federal circuit courts have applied a broad standard to prosecutorial and
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terpretation of prosecutorial and judicial overreaching adopted by the
majority.20 50 Instead, the double jeopardy clause bars retrial when in-
tentional overreaching is motivated by bad faith or intended to harass
or prejudice the defendant's chances for acquittal. The dissent con-
cluded that had this case involved a mistrial rather than appellate re-
versal, double jeopardy would have barred reprosecution.
In United States v. Zimmelman 2 °5 1 the defendant's motion for
mistrial, based on prosecutorial misconduct during the cross-examina-
tion of a witness, was granted and a new trial ordered. The Ninth Cir-
cuit held that although the Government's cross-examination exceeded
a prior court order in limine, the misconduct was not intentional and in
bad faith.2 52 Therefore, the double jeopardy clause did not bar retrial.
I. on court's order
When a judge declares a mistrial without the defendant's request
or consent, the double jeopardy clause bars reprosecution unless there
was a "manifest necessity" for the mistrial declaration.0 53 Courts have
refused to formulate explicit rules governing sua sponte mistrial decla-
rations. Instead, the "manifest necessity" standard requires a trial
judge to exercise sound discretion on a case-by-case basis.20 54 A judge
judicial overreaching: retrial is barred if the error was motivated by bad faith, undertaken
to harass or prejudice the defendant, or intended to provoke a mistrial request. See, e.g.,
Mitchell v. Smith, 633 F.2d 1009, 1011-13 (2nd Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1088 (1981);
United States v. Zozlio, 617 F.2d 314, 315 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Opager, 616 F.2d
231, 233-34 (5th Cir. 1980); Drayton v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 117, 121-22 (2d Cir. 1979); United
States v. Martin, 561 F.2d 135, 139-40 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Kessler, 530 F.2d
1246, 1254-58 (5th Cir. 1976).
2050. The dissent noted that the majority opinion lacked reasons for distinguishing be-
tween prosecutorial overreaching intended to provoke a mistrial request and prosecutorial
misconduct intended to harass or prejudice the defendant. The dissent found no reason to
distinguish between the two for double jeopardy purposes and also noted that they are often
inextricably intertwined. 640 F.2d at 229-30 (Norris, J., dissenting).
2051. 634 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
2052. The court stated that prosecutorial and judicial overreaching has been interpreted in
the Ninth Circuit to mean improper conduct committed intentionally and in bad faith. Id
at 1238.
2053. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824).
2054. For cases in which the court abused its discretion in determining that there was a
"manifest necessity" for declaring a mistrial sua sponte, see, e.g., United States v. Join, 400
U.S. 470 (1971) (plurality opinion) (mistrial declared after IRS failed to adequately warn
taxpayer witnesses of right against self-incrimination); Downum v. United States, 372 U.S.
734 (1963) (jury discharged after prosecutor failed to produce key witness); United States v.
Smith, 621 F.2d 350 (9th Cir. 1980) (jury discharged after one juror became unavailable and
without court first considering alternatives; however, retrial permitted because defense coun-
sel implicitly consented to mistrial declaration), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1087 (1981); United
States v. Sanders, 591 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1979) (jury discharged after prosecution witness
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must permit a defendant to have his or her trial completed by the first
jury unless "a scrupulous exercise of judicial discretion leads to the
conclusion that the ends of public justice would not be served by a
continuation of the proceedings. 2 55
In United States v. Willis, 256 the Ninth Circuit determined that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in declaring a mistrial after the
defendant failed to appear on the second day of trial.20 57 After a two
hour recess during which Willis could not be located, the trial judge
declared a mistrial sua sponte. Willis was later retried and convicted.
On appeal, Willis argued that the trial court's failure to consider alter-
natives less drastic than mistrial constituted an abuse of discretion and
committed perjury); United States v. McKoy, 591 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1979) (mistrial declared
to give defendant time to consult with independent counsel); United States v. Rich, 589 F.2d
1025 (10th Cir. 1978) (no reason orally stated for jury's discharge and none apparent from
the record); Mizell v. Attorney Gen. of N.Y., 586 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1978) (jury discharged
after two prosecution witnesses failed to appear), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 967 (1979); United
States v. Horn, 583 F.2d 1124 (10th Cir. 1978) (mistrial declared when jury deliberated an
hour after receiving411en charge); Dunkerley v. Hogan, 579 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1978) (failure
to consider feasible alternatives after learning defendant would be briefly hospitalized), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1090 (1979); United States v. Starling, 571 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1978) (jury
dismissed after defendant's communication with juror); United States ex rel Webb v. Court
of Common Pleas, 516 F.2d 1034 (3d Cir. 1975) (mistrial declared after six and one-half
hours of deliberation and upon foreman's opinion of hopeless deadlock).
For cases in which the court exercised sound discretion in determining that there was a
"manifest necessity" for declaring a mistrialsua sponte, see, e.g., Arizona v. Washington, 434
U.S. 497 (1978) (possible jury bias from defense counsel's improper and prejudicial remarks
during opening statement; judge's failure to set forth explicitly all factors justifying mistrial
did not negate requisite "manifest necessity"); Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973)
(indictment insufficient to charge crime and incurable by amendment); Gori v. United
States, 367 U.S. 364 (1961) (prosecutor's direct examination intended to elicit inadmissible
evidence); Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949) (mistrial declared by court-martial in Ger-
many because of tactical situation and distance to witnesses' residence); Lovato v. New Mex-
ico, 242 U.S. 199 (1916) (jury dismissed after prosecutor's realization that defendant had
neither been arraigned nor had entered a plea); Thompson v. United States, 155 U.S. 271
(1894) (jury discharged after learning that juror had also been member of defendant's grand
jury); Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148 (1891) (newspaper publication of defense
counsers letter, denying allegation of juror's acquaintance with defendant, prejudiced the
jury); Rogers v. United States, 609 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir. 1979) (jury deadlock after deliberat-
ing three and one-half days following three day trial); United States v. Lorenzo, 570 F.2d
294 (9th Cir. 1978) (after three hour deliberation, each juror questioned whether their differ-
ences were irreconcilable); Arnold v. McCarthy, 566 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1978) (jury dead-
locked after twelve hour deliberation without possibility of reaching verdict); United States
v. See, 505 F.2d 845 (9th Cir. 1974) (jury deadlocked after ten hour deliberation; judge
refused to give,411en charge), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992 (1975); United States v. Brahm, 459
F.2d 546 (3d Cir.) (mistrial declared after five hour deliberation for two day trial and with-
out defendant's request that jury continue deliberations), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 873 (1972).
2055. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485 (1971) (plurality opinion).
2056. 647 F.2d 54 (9th Cir. 1981).
2057. Id at 59.
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that retrial subjected him to double jeopardy.20 58 The Ninth Circuit
pointed out that the exercise of sound discretion did not require consid-
eration of alternatives such as continuance.20 59 The court also distin-
guished this case from a Third Circuit decision °60 in which the judge
declared a mistrial after waiting only ten minutes for the defendant's
appearance at closing argument. The Ninth Circuit concluded that
Willis' retrial was not barred by double jeopardy because the trial court
had exercised sound discretion in declaring a mistrial.0 61
b. for insufficient evidence
The double jeopardy clause does not bar retrial of a defendant
who has succeeded in overturning his conviction.2 0 62 However, re-
prosecution for the same offense is prohibited once a reviewing court
has determined that the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain the
jury's guilty verdict. °63
The Supreme Court reaffirmed this principle in Hudson v. Louisi-
ana. 2o After Hudson was convicted of first degree murder in a state
court, the trial judge granted his motion for a new trial on the ground
of insufficient evidence to sustain a guilty verdict.206 -5 Hudson was re-
tried and was again found guilty.2 6 Relying on Burks v. United
2058. Id
2059. Id "Declaration of a mistrial is committed to the discretion of the trial court; ex-
press consideration of alternatives such as continuance is not required." Id This proposi-
tion was not supported by any authority. It is well established, however, that a trial court
must consider allpossible alternatives before finding a "manifest necessity" for the sua sponte
mistrial declaration. This protects the defendant's right to have his trial completed by the
first jury. See United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. at 487.
2060. United States v. Tinney, 473 F.2d 1085 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 928 (1973).
After waiting ten minutes for defendant Tinney to appear in court on the last day of his trial,
the judge declared a mistrial. Seven minutes after the prosecutor had begun his closing
address for Tinney's co-defendant, defendant Tinney entered the courtroom. The Third
Circuit determined that the trial judge's failure to grant a continuance for a reasonable
length of time constituted abuse of discretion. "Manifest necessity" did not exist to warrant
such a hasty mistrial declaration.
2061. 647 F.2d at 59.
2062. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 672 (1896).
2063. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978) (double jeopardy clause barred retrial after
appellate court determined that evidence was legally insufficient to sustain jury's guilty
verdict).
2064. 450 U.S. 40 (1981).
2065. Under Louisiana law, a criminal defendant's only means of challenging the suffi-
ciency of evidence is by a motion for new trial. Trial judges are not authorized to enter
judgments of acquittal in jury trials. 450 U.S. at 41 n.l.
2066. During retrial, an eyewitness who was not present at the original trial testified for the
prosecution. State v. Hudson, 373 So. 2d 1294, 1295 (La. 1979).
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States,2067 Hudson argued that the double jeopardy clause barred his
second trial. In affirming his conviction, the Louisiana Supreme Court
interpreted Burks as precluding a second trial only when a reviewing
court has determined that "there was no evidence of the crime charged
or an essential element thereof."2068 Because the trial judge granted
Hudson's motion for new trial on the basis of insufficient evidence
rather than no evidence, the Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that
Burks did not bar a second trial.20 69
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Louisiana Supreme
Court's interpretation of Burks, 2070 considering this case "precisely the
circumstance" 207' in which the double jeopardy clause precludes re-
trial: when a reviewing court2 72 has found the evidence legally insuffi-
cient to sustain the verdict.
20 73
In United States v. Marolda,2 °74 the Ninth Circuit similarly dis-
2067. 437 U.S. 1 (1978). Burks was convicted of bank robbery in federal district court. On
appeal, his conviction was reversed on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to sup-
port a guilty verdict: after Burks had presented a prima facie defense of insanity, the prose-
cution failed to uphold its burden of proving sanity. The court of appeals then remanded to
the district court for a determination of whether a verdict of acquittal or a new trial should
be granted. The Supreme Court held that retrial was barred by double jeopardy and thus
the only remedy available was an acquittal.
2068. 373 So. 2d at 1297. The Louisiana Supreme Court's interpretation of 'urks was
based on the following language:
"The same cannot be said when a defendant's conviction has been overturned
due to a failure of proof at trial, in which case the prosecution cannot complain of
prejudice, for it has been given one fair opportunity to offer whatever proof it
could assemble. . . . Moreover, such an appellate reversal means that the Govern-
ment's case was so lacking that it should not have been submitted to the jury."
"[I]t is apparent that such a decision wil be confined to cases where the
prosecution's failure is clear."
Id at 1297-98 (emphasis added) (quoting Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. at 16-17).
2069. 373 So. 2d at 1298.
2070. "Nothing in Burks suggests, as the Louisiana Supreme Court seemed to believe, that
double jeopardy protections are violated only when the prosecution has adduced no evi-
dence at all of the crime or an element thereof." 450 U.S. at 43.
2071. Id Adopting the reasoning of Justice Tate in his concurring opinion to the Louisi-
ana Supreme Court's decision, the State contended that Burks was not controlling. It argued
that the trial judge had granted the new trial not on the basis of insufficient evidence, but
because he had personal doubts about the guilty verdict. The Supreme Court rejected this
contention, stating that it was clear from the state court decisions that the new trial was
granted on the ground of legally insufficient evidence.
2072. The reviewing court may be either the trial court or a court of appellate jurisdiction.
Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. at 11.
2073. It makes no difference whether the determination of evidentiary insufficiency is
made on the defendant's appeal, a motion for new trial, or a motion for judgment of acquit-
tal. Id at 16-17.
2074. 648 F.2d 623 (1981). Marolda had been installed as the president of a newly merged
union local. After the executive board terminated the practice of allowing union officers to
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missed the retrial of defendant Marolda because the trial evidence was
insufficient to sustain the conviction. Marolda appealed his conviction
for embezzling from a labor union,2 75 arguing both trial error and evi-
dentiary insufficiency.0 7 6 Considering only the issue of trial error, the
Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction.0 77 Upon retrial, Marolda
moved to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds, contending that insuffi-
cient evidence had been introduced at the first trial to prove an element
of the offense.2178  The Ninth Circuit concluded that the trial error,
leading to reversal of the conviction, had not prejudiced the prosecu-
tion20 79 and that there was no direct evidence supporting an essential
element of the charged offense. 2080 Therefore, double jeopardy barred
retrial.
3. Consecutive sentences
The fifth amendment guarantee against double jeopardy precludes
charge gasoline purchases on union credit cards and adopted a new policy of providing a
fixed monthly allowance, Marolda continued to use his credit card for two years. Id at 625.
2075. Embezzling from a labor union violates 29 U.S.C. § 501(c) (1976).
2076. Marolda based his appeal on three arguments: "(1) the definition of the offense in
instructions to the jury excluded statutory elements; (2) there was a prejudicial variance
between the offense as set forth in the indictment and as defined in the instructions; and
(3) the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction." 648 F.2d at 624.
2077. United States v. Marolda, 615 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1980).
2078. The Government failed to prove that Marolda had used the gasoline credit card
without any benefit to the union. 648 F.2d at 624.
2079. Id The trial error appeared in the court's jury instructions. As a result, the error
did not prejudice the prosecution in the presentation of its case: no additional evidence
would have been introduced, nor would a different trial strategy or theory have been pur-
sued by the prosecution. Such reasoning distinguishes Maralda from the line of cases in
which reversal is based on improperly admitted evidence. When failure to suppress evi-
dence constitutes the trial error leading to reversal, the prosecution has been prejudiced. In
such a case, it is impossible to know whether the prosecution might have introduced addi-
tional evidence or what theory the prosecution might have pursued had the faulty evidence
been excluded. Thus, when evidence has been erroneously admitted, retrial cannot be
barred for lack of sufficient evidence because the prosecution has been prejudiced. See, e.g.,
United States v. Harmon, 632 F.2d 812, 814 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (double jeopardy
clause not bar to retrial when reversal based on improper admission of evidence); United
States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1373-74 (4th Cir.) (the sufficiency of the evidence should be
determined by the trier of fact on retrial), rev'd on other grounds, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir.
1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980); United States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535, 544
(4th Cir. 1978) (Burks not to be extended to require acquittal when properly admitted evi-
dence is insufficient to support guilty verdict).
2080. 648 F.2d at 625. The standard for determining whether evidence is sufficient to sus-
tain a verdict "is whether, 'after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt."' Id at 624 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319
(1979)).
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multiple punishment for the same offense.20 8 1 However, the double
jeopardy clause does not bar the imposition of cumulative punishment
when a single criminal act violates more than one statutory offense,
provided that the Supreme Court's Blockburger test is satisfied. 0 82 To
impose consecutive sentences, each statutory offense for which the de-
fendant is convicted must require proof of a fact or element not re-
quired by the others.
208 3
2081. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873). When successive criminal acts violate
the same statutory offense or several statutory offenses, the double jeopardy clause does not
preclude the imposition of consecutive sentences. In Fierro v. MacDougall, 648 F.2d 1259
(9th Cir.) (per curiam), cer t. denied, 454 U.S. 933 (1981), the defendant was convicted of
eighteen state crimes and sentenced to 184 years in state prison. In rebutting the defendant's
argument that the sentencing court was without authority to impose consecutive sentences,
the Ninth Circuit stated that "[t]he imposition of consecutive sentences is nothing more than
the imposition, for each crime, of the sentence fixed by legislative act." Id at 1260.
2082. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). Blockburger was convicted
for selling eight grains of morphine in violation of sections one and two of the Harrison
Narcotic Act. Section one prohibited the sale or distribution of certain drugs except in or
from the original stamped package. Section two forbade the sale of these drugs except pur-
suant to a written order. Blockburger was sentenced to five years imprisonment for each
violation, the terms to run consecutively. He argued that because the sale involved only one
transaction, it constituted a single offense for which only one penalty could be imposed. In
affirming the consecutive sentences, the Supreme Court set forth the following test: "The
applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two dis-
tinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses
or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not." .d
at 304. See supra note 2024.
2083. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. at 304. The Blockburger test is a rule of
statutory construction; it focuses on the statutory elements of the offense. The Supreme
Court has applied the Blockburger doctrine when a single act violates more than one sub-
stantive offense. See, e.g., Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 693 (1980) (consecutive
sentences for the statutory offenses of rape and killing in the perpetration of rape held un-
constitutional; conviction for rape does not require proof of additional facts from the offense
of killing in the course of rape); Harris v. United States, 359 U.S. 19, 23 (1959) (consecutive
sentences for the separate offenses of purchasing heroin from an unstamped package and
receiving heroin with knowledge that it was unlawfully imported); Gore v. United States,
357 U.S. 386, 388 (1958) (consecutive sentences for three separate offenses arising from a
single transaction: sale of drugs without a written order, sale of drugs not in the original
stamped package, and sale of drugs with knowledge that they had been unlawfully im-
ported).
The Supreme Court has applied the Blockburger test to determine whether multiple
punishment may be imposed for convictions of conspiracy and the underlying substantive
offense. See, e.g., Ianneli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785 n.17 (1975) (Blockburger test
satisfied for conspiracy and the substantive offense of conducting illegal gambling business).
The Supreme Court has also applied the Blockburger test to determine whether multiple
punishment may be imposed when a single act violates two conspiracy statutes. See, e.g.,
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 787-88 (1946) (multiple punishment
for conspiracy to restrain trade and conspiracy to monopolize trade not precluded by double
jeopardy clause, even though only one agreement existed).
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In Albernaz v. United States,20 84 the Supreme Court applied the
Blockburger doctrine to uphold consecutive sentences for a single con-
spiratorial agreement that violated two conspiracy statutes. The de-
fendants were convicted and received consecutive sentences for
conspiring to import marijuana, a violation of 21 U.S.C. sections
960(a)(1) and 963,2085 and for conspiring to distribute marijuana, a vio-
lation of 21 U.S.C. sections 841(a)(1) and 846.2086 The violation of
these two conspiracy statutes arose from a single agreement having
dual objectives: to import marijuana and then distribute it
domestically.
2 87
The defendants argued that congressional intent to authorize mul-
tiple punishment for a single agreement that violated these two conspir-
acy statutes was unclear,208 8 and therefore the rule of lenity should
operate to preclude consecutive sentences. 08 9 The Supreme Court
ruled, however, that absent explicit legislative history on the issue of
cumulative punishment for the violation of several statutes, the Block-
2084. 450 U.S. 333 (1981).
2085. 21 U.S.C. § 963 (1976) provides that: "Any person who attempts or conspires to
commit any offense defined in this subchapter is punishable by imprisonment ... ." The
intentional importation of marijuana is prohibited in 21 U.S.C. § 960(a)(1) (1976).
2086. 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976) provides that: "Any person who attempts or conspires to
commit any offense defined in this subchapter is punishable by imprisonment ... ." The
intentional or knowing distribution of marijuana or possession with intent to distribute is
prohibited in 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976).
2087. Defendants Albernaz and Rodriguez negotiated with a Drug Enforcement Adminis-
tration (DEA) agent to procure a cargo of marijuana from a freighter in the Bahamas. The
DEA agent arranged a rendezvous with the freighter; the cargo was unloaded onto the pick-
up boat; and the two defendants were then arrested in a Miami hotel. United States v.
Rodriguez, 585 F.2d 1234, 1238-39 (1978).
2088. The defendants conceded that the legislative history is silent as to Congress' intent to
impose multiple punishment for a single agreement that violated sections 846 and 963.
However, the defendants interpreted this silence as an ambiguity over whether Congress
intended to authorize multiple punishment. In support of this argument, the defendants
contended that the existence of two distinct conspiracy statutes was the result of two differ-
ent House committees having jurisdiction over various subchapters of the Drug Abuse Pre-
vention and Control Act of 1970. 450 U.S. at 341 n.l. In response to this contention, the
Government argued that coordination between the two committees demonstrated Congress'
awareness of the separate conspiracy provisions. 1d The Supreme Court concluded that "if
anything is to be assumed from the congressional silence on this point, it is that Congress
was aware of the Blockburger rule and legislated with it in mind." Id at 341-42.
2089. The rule of lenity operates only when a statutory ambiguity exists. "This policy of
lenity means that the Court will not interpret a federal criminal statute so as to increase the
penalty that it places on an individual when such an interpretation can be based on no more
than a guess as to what Congress intended." Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387
(1980) (quoting Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 178 (1958)). In Albernaz, the
Supreme Court stated that the rule of lenity was inapplicable because there was no statutory
ambiguity regarding multiple punishment. 450 U.S. at 343.
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burger test is controlling.2 90 After finding the legislative history to be
silent,20 91 the Court applied the Blockburger doctrine to determine
whether Congress intended to authorize multiple punishment.2 92 The
Court found that the two conspiracy statutes satisfied the Blockburger
test.20 93 The distinguishing element of the two offenses was the pro-
scribed object of the conspiracy: section 846 prohibited conspiring to
distribute marijuana as opposed to section 963 which prohibited con-
spiring to import marijuana. The Supreme Court concluded that be-
cause Congress intended to authorize cumulative punishment for
conspiring to import and distribute marijuana, the double jeopardy
clause does not bar consecutive sentences.20 94
In United States v. Tavelman,2 °95 the Ninth Circuit upheld consec-
utive sentences for conspiring to possess cocaine with intent to dis-
2090. Id at 340. Relying on Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49 (1942), the defend-
ants argued that the .Blockburger doctrine is not applicable when a single conspiratorial
agreement violates more than one conspiracy statute. Id at 339. However, Braverman does
not support this contention. Unlike the Albernaz case, Braverman did not involve separate
conspiracy statutes; rather, the single conspiratorial agreement, although encompassing sev-
eral criminal offenses, violated only one conspiracy statute. See American Tobacco Co. v.
United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946) (single conspiracy violated two distinct conspiracy
statutes).
2091. 450 U.S. at 340.
2092. The Ninth Circuit has applied the Blockburger test to discern whether Congress in-
tended to authorize multiple punishment for a single agreement that violated two conspiracy
statutes. See, e.g., United States v. Marotta, 518 F.2d 681, 685 (9th Cir. 1975) (congressional
intent to impose cumulative punishment for a conspiracy that violated two different sections
of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention Act of 1970).
2093. 450 U.S. at 339.
2094. Id at 344. In a concurring opinion, Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Marshall and
Stevens, disagreed with the fact that the majority equated legislative intent with constitu-
tionality. The majority concluded that "the question of what punishments are constitution-
ally permissible is not different from the question of what punishment the Legislative
Branch intended to be imposed. Where Congress intended, as it did here, to impose multi-
ple punishment, imposition of such sentences does not violate the Constitution." Id (foot-
note omitted). The concurring Justices interpreted this statement as limiting the
Blockburger doctrine to only those situations in which Congress has failed to expressly au-
thorize cumulative punishment. They assert that to impose multiple punishment when a
single criminal act violates several statutory offenses, the Blockburger test must be satisfied
regardless of Congress' express intent to authorize multiple punishment. The concurring
Justices stated that "[n]o matter how clearly it spoke, Congress could not constitutionally
provide for cumulative punishments unless each statutory offense required proof of a fact
that the other did not .... " Id at 345 (Stewart, J., concurring). This concern, however,
did not arise in the present case, because the legislative history was silent and consequently
the Court applied the Blockburger test to determine whether Congress intended to impose
multiple punishment.
2095. 650 F.2d 1133 (9th Cir. 1981).
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tribute20 96 and for violating the Travel Act, which prohibits interstate
travel for the purpose of distributing cocaine. 09 7 The defendants had
flown from Los Angeles to Reno for a substantial cocaine purchase and
were subsequently arrested by Drug Enforcement Administration
agents. Arguing that both convictions arose from a single transaction
and identical facts, defendant Job contended that the conspiracy con-
viction and Travel Act violation were not separately punishable
offenses.20 98
In affirming consecutive sentences, the Ninth Circuit compared the
elements of the two offenses: the conspiracy did not require proof of
interstate travel, and the element of agreement was not required for the
Travel Act violation. 209 9 The court compared the Tavelman case to
United States v. Wylie, 21°° in which the Ninth Circuit heldthat in the
context of narcotic offenses, consecutive sentences for conspiracy and
the substantive offense are permissible under the double jeopardy
clause.2" 0' In Tavelman, however, the court went an additional step by
upholding multiple punishment for a single act which led to convic-
tions of conspiracy and Travel Act violations.2 0 2
4. Sentence enhancement
In United States v. DiFrancesco,2 °3 the Supreme Court addressed
2096. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (1976) prohibit conspiring to possess cocaine with intent
to distribute. See supra note 2086.
2097. 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3) (1976) provides that:
(a) Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce... with intent to-
(3) otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the promo-
tion, management, establishment, or carrying on, of any unlawful activity,
and thereafter performs or attempts to perform any of the acts specified in... (3),
shall be fined... or imprisoned... or both.
2098. 650 F.2d at 1140.
2099. Id
2100. 625 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir. 1980) (consecutive sentences for conspiring to manufacture
and distribute LSD and for the actual distribution of LSD), cer. denied, 449 U.S. 1080
(1981).
2101. The Wyvlie court applied the Blockburger test in determining that the imposition of
multiple punishment for conspiracy and the substantive charge did not violate the double
jeopardy clause: "As a general rule, a substantive charge, and conspiracy charge based on
the substantive charge, pass muster under the Blockburger test and retain their separate-
ness." 1d at 1381. Accord United States v. Kearney, 560 F.2d 1358, 1365-67 (9th Cir.)
(Blockburger "required proof' test applied to uphold consecutive sentences for conspiracy
and the substantive narcotics offenses), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 971 (1977).
2102. Accord United States v. Stevens, 612 F.2d 1226, 1231 (10th Cir. 1979) (conspiracy to
distribute heroin and interstate travel to promote a conspiracy to distribute heroin consid-
ered separately punishable offenses), cer. denied, 447 U.S. 921 (1980).
2103. 449 U.S. 117 (1980). See Note, United States v. DiFrancesco: Court Upholds State
Initiated Sentence Appeals, 32 MERCER L. Rnv. 1261 (1981).
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for the first time the constitutionality of the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. section 357 6 ,21° which allows the Government
to seek, through an appeal, an increase of the sentence of a "dangerous
special offender." The Court determined that section 3576 does not
violate the double jeopardy protection against multiple trials and mul-
tiple punishment.2 10 5
In 1977, the defendant had been convicted for participating in an
arson-for-hire scheme. The Government sought enhanced sentencing
under the dangerous special offender statute.2106 Prior to the special
offender's sentencing hearing for the 1977 conviction, the defendant
was convicted in 1978 of several crimes arising from the "Columbus
Day bombings." He was first sentenced to nine years imprisonment for
the 1978 conviction. He was then sentenced as a dangerous special of-
fender for the 1977 conviction and given two ten-year terms. All
sentences were to be served concurrently. Thus, the 1977 conviction
resulted in additional punishment of only one year. Seeking a more
severe sentence for the 1977 conviction, the Government appealed
under section 3576. The Second Circuit dismissed the appeal on the
ground that increase of the defendant's sentence constituted multiple
punishment in violation of the double jeopardy clause.210 7
2104. 18 U.S.C. § 3576 (1976) provides in part:
With respect to the imposition, correction, or reduction of a sentence after
proceedings under section 3575 of this chapter, a review of the sentence on the
record of the sentencing court may be taken by the defendant or the United States
to a court of appeals .... The taking of a review of the sentence by the United
States shall be deemed the taking of a review of the sentence and an appeal of the
conviction by the defendant. Review of the sentence shall include review of
whether the procedure employed was lawful, the findings made were clearly erro-
neous, or the sentencing court's discretion was abused. The court of appeals on
review of the sentence may, after considering the record, including the entire
presentence report, information submitted during the trial of such felony and the
sentencing hearing, and the finding and reasons of the sentencing court, affirm the
sentence, impose or direct the imposition of any sentence which the sentencing
court could originally have imposed, or remand for further sentencing proceedings
and imposition of sentence, except that a sentence may be made more severe only
on review of the sentence taken by the United States and after hearing. Failure of
the United States to take a review of the imposition of the sentence shall, upon
review taken by the United States of the correction or reduction of the sentence,
foreclose imposition of a sentence more severe than that previously imposed. Any
withdrawal or dismissal of review of the sentence taken by the United States shall
foreclose imposition of a sentence more severe than that reviewed but shall not
otherwise foreclose the review of the sentence or the appeal of the conviction. The
court of appeals shall state in writing the reasons for its disposition of the review of
the sentence.
2105. 449 U.S. at 139.
2106. 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1976).
2107. United States v. DiFrancesco, 604 F.2d 769, 783-87 (2d Cir. 1979). See infra note
2116.
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In upholding the constitutionality of section 3576, the Supreme
Court first ruled that the Government's right to appeal the sentence of a
dangerous special offender does not violate the double jeopardy guar-
antee against multiple prosecutions.210 8  The majority compared a
criminal sentence with a verdict of acquittal, and concluded that the
double jeopardy protection against retrial and appellate review follow-
ing an acquittal210 9 should not be extended to sentencing appeals.211
In reaching this conclusion, the Court considered the history of sen-
tencing, Supreme Court decisions regarding the finality of
sentences, 2 11 and double jeopardy policy considerations. The Court
noted that review of a sentence does not subject the defendant to the
same expense, anxiety, and insecurity as the guilt or innocence stage of
trial.21 12 Moreover, unlike a verdict of acquittal, there is no expectation
of finality when sentenced as a dangerous special offender, because sec-
tion 3576 constitutes notice of the Government's right to appeal.2 3
The majority also stated that for double jeopardy purposes a sentence
does not constitute an "implied acquittal" of a greater sentence 2114 and
that a defendant does not have a right to know, at any time, the exact
limit of his sentence.2 1 5
2108. 449 U.S. at 139.
2109. See United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977) ("the most
fundamental rule in the history of double jeopardy jurisprudence has been that '[a] verdict
of acquittal. . . could not be reviewed, on error or otherwise, without putting [a defendant]
twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the Constitution.'") (quoting United States v. Ball,
163 U.S. 662, 671 (1896)).
2110. 449 U.S. at 132.
2111. In making the determination that a criminal sentence does not have the same degree
of constitutional finalilty as a verdict of acquittal, the Court examined two Supreme Court
cases. In Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160 (1947), the Court approved the imposition of
both a fine and imprisonment after the defendant had previously been sentenced to only
imprisonment. The charged offense required a mandatory minimum of both fine and im-
prisonment.
In North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), the imposition of a harsher sentence
on retrial, after the defendant had succeeded in reversing his original conviction, was held
constitutional. The DiFrancesco Court stated that "[i]f any rule of finality had applied to the
pronouncement of a sentence, the original sentence in Pearce would have served as a ceiling
on the one imposed at retrial." 449 U.S. at 135 (footnote omitted). The DiFrancesco Court
further stated that Pearce stands for the proposition that the imposition of a sentence less
than the maximum does not operate as an implied acquittal of a greater sentence. Id at 135
n.14. In comparing the enhancement of an existing sentence by an appellate court under
section 3576 to the imposition of a harsher sentence on retrial, the DiFrancesco Court found
the difference to be "no more than a 'conceptual nicety.'" Id at 135-36 (quoting North
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 722).
2112. 449 U.S. at 136-37.
2113. Id at 136.
2114. Id at 133.
2115. Id at 137. In support of the proposition that a defendant does not have the right to
19821 CRIMINAL LAW SURVEY
The Supreme Court also ruled that enhancement of an existing
sentence by the court of appeals under section 3576 does not constitute
multiple punishment.21 6 The Court considered whether Congress had
intended to authorize an increase of punishment on appellate review,
and it concluded that section 3576 clearly indicates that Congress au-
thorized sentencing appeals for dangerous special offenders.11 7 Fi-
nally, the majority compared section 3576 to decisions upholding the
constitutionality of two-tiered criminal proceedings.2 118 The Court
noted that section 3576 establishes a "two stage sentencing procedure"
that does not subject a dangerous special offender to a second trial.21 19
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White,
Marshall, and Stevens, concluded that the imposition of an enhanced
sentence under section 3576 constitutes multiple punishment in viola-
tion of the double jeopardy clause.212 0 The dissenting Justices found
know the limit of his punishment, the Court cited cases in which a defendant's probation or
parole had been revoked and a sentence of imprisonment imposed. The Court then com-
pared a dangerous special offender, having knowledge that his sentence may be increased on
review by a court of appeals under section 3576, to a defendant on probation or parole who
is aware that imprisonment may later be imposed. Id
2116. Id at 138-39. The Second Circuit relied on dictum in United States v. Benz, 282
U.S. 304, 307 (1931), for its determination that an increased sentence under section 3576
constitutes multiple punishment. United States v. DiFrancesco, 604 F.2d at 785. In Benz,
the Court held that a trial judge had authority to reduce a sentence after the defendant's
service had begun. The Benz Court cited Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873), for
the proposition that increasing the severity of a penalty during the same term subjects the
defendant to double punishment for the same offense. The DiFrancesco Court pointed out,
however, that this dictum in Benz was not supported by Exparte Lange. In Exparte Lange,
the defendant had received both imprisonment and a fine, even though the criminal statute
that he had violated provided for punishment by either imprisonment or fine. After the
defendant paid the fine and served five days in prison, the trial court, on a writ of habeas
corpus, vacated the former judgment and sentenced him to a one-year prison term. The
Supreme Court held that the trial court lacked authority to impose a second punishment
because the defendant had already fully performed one of the alternative penalties. The
DiFrancesco Court considered Ex parte Lange and the dictum in Benz inapplicable to
whether the imposition of an increased sentence under section 3576 constitutes multiple
punishment. 449 U.S. at 139.
2117. Id
2118. Id. at 139-41. See, e.g., Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204 (1978) (Maryland's two stage
juvenile proceeding held constitutional against double jeopardy challenge). The
DiFrancesco Court proposed a sentencing statute that would serve the same purpose as sec-
tion 3576 but without raising double jeopardy issues. Under this hypothetical statute, Con-
gress would provide that defendants convicted as dangerous special offenders receive a
mandatory maximum sentence. If the trial court felt that the defendant should not receive
the maximum penalty, however, it could recommend a lesser sentence to the court of ap-
peals. 449 U.S. at 142.
2119. Id at 140 n.16, 141.
2120. Id at 152 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissenting Justices stated that the Supreme
Court "has consistently assumed that an increase in the severity of a sentence subsequent to
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no basis for differentiating between the finality of sentences and the
finality of an acquittal verdict; thus, the double jeopardy clause pre-
cludes Government sentencing appeals just as it prevents appeals from
an acquittal.2" 2' The dissent also disagreed with the majority's "star-
tling conclusion" that double jeopardy considerations have no signifi-
cant application to the prosecutorial right to appeal under section 3576
because these appeals expose the defendant to "minimal incremental
embarrassment and anxiety."" 22 The dissent pointed out that sentenc-
ing is at least as critical to the defendant as the determination of guilt
or innocence. In response to the majority's contention that a defendant
does not possess an expectation of finality when sentenced as a danger-
ous special offender, the dissenting Justices asserted that this reasoning
could logically be extended to justify a statutory right to appeal acquit-
tal verdicts.
2123
In a separate dissent, l2 4 Justice Stevens stated that the rationale
for allowing the imposition of a more severe sentence upon retrial has
no application to whether an existing sentence may be increased upon
the Government's appeal under section 3576.2125
The double jeopardy clause allows the imposition of a harsher sen-
tence on retrial after a defendant has succeeded in reversing his convic-tion. ~1 26 In Vullingtan v. Missouri 1 27 decided five months after United
States v. DiFrancesco,2 12 1 the Supreme Court made an exception to this
rule. The Court held that the double jeopardy clause barred the impo-
sition of the death penalty upon the defendant's retrial under the Mis-
its imposition ... constitutes multiple punishment in violation of the Double Jeopardy
Clause." Id at 144-45. Although the dissent recognized that this assumption has only been
stated as dicta, it asserted that the number of cases and authority of their sources offer im-
pressive evidence of the prevalence of this view. Id at 145.
2121. Id at 146-52. The dissent noted that the majority's use of North Carolina v. Pearce,
395 U.S. 711 (1969), to distinguish between the finality of sentences and the finality of a
verdict of acquittal was misplaced. In Pearce, the Supreme Court approved the imposition
of a harsher sentence on retrial after the defendant had succeeded in having his original
conviction and sentence set aside; In contrast, section 3576 authorizes the enhancement of
an existing sentence on appeal. The dissent stated that "jilt is the fact of the retrial itself that
gives the trial court power to impose a new sentence ... " 449 U.S. at 151 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
2122. Id at 149-50.
2123. Id at 150.
2124. Id at 152-54 (Stevens, I., dissenting).
2125. Justice Stevens advocates the position taken by Justice Harlan in a separate opinion
in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 744 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
2126. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723 (1969).
2127. 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
2128. 449 U.S. 117 (1980).
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souri capital murder statute when the first trial resulted in a sentence of
life imprisonment. 129
Robert Bullington had been indicted in Missouri for capital mur-
der for the drowning of a young woman. Missouri law provided only
two possible sentences for a conviction of capital murder: death or life
imprisonment without eligibility for probation or parole for fifty
years. 21 30 Missouri's capital murder statute also required a bifurcated
proceeding.213' At the guilt or innocence stage of Bullington's trial, the
jury found him guilty of capital murder. The second phase of the trial
involved a separate sentencing proceeding, during which the jury heard
additional evidence of aggravating circumstances.2 32 The death pen-
alty could have been imposed if the jury was convinced beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances warranted such a
punishment.
After the jury returned a sentence of life imprisonment, the trial
judge granted Bullington's motion for a new trial.21 33  Immediately
thereafter, the State sought a retrial and filed notice that it would again
seek the death penalty. Bullington then moved to strike the notice,
claiming that the double jeopardy clause prohibited imposition of the
death penalty on retrial. The Missouri Supreme Court disagreed.2134
In determining that the double jeopardy clause barred the imposi-
tion of the death penalty at Bullington's second trial, the Supreme
Court distinguished Missouri's bifurcated capital murder proceeding
from Supreme Court decisions that have authorized harsher sentences
upon retrial.21 35 The majority noted that the Missouri statute did not
2129. 451 U.S. at 446.
2130. Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.008.1 (1978).
2131. Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.006 (1978).
2132. Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.006.2 provides that in the presentence hearing "the jury.
shall hear additional evidence in extenuation, mitigation, and aggravation of punishment,
including the record of any prior criminal convictions and pleas of guilty or pleas of nolo
contendere of the defendant, or the absence of any such prior criminal convictions and
pleas."
2133. The trial judge granted Bullington's motion for a new trial on the basis of Duren v.
Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979), which was decided while the motion had been pending. In
Duren, Missouri's statute allowing women to claim automatic exemption from jury service
was declared unconstitutional, because it violated a defendant's sixth amendment right to
have a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community.
2134. State ex rel. Westfall v. Mason, 594 S.W.2d 908 (Mo. 1980).
2135. 451 U.S. at 438-40. The Court distinguished Missouri's capital murder statute from
three Supreme Court decisions. In Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919), the defend-
ant was tried and convicted of first degree murder three times. At his first trial, he had been
sentenced to death; upon retrial he was reconvicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.
After obtaining a writ of error, Stroud was again tried and the death sentence was imposed.
Unlike Bullington, Stroud did not involve a separate sentencing hearing, and there were no
19821
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provide the sentencer with unlimited discretion to select from a wide
range of punishments; rather, explicit standards guided the jury's deci-
sion between life imprisonment and the death penalty. 136 The Court
compared Missouri's separate sentencing proceeding to "a trial on the
issue of punishment,"2 137 in which the State had the burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating circumstances justified the
death penalty. The Supreme Court also distinguished Missouri's capi-
tal murder proceeding from the dangerous special offender statute that
was held constitutional in United States v. DiFrancesco. 
21 31
The majority extended double jeopardy principles to the sentenc-
ing phase of trial.2 139 The Court first considered the rule that retrial is
barred when a defendant's conviction has been reversed on the ground
that the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict.21 40
The Court applied this principle to Missouri's capital murder sentenc-
ing proceeding.2 14' Unlike usual sentencing proceedings in which it is
impossible to determine why a sentence less than the statutory maxi-
mum has been imposed, Missouri's statute "explicitly requires the jury
to determine whether the prosecution has 'proved its case.' ",2142 Thus,
standards for setting the punishment. In North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), the
landmark case establishing the general rule that a harsher sentence may be imposed on
retrial, a wide range of punishments was available without standards guiding the judge's
discretion. Finally, in Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973), the jury had unlimited
discretion to select from a broad range of punishments for the defendant's robbery convic-
tion: death, life imprisonment, or four to fifteen years imprisonment. The defendant was
sentenced to fifteen years in prison; upon retrial he was reconvicted and sentenced to life
imprisonment. Unlike Bulhngton, these three cases did not involve a separate sentencing
proceeding, during which the prosecution could introduce evidence to support a particular
sentence.
2136. 451 U.S. at 438.
2137. Id
2138. 449 U.S. 117 (1980) (18 U.S.C. § 3576, authorizing the sentence of a dangerous spe-
cial offender to be increased by court of appeals upon Government's appeal, held not to
violate double jeopardy clause). The Bullington Court noted that DiFrancesco involved en-
hancement of an existing sentence on appellate review, rather than the imposition of a
harsher sentence on retrial. Although section 3576 requires a separate presentence hearing
to classify the defendant as a dangerous special offender, the judge is given unfettered dis-
cretion to impose a wide range of punishments. The Bullington Court also noted the differ-
ent standards of proof: section 3576 requires only that the Government prove by a
preponderance of the information that the defendant is a dangerous special offender, while
Missouri's sentencing proceeding requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the death
penalty is warranted. 451 U.S. at 440-41.
2139. Id at 441-46.
2140. See, e.g., Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978); Green v. United States, 355 U.S.
184 (1957) (retrial for first degree murder barred by double jeopardy clause after defendant
had been found guilty of second degree murder at first trial).
2141. 451 U.S. at 445.
2142. Id at 444.
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the jury's verdict of life imprisonment indicated that the State had
failed to introduce sufficient aggravating circumstances to warrant the
imposition of the death penalty; and as a result, the death penalty could
not be imposed at Bullington's second trial. The majority also applied
to sentencing the double jeopoardy principle that bars retrial following
a verdict of acquittal.2143 The Court characterized the jury's verdict of
life imprisonment as an acquittal of the death penalty, and thus double
jeopardy barred imposition of the death penalty at Bullington's
retrial.2 14
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justices White and Rehnquist, concluded that the double
jeopardy clause allows the imposition of a harsher sentence on retrial,
including the death penalty.2 145 The dissent stated that the procedural
differences between Bulling/on and previous Supreme Court decisions
allowing harsher sentences on retrial were unimportant for double
jeopardy purposes.2146 The dissenting Justices considered this decision
to be the first in which the Supreme Court has held that the double
jeopardy clause applies equally to determinations of guilt or innocence
and to the sentencing phase of trial.2 14 7
The dissent also disagreed with the majority's application of the
"implicit acquittal" principle to sentencing. 1 48 It criticized the major-
ity's decision as inconsistent with dictum in United States v.
DiFrancesco, 2149 decided the same term, in which the Court stated that
"the imposition of [a] sentence does not operate as an implied acquittal
of any greater sentence."215 The dissent further noted that the policy
reasons for attaching absolute finality to an acquittal verdict do not
apply to a sentencing decision imposing less than the statutory
2151maximum.
2143. Id. at 446. The majority determined that double jeopardy considerations which un-
derlie the finality accorded to an acquittal were equally applicable to Missouri's sentencing
hearing. Id at 445-46.
2144. Id at 445. The majority expressly refused to apply the reasoning in Stroud v.
United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919), to Missouri's sentencing procedure. 451 U.S. at 446. See
supra note 2135.
2145. 451 U.S. at.453 (Powell, J., dissenting).
2146. Id at 448-49 n.2.
2147. Id at 449.
2148. Id at 451.
2149. 449 U.S. 117 (1980).
2150. Id at 136 n.14.
2151. 451 U.S. at 451 (Powell, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that "[t]he possibility of a
higher sentence is acceptable under the Double Jeopardy Clause, whereas the possibility of
error as to guilt or innocence is not .... ." Id
The dissent disagreed with the majority's application of Burks v. United States, 437
1982]
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In a 1981 survey case, United States v. Williams,2"5 2 the Ninth Cir-
cuit considered whether increasing the severity of a sentence on retrial
was warranted. In 1978, defendant Williams had been convicted by a
federal jury of bank robbery, for which he received a twenty-year
prison term with parole eligibility after six years and eight months.
While his appeal was pending, Williams was convicted in a California
superior court of first-degree murder. The state judge sentenced Wil-
liams to life imprisonment, to run concurrently with the twenty-year
federal bank robbery sentence. Because California law established pa-
role eligibility after serving seven years of a life term, Williams would
have been eligible for parole under both sentences after seven years.
Williams' bank robbery conviction was reversed by the Ninth Circuit,
and in 1979 he was retried and again convicted. The district judge
sentenced Williams to a ten-year prison term, to run consecutively with
the state life term. Under this second federal sentence, Williams would
be eligible for parole after serving ten years and four months-seven
years for the state term, plus three years and four months for the con-
secutive ten-year federal term. Williams appealed this second bank
robbery sentence, contending that a harsher sentence on retrial was
unjustified.
The Ninth Circuit first determined whether the second federal
bank robbery sentence was actually more severe than the original
one.2153 In making this determination, the court did not consider the
technical length of the sentence but rather the overall impact of the
sentence on the defendant. 21 14 Although Williams' second bank rob-
bery sentence was one-half as long as the original one, the practical
effect of the second sentence was to increase the length of his incarcera-
tion.215  Therefore, the federal judge's imposition of a ten-year sen-
U.S. 1 (1978), to Missouri's capital murder sentencing proceeding. A sentence of life impris-
onment does not invariably indicate that the State had introduced insufficient evidence to
impose the death penalty. The dissent noted that the trial court had instructed the jury that
although it might find sufficient aggravating circumstances to justify imposing the death
penalty, it was not compelled to do so. Therefore, there was "significantly less reason to
assume that the State failed to prove its case." 451 U.S. at 452 n.4 (Powell, J., dissenting).
2152. 651 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1981).
2153. Id at 647.
2154. See Thurman v. United States, 423 F.2d 988, 989 (9th Cir.) (totality of the impact of
a sentence on defendant determines its severity), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970).
2155. The court compared Williams' situation to United States v. Young, 593 F.2d 891
(9th Cir. 1979). Young had been sentenced to a twelve-year prison term for a drug offense.
While his appeal was pending, he was convicted of a separate drug offense and received a
fifteen-year sentence, to run concurrently with the earlier sentence. After the first conviction
was reversed on appeal, Young was retried and convicted. The district judge imposed a new
twelve-year term, to run consecutively with the fifteen-year sentence. The sentence imposed
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tence, to run consecutively with the state penalty, increased the severity
of Williams' punishment.
1 56
After finding that the second bank robbery sentence was indeed
harsher than the original one, the Ninth Circuit considered whether the
increase in seveity was warranted. The court applied the standard de-
veloped in North Carolina v. Pearce2157 : a harsher sentence may be
imposed on retrial when there exists "objective information concerning
identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant, occurring after the
...original sentencing proceeding."215 The Government argued that
Williams' indictment and conviction for murder justified imposing a
harsher sentence on retrial, because they occurred after the original
bank robbery sentencing and reflected negatively on Williams' charac-
ter.2159 In rejecting this argument, the Ninth Circuit stated that only
conduct occurring after the first sentencing may be used as a basis for
increasing punishment on retrial. Because the murder had occurred
before the original sentencing, it did not justify a harsher sentence on
retrial. 21 60 The court found nothing in the record concerning Williams'
conduct after the first bank robbery sentencing that would justify im-
posing a harsher sentence, and thus it concluded that the district
judge's second sentence had violated the Pearce standard.216 1 The 1979
bank robbery sentence was vacated and the case was remanded for
resentencing.
In the 1981 case of United States v. Diogenes,2 62 the Ninth Circuit
held that the federal bank robbery statute, 18 U.S.C. section 2113,
preempts the permissible penalties for a bank robbery conviction.2163
Section 2113 provides penalties for bank robberies of varying degrees
of violence, as well as enhanced punishment when the defendant
"uses" a dangerous weapon. 2164 Diogenes was convicted of bank rob-
on retrial had the effect of increasing Young's original punishment of twelve years imprison-
ment to twenty-seven years. The Ninth Circuit determined that Young's second sentence
was unwarranted, because the record failed to show any affirmative reasons justifying the
imposition of a harsher sentence on retrial. Id at 893. The fact that both of Young's trials
had been in federal court, while Williams' intervening conviction had been in state court,
was considered immaterial. 651 F.2d at 647.
2156. Id at 648.
2157. 395 U.S. 711, 726 (1969).
2158. Id This standard protects the defendant from potential vindictiveness by the resen-
tencing judge when the defendant successfully appeals his original conviction. Id at 725.
2159. 651 F.2d at 648.
2160. Id
2161. Id
2162. 638 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1981).
2163. Id at 126.
2164. 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
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bery involving force, violence, and intimidation, a violation of section
2113(a).21 65 He was also convicted under 18 U.S.C. section
924(c)(2)2 16 6 for carrying a firearm during the commission of a federal
felony. Diogenes received consecutive sentences of twenty years for the
bank robbery conviction and five years for carrying a firearm. He ap-
pealed, contending that Congress had not intended multiple punish-
ment for a single bank robbery. Relying on two recent Supreme Court
decisions, 2167 the Ninth Circuit held that enhanced sentencing under
section 924(c) is impermissible when a defendant has been convicted of
a section 2113 bank robbery.2 68
The court considered whether section 924(c)(2) remains applicable
when a defendant carries rather than uses a firearm, since section
2113(d) authorizes the imposition of a harsher sentence for only the
"use of a dangerous weapon" during the commission of a bank rob-
(a) Whoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts to take,
from the person or presence of another any property or money or any other thing
of value belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, management, or possession
of, any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan association;. . . Shall be fined
not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
(d) Whoever, in committing, or in attempting to commit, any offense defined in
subsections (a) and (b) of this section, assaults any person, or puts in jeopardy the
life of any person by the use of a dangerous weapon or device, shall be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty-five years, or both.
2165. Id
2166. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1976) provides in relevant part:
Whoever--(l) uses a firearm to commit any felony for which he may be prose-
cuted in a court of the United States, or (2) carries a firearm unlawfully during the
commission of any felony for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United
States, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for the commission of such
felony, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for not less than one year nor more
than ten years.
2167. In Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398 (1980), the defendants were convicted of
armed assault on federal officers and received enhanced sentences under section 924(c) for
using a firearm. The Supreme Court held that sentence enhancement under section 924(c) is
impermissible when the substantive felony statute contains its own enhancement provision.
Id at 404. In Busic, the Court relied on a 1978 decision, Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S.
6 (1978), which involved the federal bank robbery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1976). Simpson
was convicted of aggravated bank robbery in violation of section 2113(a); he received an
enhanced penalty under both sections 2113(d) and 924(c)(1) for using a firearm. The
Supreme Court concluded that a defendant convicted for a single bank robbery committed
with a firearm may not be sentenced under both 924(c) and 2113(d). 435 U.S. at 16.
Neither Busic nor Simpson addressed whether a defendant convicted of carrying a fire-
arm, rather than actually using it, may be punished under section 924(c)(2) when the en-
hancement provision of the underlying felony statute authorizes a harsher sentence only
upon "use" of a firearm.
2168. 638 F.2d at 126. Diogenes overruled United States v. Brown, 602 F.2d 909 (9th Cir.
1979), which held that the Government had discretion to select whether to prosecute the
defendant under section 2113(d) or section 924(c).
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bery.2169 After reviewing the legislative history of section 924(c), 2170
the Ninth Circuit concluded that Congress had clearly intended section
924(c) to be inapplicable when the underlying felony statute contains
its own enhancement provision.2171 In support of this conclusion, the
court explained that the coexistence of enhanced sentencing under sec-
tions 2113 and 924(c)(2) would lead to absurd consequences: an en-
hanced sentence under section 924(c)(2) for carrying a firearm during a
bank robbery might be greater than the penalty under section 2113(d)
for actually using a dangerous weapon.2172 Thus, section 2113 pre-
empted the permissible penalties for Diogenes' bank robbery convic-
tion; and as a result, the district court's imposition of a five-year prison
term under section 924(c)(2) was unlawful.
2173
The Ninth Circuit also considered whether Diogenes could have
received an enhanced sentence under section 2113(d) for carrying a
firearm.21 74 Invoking the doctrine of negative implication,2 75 the court
determined that section 2113(d) applies only to a defendant who actu-
ally uses a dangerous weapon and not merely carries one.2176 Thus,
Diogenes' conviction for carrying a firearm did not warrant an in-
creased penalty under the bank robbery statute.
B. Inconsistent Verdicts
A verdict is inconsistent when a defendant is found guilty on one
count of an indictment and innocent on another despite evidence of
2169. 638 F.2d at 127-28.
2170. Congressional intent regarding the scope of section 924(c) was found in Representa-
tive Pofi's statement:
For the sake of legislative history, it should be noted that my substitute is not
intended to apply to title 18, sections 111, 112 or 113 which already define the
penalties for the use of a firearm in assaulting officials, with sections 2113 or 2114
concerning armed robberies of the mail or banks, with section 2231 concerning
armed assaults upon process servers or with chapter 44 which defines other firearm
felonies.
114 CONG. REC. 22232 (1968).
2171. 638 F.2d at 127-28.
2172. Id at 128. The maximum penalty for committing a bank robbery with the use of a
dangerous weapon, a violation of section 2113(d), is twenty-five years imprisonment. In
contrast, the maximum sentence for carrying a firearm during the commission of a bank
robbery in violation of sections 2113(a) and 924(c)(2) is thirty years' imprisonment.
2173. Id
2174. Id at 127.
2175. The doctrine of negative implication provides that the court may not expand the
scope of enhanced sentencing when the legislature, by its explicit language, has preempted
the field.
2176. I
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culpability as to both counts. 2177 Verdicts are also inconsistent when
evidence of culpability applies equally to co-defendants but one de-
fendant is found guilty while another is found innocent.2178
In Dunn v. United States,2179 the Supreme Court held that incon-
sistent verdicts in a criminal jury trial may stand.2 180 The Court rea-
soned that inconsistent verdicts do not, of necessity, indicate that the
jury was not convinced of the defendant's guilt.2 18' Rather, such ver-
dicts may be the result of jury sympathy for a defendant facing a harsh
sentence.2182 In addition, the Court held that although the verdict may
have resulted from compromise or mistake on the part of the jury, ver-
dicts cannot be overturned on the basis of speculation about or inquiry
into such matters.2183
Because the Dunn Court's reasoning was in large part based upon
the nature and function of juries, the Court did not address the effect of
inconsistent verdicts in federal criminal bench trials. The circuits have
split on this issue. In McElheny v. United States,2184 for example, the
Ninth Circuit upheld inconsistent verdicts in a bench trial, relying on
Dunn and noting that it was "well settled" that verdicts need not be
consistent.185 The court, however, did not address the issue of whether
distinctions between jury and bench trials merited a different resolution
of the inconsistent verdict issue.
Conversely, in United States v. Maybury,2186 the Second Circuit
reversed a guilty verdict in a bench trial on the ground that it was in-
consistent with an acquittal on another count. The court interpreted
Dunn narrowly, restricting its holding to jury trials.218
2177. See, e.g., McElheny v. United States, 146 F.2d 932, 933 (9th Cir. 1944).
2178. See, e.g., United States v. Duz-Mor Diagnostic Lab., Inc., 650 F.2d 223, 225 (9th Cir.
1981).
2179. 284 U.S. 390 (1932).
2180. Id at 393. "Consistency in the verdict is not necessary. Each count in an indictment
is regarded as if it was a separate indictment." Id
In Dunn the defendant was indicted on three counts of maintaining a common nuisance
(keeping liquor for sale in the back room of his sporting goods store), unlawfully possessing
liquor, and unlawfully selling liquor. On the same evidence, the jury found the defendant
guilty on the first count but not guilty on the second and third counts. Id at 391-92.
2181. Id at 393 (citing Steckler v. United States, 7 F.2d 59, 60 (2d Cir. 1925)).
2182. 284 U.S. at 393.
2183. Id at 394.
2184. 146 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1944).
2185. Id at 933 (citing Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390 (1932)).
2186. 274 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1960).
2187. Id at 903. "Since we find no experience to justify approval of an inconsistent judg-
ment when a criminal case is tried to a judge, we think logic should prevail." Id
The Maybury court distinguished Steckler and Dunn by noting that those cases:
show on their face that the decision to ignore inconsistencies in the verdict of a jury
[Vol. 15
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In United States v. West,21 88 the Eighth Circuit declined to follow
Maybury. Instead, the court relied on Dunn and McElheny and ruled
that consistency in verdicts on a multiple-count indictment is unneces-
sary in either a bench or jury trial.
2189
In Rivera v. Harris,21 o the Second Circuit introduced the concept
of "rational explanation. 21 9' The court reasoned that because facially
inconsistent verdicts might be rationally explained, such inconsistency
does not constitute unfairness per se. In the absence of a rational ex-
planation, however, an inconsistent verdict is a violation of a defend-
ant's right to due process of law.21 92 The court observed that a
requirement of appropriate findings would dispel any uncertainty
about the validity of the conviction. 9  Although the Rivera court
cited Maybury with approval, it noted that its decision, unlike that in
Maybury, was constitutionally based.21 94
The Ninth Circuit recently considered the effect of inconsistent
verdicts in a criminal bench trial in United States v. Duz-Mor Diagnos-
in a criminal case was based on special considerations relating to the nature and
the function of the jury in such cases rather than on a general principle to be ap-
plied even when these considerations were absent.
Id. at 902.
The relevant differences between jury and bench trials as noted by the Maybury court
were: (1) the jury was originally a replacement of trial by ordeal and was not conceived of
as a rational body. Its subsequent rationalization has been gradual and has not been com-
pleted, as inconsistent verdicts indicate; (2) the requirement of jury unanimity expresses the
verdict of the neighborhood, community, or country. "Ignoring inconsistency in a jury's
disposition of the counts of a criminal indictment may thus be deemed a price for securing
the unanimous verdict that the Sixth Amendment requires." Id at 902-03 (citing Andres v.
United States, 333 U.S. 740, 748 (1948)).
Judges, on the other hand, should be as rational as possible; they do not reach unanim-
ity with themselves, and they do not speak for the community. Thus, no allowance for
inconsistency should be made. 274 F.2d at 902-03.
2188. 549 F.2d 545 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 956 (1977).
2189. Id at 533 (citing Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390 (1932); McElheny v. United
States, 146 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1944)).
2190. 643 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1981).
2191. Id at 92.
2192. Id at 96. The Rivera court actually cited two tests for determining the validity of
inconsistent verdicts: the identical evidence test, in which any difference as to evidence with
respect to each count (or co-defendant) will justify apparent inconsistency; and the rational
basis test, in which only a difference capable of explaining the apparent inconsistency will
allow the verdict to stand. The second test was ultimately adopted by the court. Id at 93.
2193. Id at 97.
2194. Id at 94 (citing United States v. Maybury, 274 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1944)). The Rivera
court approved the basis of the Maybury decision, namely the existence of fundamental
differences between judge and jury. See supra note 2187. But the court suggested that in
contrast to the constitutional basis of its own holding, the Maybury court may simply have
been exercising its supervisory power over the administration of criminal justice within the
Second Circuit. 643 F.2d at 94.
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tic Laboratory, Inc. 2195 The court distinguished McElheny2196 and re-
lied extensively on Rivera2197 in holding that unless there existed a
rational explanation for inconsistent verdicts, the defendant corpora-
tion would be deprived of its "fundamental interest in liberty" without
due process of law.2198 The court would then be required to set aside
the conviction.2 99
In Duz-Mor, the laboratory and its president and chief technolo-
gist, Irigene Morehead, were indicted for participation in an illegal
kickback scheme.22 °° Morehead and her husband were the sole share-
holders in the corporation. 220' The trial judge dismissed the indictment
against Morehead but ultimately entered a judgment of conviction
against the corporation.220 2 Because the evidence of culpability applied
equally to Morehead and the corporation, the latter's appeal raised the
inconsistent verdict issue.
2203
The court treated the dismissal of Morehead as an acquittal,22°
thus bringing the inconsistency issue into sharp focus. Although it fol-
lowed the reasoning of the Rivera court, the Duz-Mor court stressed
that both the Rivera right to due process of law and an additional right
to equal protection under the law were relevant to its decision. Because
Duz-Mor involved inconsistency between verdicts as to multiple de-
fendants, "there [was] a constitutional concern that like defendants be
treated equally. ' 220 5 Accordingly, the court remanded the case to the
2195. 650 F.2d 223 (9th Cir. 1981).
2196. Id at 226 n.2. The Duz-Mor court noted that: (1) MeElheny concerned an inconsis-
tency between multiple counts of an indictment whereas Duz-Mar concerned inconsistency
between verdicts as to multiple defendants; see supra notes 2177-78 and accompanying text;
(2) the McElheny court failed to consider the differences between judge and jury which were
discussed in Maybury and Rivera; (3) regardless of whether consistency is constitutionally
required, the court has the power to require findings explaining seemingly inconsistent ver-
dicts as part of its supervisory power over the criminal justice system within its jurisdiction.
650 F.2d at 226 n.2.
2197. "[W]e adopt the Rivera approach." Id at 227.
2198. Id "[W]e do not hold that an inconsistency between the verdicts invalidates Duz-
Mor's conviction. Rather, we are concerned with Duz-Mor's due process right to have its
conviction rest on a rational basis, whether or not the conviction is consistent with the dis-
missal of the indictment against [the co-defendant]." .d at 226 n.3.
2199. Id at 227.
2200. Duz-Mor and Morehead were charged with offering to make payments in exchange
for the referral of laboratory business for which they would be reimbursed from Medicare
and MediCal funds. Id at 225.
2201. Id
2202. Id
2203. Id
2204. Id at 227.
2205. Id at 226 n.2. See supra note 2192. Although Rivera also concerned multiple de-
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trial court for an explanation of its decision and ordered the corpora-
tion's conviction to be set aside unless the trial court could articulate a
rational basis for the apparent inconsistency.22°
C Appeals
1. Finality
Finality is a prerequisite to appeal within the federal judicial sys-
tem.2207 It acts to prevent piecemeal litigation by eliminating delays at
the trial level, thus promoting effective and fair administration of the
criminal law.2"' The Supreme Court, however, has created an excep-
tion2219 to the finality requirement when (1) there is a complete and
final rejection of the claim,221 ° (2) the claim is separable from, and col-
lateral to, the merits of the action,221 ' and (3) the right upon which the
claim is based will be lost if immediate appeal is not permitted.2212
a. subject matter jurisdiction
In United States v. Layton,2 13 the Ninth Circuit ruled that a sub-
ject matter jurisdiction claim did not satisfy the last of the above re-
quirements because it would not be lost upon denial of defendant's
interlocutory appeal.2214 According to the court, a subject matter claim
could be effectively reviewed in a post-judgment appeal.221 5
fendants, one of whom received a facially inconsistent guilty verdict, the court did not ad-
dress the equal protection issue.
2206. 650 F.2d at 227.
2207. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976) provides: "The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of
appeals from all final decisions of the district courts.. . except where a direct review may
be had by the Supreme Court."
2208. DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 124 (1962) (citing Cobbledick v. United
States, 309 U.S. 323, 324-26 (1940)).
2209. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). In Cohen, the
plaintiff was required by statute to post security for reasonable expenses incurred by the
defense. He challenged this requirement in the trial court, but did not prevail. On appeal,
he successfully argued that if he had to wait until after trial to appeal the imposition of the
security, the issue would be irretrievably lost. Id at 544-45. See also Abney v. United States,
431 U.S. 651, 660 (1977) (double jeopardy claim).
2210. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
2211. Id
2212. Id
2213. 645 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1981). Layton arose out of the Jonestown, Guyana massacre.
The defendant, who was in Guyana when the indictment was returned, claimed that the
statutes under which he was indicted required his presence in the United States. Id
2214. Id at 683.
2215. The Layton court relied on United States v. Sorren, 605 F.2d 1211, 1213-15 (1st Cir.
1979), in denying the interlocutory appeal. The Sorren court rejected a pretrial challenge-to
the court's personal jurisdiction, which Layton characterized as a "much more attractive
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b. criminal action estoppel defense
In United States v. Sears, Roebuck, and Co., 2u 6 the Ninth Circuit
ruled that a defense based on the theory that the government "actively
misled" the defendant failed to meet both the second and third require-
ments of the finality exception.22 17 According to the court, the issue
raised by this defense was that of criminal intent. A hearing on the
issue would therefore be indistinguishable from a trial on the mer-
its.22 " Such a hearing was certainly not separable from or collateral to
the merits. Moreover, because the defense could be raised at trial,221 9 it
would not be lost upon denial of defendant's immediate appeal.
c. selective prosecution
The Sears court also determined that although selective prosecu-
tion may provide the basis for an interlocutory appeal, the particular
claim raised by the defendant did not satisfy the requirement of final-
ity. 2220 The court cited language from United States v. Wilson,222 1 lim-
iting application of the finality exception to prosecutions "based on
impermissible grounds such as race, religion, or the exercise of consti-
tutional rights."2 2 As a corporation, defendant Sears could not argue
that it was being prosecuted on racial or religious grounds.2 223 Regard-
ing its constitutional rights, the Ninth Circuit stated that defendant
failed to make such a claim.2224 Instead, Sears "merely [made] vague
candidate for interlocutory appeal." 645 F.2d at 683. Logically, however, the denial of a
subject matter jurisdiction claim should be immediately appealable. Fair administration of
justice and judicial economy are both served by speedy resolution of subject matter jurisdic-
tion because the claim goes to the core of whether the trial should be held in the first place.
2216. 647 F.2d 902 (9th Cir. 1981).
2217. d at 904 n.12. Sears was charged with mailing false statements and presenting false
invoices to the Customs Service. Sears argued that because the Service had always known
that Sears' invoices did not reflect the actual (lower) price it had paid for merchandise im-
ported from Japan, the Service was estopped from denying their accuracy. 1d
2218. Id
2219. Id The Sears court noted that requiring the defense to be raised at trial would
enable the defendant to develop the defense to its greatest potential. Id
2220. Id
2221. 639 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1981).
2222. 647 F.2d at 904 (citing 639 F.2d at 503). See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)
(equal protection challenge to conviction under habitual offender statute denied because
"[e]ven though the statistics. . . might imply a policy of selective enforcement, it was not
stated that the selection was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race,
religion, or other arbitrary classification.").
2223. 647 F.2d at 904 (citing United States . Wilson, 639 F.2d at 503-04).
2224. 647 F.2d at 904-05. The Sears court's language implies that the defendant did not
argue that its right "to engage freely in business and foreign commerce" was a constitutional
right. By disposing of the defendant's claim in this manner, the Ninth Circuit avoided ad-
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assertions that its right to engage freely in business and foreign com-
merce [was] being interfered with by the instant prosecution. 2225
These assertions alone, the court determined, would not support a se-
lective prosecution claim.2226
d vindictive prosecution
Like selective prosecution claims, vindictive prosecution claims
also merit immediate appeal.2227 In United States v. Shaw,22 zs the
Ninth Circuit determined that this principle extends as well to prosecu-
tions that have the appearance of being vindictive.2229 In Shaw, the
appearance of vindictiveness arose when the prosecution moved to va-
cate a plea-bargained guilty plea in retaliation for the defendant's filing
a motion in arrest of judgment against the single remaining charge.2230
Although four counts had been filed against him, 231 the defendant
made a plea bargain allowing him to plead guilty to one count of his
choice. Because his lawyers believed that the court lacked subject mat-
ter jurisdiction over the count of bribing a public official, the defendant
chose to plead guilty to that count.2232 In exchange, the prosecution
dropped the charges on the other counts.2233 Subsequently, defendant
moved to arrest the judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.2234
The prosecution was then granted a motion to vacate, and the trial
court changed Shaw's plea from guilty on one count to not guilty on all
dressing whether the right asserted is indeed constitutional. Business liberty interests under
the fourteenth amendment have been expressly accorded a lesser degree of protection than
other constitutional interests since the decision in United States v. Carolene Products Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Courts have, however, been willing to recognize that these
interests should be afforded some protection, even if it is only that offered by the rational
basis test. See, e.g., Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976).
2225. 647 F.2d at 905 (citing United States v. Choate, 619 F.2d 21, 23-24 (9th Cir. 1980)).
2226. 647 F.2d at 905.
2227. United States v. Griffin, 617 F.2d 1342, 1345 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 863
(1980).
2228. 655 F.2d 168 (9th Cir. 1981).
2229. Id at 171. See United States v. Groves, 571 F.2d 450, 453 (9th Cir. 1978).
2230. 655 F.2d at 171.
2231. The four counts included conspiracy, mail fraud, and two bribery counts. Id at 170.
2232. Id
2233. Id
2234. Id Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 34 provides:
The court on motion of the defendant shall arrest judgment if the indictment or
information does not charge an offense or if the court was without jurisdiction of
the offense charged. The motion in arrest of judgment shall be made within 7 days
after the verdict or finding of guilty, or after plea of guilty or nolo contendere, or
within such further time as the court may fix during the 7-day period.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 34.
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four counts.2 235 The Ninth Circuit ruled that the prosecution's motion
to vacate created at least the appearance of vindictiveness, because its
effect was to increase the defendant's total exposure to punishment. 236
e. grandjury investigations
The Supreme Court has prohibited interlocutory appeals from
grand jury investigations,2237 reasoning that the need for grand jury
secrecy overrides the need for immediate appeal.2238 However, once
grand jury proceedings have terminated, a disclosure order under Fed-
eral Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) is considered a final decision.2239
In In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 78-184,2240 the Ninth Circuit
ruled that because the grand jury investigation had been completed, a
subsequent disclosure order in a civil action was appealable. 2241 The
court rejected an argument raised by the Government that the order
was not appealable because improperly obtained evidence from a
grand jury may be suppressed in a subsequent civil proceeding.2242 In-
herent in the court's reasoning was the concept that the damage from
2235. 655 F.2d at 170.
2236. Id at 171 (citing Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28 (1974)). See also United States
v. Burt, 619 F.2d 831, 836 (9th Cir. 1980) (when defendant proves that charges have been
increased after exercising constitutional or statutory right, appearance of vindictiveness has
been demonstrated); United States v. Groves, 571 F.2d 450, 453 (9th Cir. 1978) ("[I]t is the
appearance of vindictiveness, rather than vindictiveness in fact, which controls.").
2237. Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 327-28 (1940).
2238. In United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958), the Court enumer-
ated the reasons for secrecy:
(1) To prevent escape of those whose indictment may be contemplated; (2) to in-
sure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its deliberations, and to prevent per-
sons subject to indictment or their friends from importuning the grand jurors; (3) to
prevent subornation of perjury or tampering with the witnesses who may testify
before [the] grand jury and later appear at the trial of those indicted by it; (4) to
encourage free and untrammeled disclosures by persons who have information
with respect to the commission of crimes; (5) to protect [an] innocent accused who
is exonerated from disclosure of the fact that he has been under investigation, and
from the expense of standing trial where there was no probability of guilt.
Id at 681-82 n.6 (quoting United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628-29 (3d Cir. 1954)).
2239. See United States v. Sobatka, 623 F.2d 764, 766 (2d Cir. 1980).
2240. 642 F.2d 1184 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, - U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 2034 (1982).
2241. Id at 1187. The defendants had plea bargained to tax fraud charges. The Civil
Division of the United States Justice Department then moved for disclosure of grand jury
proceedings for possible use in subsequent civil actions. Nine months after the order, the
Government fied a civil suit. Id at 1186-87. See also Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops North-
west, 441 U.S. 211, 233 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); In re Grand Jury Investigation,
630 F.2d 996, 999-1000 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1081 (1980).
2242. 642 F.2d at 1188. See In re April 1977 Grand Jury Subpoenas (General Motors),
584 F.2d 1366, 1370 (6th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cer. denied, 440 U.S. 934 (1979); Coson v.
United States, 533 F.2d 1119, 1120-21 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
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disclosure itself cannot be undone by subsequently suppressing the
fruits of the disclosure.
f. juvenile cert~fcation orders
In Guam v. Kingsbury,2243 the Ninth Circuit held that pretrial juve-
nile certification orders which cannot be appealed after conviction con-
stitute final decisions.22" In Kingsbury, the defendant appealed the
district court's affirmance of a Guam juvenile court's order certifying
him to stand trial as an adult.2245 The Ninth Circuit found the applica-
ble Guam statutes and precedent unclear regarding whether a juvenile
defendant was required to question the propriety of being tried as an
adult before trial, and was, therefore, prohibited from raising that issue
after trial.224 Consequently, the court examined the approach taken
by other jurisdictions which had broad statutes similar to Guam's.
Based on this examination, the court determined that those jurisdic-
tions had construed such statutes to permit appeal of a juvenile certifi-
cation order immediately after entry of the order, but not after the
defendant's conviction. Hence, the court treated the order as a final
decision for purposes of appeal.2247
The dissent pointed out that in Guam v. Lefever,224 the Ninth Cir-
cuit ruled that a trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss, based on the
defendant's allegation that he was subject to the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Guam juvenile court, did not constitute a final order.2249 The
order in Lefever, the dissent explained, could have been "fully re-
viewed" by the Ninth Circuit after Lefever's conviction and sentenc-
ing.2250 The majority made no attempt to distinguish Kingsbury from
Lefever. Moreover, the dissent noted that the practical effect of Kings-
bury is to give the Guam Legislature the "power to control the scope of
review by this court of cases coming from a district court."
2251
2243. 649 F.2d 740 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895 (1981).
2244. Id at 743.
2245. Id at 741.
2246. Id at 742. Section 272 of the Guam Code of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent
part: "An interested party aggrieved by order or decree of the court may apply to the Dis-
trict Court of Guam for the allowance of an appeal, and the said court may allow such
appeal whenever in the opinion of said court the order or decree ought to be reviewed."
GUAM CIv. PROC. CODE § 272 (1953) (amended 1974).
2247. 649 F.2d at 743.
2248. 454 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
2249. 649 F.2d at 745 (Poole, J., dissenting) (citing Guam v. Lefever, 454 F:2d at 270).
2250. 649 F.2d at 745 (Poole, J., dissenting).
2251. Id at 747.
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2. Government appeals
Appeals brought by the Government in federal criminal cases are
"not favored. '2252 The Government may appeal only if expressly au-
thorized by statute. 53 In Arizona v. Manypenny,225" the Supreme
Court ruled that in cases where state law permits Government appeals
and the case is removed to federal court, 28 U.S.C. section 12912255
provides the Government with the express authority to appeal the re-
sult of the federal decision.
2256
In Manypenny, the defendant was indicted in an Arizona state
court for commiting the crime of assault with a deadly weapon.2257 Be-
cause the charge arose from an act committed while the defendant was
on duty as a federal border patrol agent, he removed the case to federal
court.2258 The district court acquitted the defendant based on an im-
munity defense, and the Ninth Circuit dismissed Arizona's appeal for
lack of express statutory authorization.2259
Under Arizona law, the prosecution had the right to appeal when
the trial court exceeds its jurisdiction or abuses its discretion,2260 as the
prosecution claimed in this case.2261 The Supreme Court observed that
2252. Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 96 (1967) (citing Carroll v. United States, 354
U.S. 394, 400 (1957)).
2253. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 568 (1977); United States v.
Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 336 (1975); United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 312 (1892).
2254. 451 U.S. 232 (1981).
2255. See supra note 2207.
2256. 451 U.S. at 250.
2257. Id at 235.
2258. I1d at 235-36. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (1976) provides:
(a) A civil action or criminal prosecution commenced in a State court against any
of the following persons may be removed by them to the district court of the
United States for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is
pending:
(1) Any officer of the United States or any agency thereof, or person acting
under him, for any act under color of such office or on account of any right,
title or authority claimed under any Act of Congress for the apprehension or
punishment of criminals or the collection of the revenue.
2259. 451 U.S. at 237-38.
2260. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2001 (1956).
2261. Arizona asserted that the district court misapplied the relevant immunity law and
lacked jurisdiction to act on a Rule 29(c) motion 11 months after a guilty verdict had been
returned. 451 U.S. at 237 n.8. Rule 29(c) states:
If the jury returns a verdict of guilty or is discharged without having returned a
verdict, a motion for judgment of acquittal may be made or renewed within 7 days
after the jury is discharged or within such further time as the court may fix during
the 7-day period. If a verdict of guilty is returned the court may on such motion set
aside the verdict and enter judgment of acquittal.
FED. R. CraM. P. 29(c) (emphasis added).
The dissent pointed out that the Arizona law giving the prosecution the right to appeal
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the policy behind the removal statute is to provide a trial free from
local interest and prejudice.2262 In addition, the Court stated that re-
moval jurisdiction neither diminishes nor enlarges the substantive
rights of the parties, 2263 which are determined by state law.22 4 There-
fore, if Arizona had the right to appeal in state court, it should not lose
that right merely because the case was removed to federal court.
The Court determined, however, that authorization to appeal
under state law does not in itself establish the state's right to appeal in
federal court.22 65 The right to appeal, the Court held, is derived from
section 1291, which applies to "any litigant. 22 66 Although express fed-
eral authority allowing the state to appeal was lacking,2 267 a state's ap-
pellate authority is a matter of state law, subject only to constitutional
limitations.2268 In Manypenny, the state's appellate authority under its
own laws, combined with section 1291, created the necessary statutory
authorization.2269
The Court found it necessary to distinguish United States v.
Sanges. 2270 In Sanges, the Supreme Court held that the appellate juris-
diction of federal courts does not extend to criminal appeals in which
the lower court found in favor of the defendant.2 27' The Manypenny
court limited Sanges to federal appeals.2272 The dissent, on the other
hand, interpreted Sanges as applying equally to the states, reasoning
that the required express authorization had to come from Congress.
2273
Because the federal statutes are "wholly barren" of any express author-
ization for states to undertake criminal appeals in federal courts, the
dissent concluded that Sanges precluded Arizona's appeal.2 274
was not as explicit as the majority implied. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2001 (1956) states
only that an appeal "may be granted," and routine granting hardly means that the "statute
itself' mandates review in "every case." 451 U.S. at 255 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2262. 451 U.S. at 242.
2263. Id
2264. Id at 243.
2265. Id at 250. This is the critical point in the Court's logic. In a dissenting opinion,
Justice Brennan pointed out that only Congress is constitutionally empowered to allow Gov-
ernment appeals in the federal courts. As such, "the Court's finding that Arizona.. . has
sanctioned prosecutorial appeals in its courts is irrelevant." Id. at 252 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
2266. Id at 244, 250.
2267. Id at 244.
2268. Id at 249.
2269. Id
2270. 144 U.S. 310 (1892).
2271. Id at 323.
2272. 451 U.S. at 247-49.
2273. Id at 247 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2274. Id at 253.
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D. Sentencing
1. Presentencing report
a. prosecutor's report
Due process requires that a sentence be vacated when it is based
on a confidential report that is substantially and materially false.2275
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit recently ruled in United States v. Wolf-
son 2276 that a trial court may not receive from the prosecution an ex
parte communication bearing on a sentence.2277
In Wo(fson, the trial court denied the defendant's request to ex-
amine a presentence report after it was filed. The judge imposed the
precise sentence that the prosecution had recommended, thereby sug-
gesting that the court relied upon the prosecutor's ex parte report.
2278
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit vacated the sentence, holding that receipt
of such communications by the trial court was improper.2279 It rea-
soned that the appearance ofjustice is violated when a judge receives ex
parte sentencing information from a prosecutor who is also an advo-
cate. 280 In addition, the court emphasized the necessity of avoiding
the appearance of collusion between the prosecutor and the judge.2281
2275. In Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948), the Court stated:
It is not the duration or severity of this sentence that renders it constitutionally
invalid; it is the careless or designed pronouncement of sentence on a foundation
so extensively and materially false, which the prisoner had no opportunity to cor-
rect by the services which counsel would provide, that renders the proceedings
lacking in due process.
See also Farrow v. United States, 580 F.2d 1339, 1359 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc); United
States v. Perri, 513 F.2d 572, 574 (9th Cir. 1975).
2276. 634 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1980).
2277. Id at 1221.
2278. The following dialogue took place between the court and Mr. Markoff, Wolfson's
attorney:
MR. MARKOFF: Sir, if I may respectfully request then what information was
brought to your attention from the United States Attorney's Office?
THE COURT: I don't think that's any of your business, Mr. Markoff ....
.d.
2279. Id. at 1222.
2280. Id Other circuits have also concluded that a sentencing judge may not receive an ex
parte communication from the prosecutor concerning the defendant's sentence. See, e.g.,
United States v. Huff, 512 F.2d 66, 71 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d
1213, 1231 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Solomon, 422 F.2d 1110, 1119-21 (7th Cir. 1970).
2281. The Supreme Court has stated:
"[E]very procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as
a judge. . . not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the State and the
accused, denies the latter due process of law." Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532
[(1927)]. Such a stringent rule may sometimes bar trial by judges who have no
actual bias and who do their very best to weigh the scales of justice equally be-
tween contending parties. But to perform its high function in the best way "justice
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In United States v. Kenny,2282 however, the Ninth Circuit refused
to extend the prohibition against ex parte sentencing communicatins
to information submitted by third parties. In Kenny, a case involving
fraud against the Navy, the court received from the acting Secretary of
the Navy a letter stressing the importance of punishing those who "sac-
rifice the public trust for private gain.""22 3 Although the prosecutor
referred to the letter during the sentencing hearing, 228 4 the defendants
had not received a copy. The Ninth Circuit saw "no reason why" the
letter had not been disclosed to the defendants, 2"1 but nevertheless af-
firmed the sentences. The court held that the resentencing remedy was
inappropriate in this case. The ex parte communication came not from
the prosecutor, as in Wolfson, but from an outsider. The existence of
the letter and its pertinent language was disclosed to the defendants at
the sentencing hearing, evoking no objection. Lastly, the court found
no indication that the judge relied on the communication in sentencing;
the record contained ample, independent grounds for the sentences
imposed.
228 6
b. in camera submission
In United States v. Lee,22 s7 the Ninth Circuit held that a sentence
will be vacated on appeal if it is based on information proven to be
false or unreliable.2288 In Lee, the defendant was sentenced to a term
of life imprisonment for various acts of espionage against the United
States. Documents were introduced during the trial, in camera, in re-
sponse to a court order following the defendant's own discovery mo-
tion. The Government claimed national security concerns, and the
must satisfy the appearance of justice." Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14
[(1954)].
In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
2282. 645 F.2d 1323 (9th Cir. 1981).
2283. Id at 1348 n.26.
2284. Id The prosecutor stated:
I think the court has received a letter from the Department of the Navy itself, from
the Acting Secretary of the Navy, and I just briefly would like to read what I think
is significant in the last paragraph of Mr. Woolsey's letter in which he says: "It is
essential to the Navy, indeed to all the nation's citizens, that other men and women
who have the power to sacrifice the public trust for private gain know not just that
yielding to such temptation is wrong, but also that it will be discovered and
punished."
Id
2285..Id at 1349.
2286. Id at 1348-49.
2287. 648 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1981).
2288. Id at 668-69.
1982]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15
defendant was denied access to the information on those grounds. 22 9
On appeal, the defendant contended that the sensitive in camera
submissions subconsciously influenced the trial judge and affected the
sentencing decision.22 90 In rejecting the defendant's contention, the
court held that although the defendant was not given the opportunity to
prove the submissions contained false and unreliable information, the
record clearly indicated that the submissions did not play a role in the
sentencing process. 2 2 9  The district judge stated that the sentence im-
posed was dictated by the record in the case and the gravity of the
crime, and was in no way influenced by the content of the in camera
submissions.2292 The court summarily rejected the idea of a subcon-
scious prejudice and noted that "[t]he very nattlre of the judicial func-
tion calls upon judges to rise above impermissible influences.
2 293
2. Special parole terms
A defendant who is convicted of importing controlled sub-
stances2294 is subject to a mandatory special parole term for each of-
fense. 2295  21 U.S.C. section 963 provides that a conviction for
attempting to import or conspiring to import controlled substances sub-
2289. Id at 668.
2290. Id
2291. Id at 669.
2292. Id at 668. The trial judge stated:
There was nothing whatever in any submissions. There was nothing whatever ex-
cept what appeared in the record before this court and before the jury that the
court looked to as the basis for imposing the sentence ... .There was no recol-
lection of the court at the time, nor is there now, of anything in any mi camera
submission which would in any way exacerbate the degree of culpability of this
defendant, nor which could in any way persuade the court as to the sentence that
ought to be imposed.
Id
2293. Id at 669. The court also rejected the defendant's argument that the in camera sub-
missions constituted prohibited ex parte communications bearing on the sentence. United
States v. Wolfson, 634 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1980), prohibited ex parte sentencing reports
submitted to the judge by the prosecutor. In this case, the submissions were in response to
defense discovery motions and did not bear on the sentence. 648 F.2d at 669.
2294. 21 U.S.C. § 960(a) (1976) provides:
Any person who -
(1) contrary to section 952, 953, or 957 of this title, knowingly or intentionally
imports or exports a controlled substance,
(2) contrary to section 955 of this title, knowingly or intentionally brings or pos-
sesses on board a vessel, aircraft, or vehicle a controlled substance, or
(3) contrary to section 959 of this title, manufactures or distributes a controlled
substance, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
2295. 21 U.S.C. § 960(b) (1976) provides that in addition to any term of imprisonment, a
special parole term of one to three years is imposed depending on the type of controlled
substance imported.
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jects a defendant to fine, imprisonment, or both, which "may not ex-
ceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the [actual] offense" of
importation.2296
In United States v. Anderson,2297 the Ninth Circuit ruled that spe-
cial parole terms could not be imposed for a section 963 violation.2298
The defendant had been convicted of one count of conspiracy to import
heroin and had been sentenced to seven years' imprisonment and a spe-
cial parole term of three years. In reaching this decision, the Ninth
Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's holding in Bifulco v. United
States2299 that a judge may not prescribe a special parole term in con-
nection with an attempt or conspiracy to manufacture a controlled sub-
stance, 230° an offense governed by 21 U.S.C. section 846.2301 Noting
that the wording of section 963 was identical to that of section 846, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that the Bfulco ruling was equally applicable
to section 963.2302 Therefore, the court held that the special parole term
given in this case was improper and reversed and remanded the case
for resentencing.23 °3
3. Rule 35 motions
Under Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a dis-
trict court may reduce a sentence within 120 days after it becomes fiial
if, upon further reflection, it seems unduly harsh.23 4- The 120-day limit
2296. 21 U.S.C. § 963 (1981) states: "Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any
offense defined in this subchapter is punishable by imprisonment or fine or both which may
not exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense, the commission of which
was the object of the attempt or conspiracy."
2297. 652 F.2d 10 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
2298. Id at 11.
2299. 447 U.S. 381 (1980).
2300. Id at 398.
2301. 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976) states: "Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any
offense defined in this subchapter is punishable by imprisonment or fine or both which may
not exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense, the commission of which
was the object of the attempt or the conspiracy."
2302. 652 F.2d at 11. See also Cates v. United States, 447 U.S. 932 (1980). In Cates, the
Supreme Court vacated a § 963 sentence with a special parole term, remanding the case to
the Fifth Circuit "for further consideration in light of Bfulco v. United States. Id. (citation
omitted)." The Fifth Circuit subsequently vacated the defendant's special parole term.
Cates v. United States, 626 F.2d 399, 400 (5th Cir. 1980).
2303. 652 F.2d at 11.
2304. Rule 35(b) provides, in pertinent part:
The court may reduce a sentence within 120 days after the sentence is imposed, or
within 120 days after receipt by the court of a mandate issued upon affirmance of
the judgment or dismissal of the appeal, or within 120 days after entry of any order
or judgment of the Supreme Court denying review of, or having the effect of up-
holding, a judgment of conviction ....
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explicit in the Rule serves two purposes. It protects the court from suc-
cessive motions by prisoners and assures that the parole board's author-
ity will not be usurped.230 5 Once the specified period has ended,
however, the district court is deprived of jurisdiction.2306 Furthermore,
Rule 45(b), which otherwise provides for flexible time limits under the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,30 7 expressly prohibits flexibility
where Rule 35 is concerned. 2308 Nevertheless, the Ninth,
230 9 Fifth,23 10
and Fourth23 1 1 Circuits have allowed district courts to retain jurisdic-
tion over motionsfiled within 120 days for a "reasonable time" after
the time limit expires.
In United States v. Smith,23 12 the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed that the
passing of a reasonable time beyond the 120-day limit serves to divest
the district court of jurisdiction over the motion for reduction of sen-
tence3 13 A loss of jurisdiction to consider such a motion therefore
operates as a de facto denial.23 14
See United States v. Maynard, 485 F.2d 247, 248 (9th Cir. 1973).
2305. See United States v. Stollings, 516 F.2d 1287, 1289 (4th Cir. 1975); United States v.
United States District Court, 509 F.2d 1352, 1356 n.6 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 962
(1975).
2306. See United States v. Mendoza, 565 F.2d 1285, 1287-88 (5th Cir.), modifed, 581 F.2d
89 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. United States District Court, 509 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 962 (1975).
2307. Rule 45(b) provides in pertinent part:
When an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the
court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with or without motion
or notice, order the period enlarged if request therefor is made before the expira-
tion of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order or (2)
upon motion made after the expiration of the specified period permit the act to be
done if the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect ....
2308. Rule 45(b) also provides in pertinent part: "[T]he court may not extend the time for
taking action under Rules 29, 33, 34, and 35, except to the extent and under the conditions
stated in them."
2309. See United States v. United States District Court, 509 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 962 (1975).
2310. See United States v. Mendoza, 565 F.2d 1285, 1291 (5th Cir.), modified, 581 F.2d 89
(5th Cir. 1978).
2311. See United States v. Stollings, 516 F.2d 1287, 1289 (4th Cir. 1975).
2312. 650 F.2d 206 (9th Cir. 1981).
2313. Id at 208.
2314. Id at 209. The court also rejected appellants' contentions that they were denied due
process of law by the unreasonable delay of the district court in ruling on their motions. The
district judge indicated in each case that he was satisfied that the original sentence was
correct. The court held that there was no indication that had the delay not occurred the
judge would have been more inclined to reduce the original sentences. Id
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4. Probation
a. maximum time limits
Unless an offense is punishable by death or life imprisonment, 18
U.S.C. section 3651 allows a federal judge to suspend imposition or
execution of sentence and place the defendant on probation.231 5 This
same statute, however, expressly limits any period of probation to five
years23 16 and any period of incarceration to six months.
23 17
In United States v. Rice,231 8 the Ninth Circuit summarily ruled that
a sentence of eighteen months' imprisonment, fifteen years' probation,
and 4500 hours of community service was "improper" under section
365 1.23 19 Rice had been convicted on three counts of receiving money
or profits by defrauding a federal credit institution. 2 ° Because the
sentence offended both the six-month imprisonment limit and the five-
year probation limit, it is unclear from the decision whether the result
would have been the same if only one of the statutory limits had been
violated. In any event, the Ninth Circuit implicitly held that the proba-
tion and incarceration limits establish maximums, regardless of the
number of counts on which a defendant has been convicted. This in-
terpretation is consistent with precedent in the Ninth,
2321 Seventh,2322
and Third232 3 Circuits.
b. conditions ofprobation
Federal judges possess extensive authority to impose probation
2315. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Upon entering a judgment of
conviction of any offense not punishable by death or life imprisonment, any court. . . may
suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the defendant on probation
2316. "The period of probation, together with extension thereof, shall not exceed five
years." Id
2317. "[I]f the maximum punishment provided for such offense is more than six months,
any court. . . may impose a sentence in excess of six months and provide that the defend-
ant be confined in a jail-type institution or treatment institution for a period not exceeding
six months and that the execution of the remainder of the sentence be suspended and the
defendant placed on probation upon such terms and conditions as the court deems best."
Id
2318. 645 F.2d 691 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 862 (1981).
2319. Id at 694.
2320. Id at 691.
2321. See Thurman v. United States, 423 F.2d 988, 990 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
911 (1970).
2322. See United States v. Hargis, 568 F.2d 21, 23 (7th Cir. 1977).
2323. See United States v. Pisano, 266 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa. 1967). But see United States
v. Lancer, 361 F. Supp. 129, 132 (E.D. Pa. 1973), vacated, 508 F.2d 719 (3d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 923 (1978).
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conditions. 3 24 In exercising this authority, they may, in fact, even re-
strict constitutional rights.2323 Conditions which have this effect, how-
ever, require "special scrutiny"23 26 and must be necessary to further the
interests of public safety or rehabilitation.2327
In United States v. Lowe,"'328 the Ninth Circuit recently held that
probation conditions restricting first amendment rights were valid in
that they furthered the goal of public safety.2 329 In Lowe, the defend-
ants had been convicted of trespassing on a submarine base. A condi-
tion of their probation forbade them from coming within 250 feet of the
base. As a result, they were unable to distribute literature to persons
entering the base or to attend weekly nuclear weapon protest meetings
held on private property within the restricted area. The Ninth Circuit
upheld the 250-foot condition as reasonably related to the goal of
preventing the defendants from climbing the fence around the base.
The court did not consider 250 feet an arbitrary distance, reasoning it
was small enough to allow some "protest activity," but large enough to
provide a "buffer zone" to protect the base and allow for detection of
"would-be trespassers."''3
The dissent argued that the 250-foot limit only marginally pro-
tected against the possibility of trespass, 3 31 and that it did not promote
rehabilitation, but rather struck "at the core of constitutional rights vi-
tal to the fabric of [the American] political system. ''2331
2324. See United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1975).
2325. See Malone v. United States, 502 F.2d 554, 556-57 (9th Cir. 1974) ("[A] convicted
criminal may be reasonably restricted as part of his sentence with respect to his associations
in order to prevent his future criminality."), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1124 (1975).
2326. United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1975).
2327. See United States v. Pierce, 561 F.2d 735, 739 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Con-
suelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265 n.14 (9th Cir. 1975) (test for determining validity of pro-
bation conditions which may impinge on constitutional rights involves balancing those
rights against goals of rehabilitation and public safety).
2328. 654 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1981).
2329. Id at 567.
2330. Id at 568. The court did not address the issue of rehabilitation. Had it done so, it
would have confronted the somewhat Orwellian possibility of sanctioning probation condi-
tions to "rehabilitate" conduct that was motivated by political ideology. As Judge
Boochever argued: "Unlike the selfish motivation for most criminal conduct, the actions of
the defendants in this case are based on a desire to publicize their belief that a federal
program threatens the public welfare." Id (Boochever, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
2331. Id at 569.
2332. Id
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conditions.232 4 In exercising this authority, they may, in fact, even re-
strict constitutional rights . 32 5 Conditions which have this effect, how-
ever, require "special scrutiny"3 26 and must be necessary to further the
interests of public safety or rehabilitation.2327
In United States v. Lowe, 2328 the Ninth Circuit recently held that
probation conditions restricting first amendment rights were valid in
that they furthered the goal of public safety.2 329 In Lowe, the defend-
ants had been convicted of trespassing on a submarine base. A condi-
tion of their probation forbade them from coming within 250 feet of the
base. As a result, they were unable to distribute literature to persons
entering the base or to attend weekly nuclear weapon protest meetings
held on private property within the restricted area. The Ninth Circuit
upheld the 250-foot condition as reasonably related to the goal of
preventing the defendants from climbing the fence around the base.
The court did not consider 250 feet an arbitrary distance, reasoning it
was small enough to allow some "protest activity," but large enough to
provide a "buffer zone" to protect the base and allow for detection of
"would-be trespassers. ' ' 3o
The dissent argued that the 250-foot limit only marginally pro-
tected against the possibility of trespass,2 3 I and that it did not promote
rehabilitation, but rather struck "at the core of constitutional rights vi-
tal to the fabric of [the American] political system."233
2
2324. See United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1975).
2325. See Malone v. United States, 502 F.2d 554, 556-57 (9th Cir. 1974) ("[A] convicted
criminal may be reasonably restricted as part of his sentence with respect to his associations
in order to prevent his future criminality."), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1124 (1975).
2326. United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1975).
2327. See United States v. Pierce, 561 F.2d 735, 739 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Con-
suelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265 n.14 (9th Cir. 1975) (test for determining validity of pro-
bation conditions which may impinge on constitutional rights involves balancing those
rights against goals of rehabilitation and public safety).
2328. 654 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1981).
2329. Id at 567.
2330. Id at 568. The court did not address the issue of rehabilitation. Had it done so, it
would have confronted the somewhat Orwellian possibility of sanctioning probation condi-
tions to "rehabilitate" conduct that was motivated by political ideology. As Judge
Boochever argued: "Unlike the selfish motivation for most criminal conduct, the actions of
the defendants in this case are based on a desire to publicize their belief that a federal
program threatens the public welfare." Id (Boochever, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
2331. Id at 569.
2332. Id
[Vol. 15
CRIMINAL LAW SUR VEY
5. Youth Corrections Act
The Youth Corrections Act 2333 offers an alternative to judges when
sentencing defendants between eighteen and twenty-six years old.
2 3 3 4
When the Act was created in 1950, Congress considered the period from
age sixteen to age twenty-three critical in determining whether a youth-
ful offender would become a "hardened criminal. '2335 Consistent with
the current sentencing philosophy, the goal of the Act was rehabilita-
tion rather than retribution.2336
The Act has three basic features: "[1] flexibility in choosing among
a variety of treatment settings and programs tailored to individual
needs; [2] separation of youth offenders from hardened criminals; and
[3] careful and flexible control of the duration of commitment and of
supervised release. 2 337 Additionally, the sentencing judge has the dis-
cretion to impose an adult sentence on a youthful offender. As such,
the effect of the Act is simply to increase the judge's sentencing
options.2338
Doubts have recently been raised regarding the ability of the Act
to change the behavior of young criminals. Many authorities now be-
lieve that the federal criminal justice system cannot effectively diagnose
2333. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026 (1976).
2334. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 437 (1974) (" 'The purpose of the...
[Youth Corrections Act] is to provide a new alternative sentencing and treatment procedure
for [youthful offenders].' ") (quoting S. REP. No. 1180, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1949)) (brack-
ets in original).
2335. "Reliable statistics demonstrate, beyond possible doubt, that the period of life be-
tween 16 and 23 years of age is the focal source of crime. It is during that period that
habitual criminals are spawned." H.R. REP. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in
1950 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3983, 3984.
2336. [B]y permitting the substitution of correctional rehabilitation for retributive
punishment, a substantial contribution will have been made toward the urgently
needed effort to stem and reverse the alarmingly increasing trend of criminal activ-
ity in the United States.
The underlying theory of the bill is to substitute for retributive punishment meth-
ods of training and treatment designed to correct and prevent antisocial tendencies.
.d at 3983, 3985. For a more detailed discussion of the Court's philosophy, see Dorszynski
v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 431-42 (1974).
2337. Durst v. United States, 434 U.S. 542, 545-46 (1978) (footnotes omitted).
2338. "[T]he Act was intended to increase the sentencing options of federal trial judges,
rather than to limit the exercise of their discretion . Dorszynski v. United States, 418
U.S. 424, 440 (1974).
The Act has four sentencing provisions. Section 5010(a) of the Act states that "[i]f the
court is of the opinion that the youth offender does not need commitment," imposition or
execution of a sentence might be suspended, and the offender might be placed on probation.
Sections 5010(b) and (c) provide that the offender, if committed, be placed in the custody of
the Attorney General for treatment and supervision, instead of being otherwise imprisoned.
Section 5010(d) allows the court to sentence the offender as an adult if it decides that he or
she will not benefit from "treatment" as a juvenile.
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or determine the proper treatment for a youthful offender.2339 This be-
lief apparently stems from the fact that it may not, as previously as-
sumed, be possible to pinpoint the moment when the criminal
tendencies of young offenders have been corrected. 2340 Accordingly,
the "original rehabilitative purposes of the YCA have generally been
abandoned. 234'
Under another federal sentencing statute, 18 U.S.C. section
3651,2342 judges may impose a "split sentence," which provides for both
a confinement and a probation period. In United States v. Smith, 
2343
the Ninth Circuit followed its prior ruling in United States . Rob-
erts, 23 4  and upheld split sentences imposed on offenders sentenced
under the Youth Corrections Act.2345 In a concurring opinion, Judge
Reinhardt conceded that a split sentence under section 3651 was ac-
ceptable for youthful offenders sentenced under the Act.23 " He felt,
however, that because Congress had intended the Act to separate
youths from hardened criminals, a split sentence should not include
2339. See Partridge, Chaset, & Eldridge, The Sentencing Options of Federal District Judges,
84 F.R.D. 175, 200 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Sentencing Options].
2340. Id
2341. United States v. Amidon, 627 F.2d 1023, 1026 (9th Cir. 1980). In Sentencing Op-
tions, the authors note that: (1) the Bureau of Prisons assigns youth offenders to exactly the
same institutions as "adult" offenders, under a policy of assigning each offender to an insti-
tution of the lowest security level consistent with adequate supervision; (2) those sentenced
under the Youth Corrections Act receive the same educational and vocational training as
adults; and (3) for the most part, the Parole Commission uses the same guidelines to deter-
mine the release dates for those sentenced under the Act as for adults, Sentencing Options,
supra note 2239, at 201-03.
2342. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
Upon entering a judgment of conviction of any offense not punishable by death or
life imprisonment, . . . [the sentencing court] may impose a sentence in excess of
six months and provide that the defendant be confined in a jail-type institution or a
treatment institution for a period not exceeding six months and that the execution
of the remainder of the sentence be suspended and the defendant placed on proba-
tion for such period and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems best,
2343. 645 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
2344. 638 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1981). In Roberts, the defendant was sentenced to three years
under the Attorney General's supervision. After the defendant served 90 days in a jail-type
institution, the trial court would suspend the remainder of the treatment and supervision
term and place the defendant on five years' probation. The court ruled that the trial judge
had the authority to impose conditional probation under § 5010(a), even if the condition was
confinement in a jail-type institution. Id at 136.
2345. 645 F.2d at 748.
2346. Id (Reinhardt, J., concurring). 18 U.S.C. § 5023(a) (1969) provides: "Nothing in
[the Act] shall limit or affect the power of any court to suspend the imposition or execution
of any sentence and place a youth offender on probation or be construed in any way to
amend, repeal, or affect the provisions of chapter 231 . . . [§§ 3651-56]." Section 5023(a)
thus makes § 3651 applicable to a § 5010(a) sentence. See Durst v. United States, 434 U.S.
542, 549 (1978).
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time in a jail-like facility.2347 Judge Reinhardt did not, however, ad-
dress the current abandonment of rehabilitation under the Act and the
fact that a youthful offender serves almost exactly the same sentence as
an adult.
The Ninth Circuit also considered the similarities between adult
and Youth Corrections Act sentences in United States v. Lowe. 2348 Act-
ing again in accordance with precedent,2349 the Lowe court held that
youthful misdemeanants could not be sentenced under the Youth Cor-
rections Act for a period longer than the corresponding "adult" sen-
tence.2350 While Lowe is consistent with recent authority, it represents
a departure from traditional concepts of sentencing under the Youth
Corrections Act. Earlier cases in the Fifth23 5I and District of Colum-
bia2352 Circuits, as closely followed in the Ninth Circuit,2353 viewed
"confinement" under the Act as qualitatively different from "incarcera-
tion" in an ordinary prison.
E Habeas Corpus
1. Scope of review
a. section 2255
A prisoner in custody pursuant to the judgment of a federal court
may seek habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. section 2255.2354 Claims per-
2347. 645 F.2d at 748 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
2348. 654 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1981).
2349. See United States v. Amidon, 627 F.2d 1023 (9th Cir. 1980). In Amidon, the Ninth
Circuit noted that "Congress has rejected the earlier conclusions of this court and others that
the rehabilitative purposes underlying the YCA justify a longer confinement." Id at 1026.
The Federal Magistrate Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3401(g)(1) (1982), prohibits the imposition of
longer sentences under the Youth Corrections Act when the corresponding "adult" penalty
is shorter. Amidon extended this provision to the sentencing of all misdemeanants, whether
by magistrate or by district court judge. 627 F.2d at 1027.
2350. 654 F.2d at 565.
2351. See, e.g., Cunningham v. United States, 256 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1958). In Cunning-
ham, the court noted that the Youth Corrections Act does not protect youthful offenders
from heavier penalties than those imposed on "adult" offenders but affords them the oppor-
tunity to escape the physical and psychological traumas that accompany an ordinary penal
sentence. At the same time, such offenders would obtain the benefits of corrective treatment,
rehabilitation, social redemption, and restoration. Id at 472.
2352. See, e.g., Carter v. United States, 306 F.2d 283, 285 (D.C. Cir. 1962) ("basic theory
of [the Youth Corrections] Act is rehabilitative and in a sense this rehabilitation may be
regarded as comprising the quidpro quo for a longer confinement but under different condi-
tions and terms than a defendant would undergo in an ordinary prison.").
2353. See, e.g., Eller v. United States, 327 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1964); Young Hee Choy v.
United States, 322 F.2d 64 (9th Cir. 1963); Standley v. United States, 318 F.2d 700 (9th Cir.
1963).
2354. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "A prisoner in custody under
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mitted under this statute are expressly limited,235" but failure to allege
one of the specified claims does not necessarily preclude review. Alter-
natively, a petitioner may assert and subsequently establish the pres-
ence of a fundamental defect that inherently results in "'a complete
miscarriage of justice.' 112356 Technical errors of law are, however, ap-
propriately outside the scope of section 2255.2357
The Ninth Circuit recently affirmed the "technical error" rule by
holding in United States v. Wilcox 2358 that the issuance of a search war-
rant by a state court which was not "a court of record" did not merit
section 2255 relief.2359 According to the circuit court, while this consti-
tuted a violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(a),2360 the
violation was so technical in nature that it did not implicate fundamen-
tal rights.236'
b. section 2254(d)
When the validity of a state court judgment is at issue, habeas re-
lief is governed by 28 U.S.C. section 2254.3.62 Claims permitted under
this statute are also expressly limited, but in a manner substantially
different from that provided for in 28 U.S.C. section 2255.2363 More-
sentence of a court established by Act of Congress. . . may move the court which imposed
the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence."
2355. Section 2255 permits claims for relief when sentences are: (1) imposed in violation
of the Federal Constitution; (2) imposed in excess of the district court's jurisdiction; (3)
imposed in excess of the statutory maximum; or (4) otherwise subject to collateral attack. 28
U.S.C. § 2255 (1976).
2356. United States v. Wilcox, 640 F.2d 970, 972-73 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting Hill v. United
States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962)); see United States v. McDonald, 611 F.2d 1291, 1294 (9th
Cir. 1980) (increase in sentence following parole violation considered fundamental defect).
2357. E.g., United States v. Zazzara, 626 F.2d 135, 137 (9th Cir. 1980) (use of perjured
testimony to obtain indictment not grounds for § 2255 relief); United States v. Boniface, 601
F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1979) (§ 2255 relief not permitted for violation of Interstate Agree-
ment on Detainers Act).
2358. 640 F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 1981).
2359. Id at 974.
2360. Id. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(a) provides: "A search warrant authorized by this rule
may be issued by a federal magistrate or a judge ofa state court ofrecord within the district
wherein the property of person sought is located, upon request of a federal law enforcement
officer or an attorney for the government." (emphasis added).
2361. 640 F.2d at 974. Accord United States v. Haywood, 464 F.2d 756, 760 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
2362. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1976) provides: "The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a cir-
cuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in
behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. .. "
2363. Section 2254 permits claims for relief only when sentence is imposed in violation of
the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1976). See supra
note 2355 for claims permitted under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
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over, review of such claims is restricted by section 2254(d), which re-
quires that factual determinations of a state court bepresumed correct
absent the existence of any one of eight enumerated factors.23 4
The proper application of section 2254(d) was recently considered
by the Supreme Court in Sumner v. Mata. 16 5 Defendant Mata was
convicted of murder in state court following a trial at which eyewit-
nesses identified him as a participant in the crime.2366 On direct ap-
peal, he argued for the first time that police had violated his right to
due process by utilizing a pretrial photographic identification proce-
dure.367 Applying the test enunciated in Simmons v. United States,
2 368
the state appellate court rejected this contention.2369
Charging the same error, Mata then sought federal habeas relief
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 2254.370 The district court denied such
2364. When any of the following factors is established or admitted, the factual determina-
tions of a state court need not be presumed correct:
(1) that the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the State court
hearing;
(2) that the factfinding procedure employed by the State court was not adequate to
afford a full and fair hearing;
(3) that the material facts were not adequately developed at the State court hearing;
(4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or over the person
of the applicant in the State court proceeding;
(5) that the applicant was an indigent and the State court, in deprivation of his
constitutional right, failed to appoint counsel to represent him in the State court
proceeding;
(6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate hearing in the State
court proceeding;
(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of law in the State court
proceeding;
(8) or unless that part of the record of the State court proceeding in which the
determination of such factual issue was made, pertinent to a determination of the
sufficiency of the evidence to support such factual determination, is produced as
provided for hereinafter, and the Federal court on a consideration of such part of
the record as a whole concludes that such factual determination is not fairly sup-
ported by the record.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1976).
2365. 449 U.S. 539 (1981).
2366. Id at 541.
2367. Id at 541-42. Mata did not raise the pretrial identification issue before the trial
court. Id For a complete description of the identification procedure, see Mata v. Sumner,
611 F.2d 754, 756-57 (9th Cir. 1979), vacated, 449 U.S. 539 (1981).
2368. 390 U.S. 377 (1968). In Simmons, the Supreme Court held that when a conviction
was based on: (1) eyewitness identification by photograph before trial, followed by (2) eye-
witness identification at trial, it could be set aside as a denial of due process "only if the
photographic identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a
very substantial likelihood of irreparable misident[icatiom" Id at 384 (emphasis added).
2369. 449 U.S. at 542. Upon review of the trial record, the state appellate court specifically
concluded that the facts of the case did not adequately support Mata's claim. Id
2370. Id Prior to seeking a federal habeas writ, Mata raised the pretrial identification
issue in state habeas corpus proceedings. A state superior and appellate court, as well as the
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relief, and Mata appealed. After analyzing his argument under the
Simmons standard, the Ninth Circuit granted a habeas writ.2371 The
circuit court did not, however, refer to the provisions of section 2254(d)
in its opinion.2372
Noting that section 2254(d) was clearly applicable,2 73 the
Supreme Court ruled that the Ninth Circuit should either have: (1) ac-
corded a "presumption of correctness" to the factual findings of the
state appellate court,2374 or (2) explained why the presumption was in-
applicable.2375 The Court observed that an adequate explanation re-
quired the habeas court to state in its opinion the reasoning it utilized
in determining the presence of one or more of the eight factors enumer-
ated in section 2254(d).2376 Because the Ninth Circuit neither applied
the presumption nor provided such an explanation, the Supreme Court
ultimately concluded that the circuit court had improperly analyzed
Mata's challenge to his state court conviction.2377 It, therefore, vacated
that court's judgment and remanded the case for further
proceedings.2378
In a dissent, Justice Brennan offered two reasons for upholding the
Ninth Circuit's decision despite its failure to discuss section 2254(d).
First, he contended that because Mata had neglected to raise the sec-
tion 2254(d) argument before the circuit court, that court was not re-
quired to consider the provisions of the statute.2379 Second, he asserted
state supreme court, all denied relief. Mata thus complied with the exhaustion of state reme-
dies doctrine. Id See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(b)-2254(c) (1976).
2371. 449 U.S. at 543. According to the Ninth Circuit, the pretrial photographic identifica-
tion procedure was "'so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a. . . substantial likeli-
hood of irreparable misidentification."' Id (quoting Mata v. Sumner, 611 F.2d 754, 759
(9th Cir. 1979), vacated, 449 U.S. 539 (1981)). This conclusion was based on the court's
finding that: "(1) the circumstances surrounding the witnesses' observation of the crime were
such that there was a grave likelihood of misidentification; (2) the witnesses had failed to
give sufficiently detailed descriptions of the assailant; and (3) considerable pressure from
both prison officials and-prison factions had been brought to bear on the witnesses." Id
2372. 449 U.S. at 547. See also Mata v. Sumner, 611 F.2d 754, 755-60 (9th Cir. 1979),
vacated, 449 U.S. 539 (1981).
2373. 449 U.S. at 545-47.
2374. Id at 547. The state appellate court was required to make its own factual findings
because Mata raised the pretrial identification issue for the first time on appeal. See supra
note 2367 and accompanying text.
2375. 449 U.S. at 552.
2376. Id at 55 1. The Court specified that a discussion of the § 2254(d) factors was essen-
tial in order to fulfill the congressional mandate that "a state finding not be overturned
merely on the basis of the usual 'preponderance of the evidence' standard." 1d
2377. Id at 552.
2378. Id
2379. 1d at 554-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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that because the issue addressed by the Ninth Circuit required the
"'application of constitutional principles to the facts as found,' "230 it
was a mixed question of law and fact which fell outside the purview of
section 2254(d).2381
On remand, the Ninth Circuit noted its "full awareness" of section
2254(d), but adhered to its initial determination that Mata's due pro-
cess rights had been violated by use of the pretrial photographic identi-
fication procedure.2382 The court characterized the issue raised under
the Simmons standard as a mixture of law and fact.2383 It then ex-
plained that, as its original analysis indicated, it did not dispute the
"state [appellate] court's factual record per se,"' 238 4 but disagreed with
the legal conclusion that the court had drawn based upon that rec-
ord.238 5 Because state court conclusions of law are considered freely
reviewable in a federal habeas proceeding and are not presumed cor-
rect under section 2254(d),2386 the Ninth Circuit reasoned that it was
free to reach a different legal determination from that reached by the
state appellate court.23 87
In concluding that a state court ruling on the issue raised under the
Simmons standard need not be presumed correct, the Ninth Circuit ap-
pears to have directly contradicted the Supreme Court's express state-
2380. Id at 557 (quoting Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 403 (1977)).
2381. 449 U.S. at 555 (Brennan, J., dissenting). According to Justice Brennan, § 2254(d)
required a federal habeas court to defer to a state court's determination only when that
determination was made in regard to an issue which was entirelyfactual in nature. Id This
application of § 2254(d) has consistently been upheld by the Supreme Court. See Cuyler v.
Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 341-42 (1980) (state court ruling on question of multiple representa-
tion by attorneys regarded as a mixture of law and fact; § 2254(d) held inapplicable); Brewer
v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 397 n.4, 401-04 (1977) (state court ruling on question of defend-
ant's waiver of constitutional right deemed a strictly legal determination; § 2254(d) held
inapplicable). See also Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 309 n.6, 318 (1963) (precursor to
§ 2254(d) held inapplicable when federal habeas court requested to consider a state court
ruling on a question of law or a mixed question of law and fact).
2382. Mata v. Sumner, 649 F.2d 713, 715 (9th Cir. 1981).
2383. Id at 717.
2384. Id at 715.
2385. Id at 716.
2386. See supra cases cited at note 2381.
2387. 649 F.2d at 717. As noted previously, the Ninth Circuit did not refer to § 2254(d) in
its first opinion. See supra note 2372 and accompanying text. See also 449 U.S. at 559
(Brennan, J., dissenting). The circuit court's original analysis does, however, indicate that it
substantially agreed with the basic facts adduced by the state appellate court. See id at 556-
57; Mata v. Sumner, 611 F.2d 754, 755-57 (9th Cir. 1979), vacated, 449 U.S. 539 (1981). It is,
therefore, possible that rather than merely adopting on remand Justice Brennan's analysis,
the Ninth Circuit initially characterized the relevant issue as a mixture of law and fact, and
determined that it disagreed with the legal conclusion of the state court rather than itsfactual
findings. On this basis, it may then have deemed it unnecessary to discuss § 2254(d).
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ment in Sumner that "§ 2254(d) is applicable to the present [case]." 2388
The contradiction is, however, only superficial. A close reading of both
decisions makes it clear that the circuit court did not, in fact, disregard
a Supreme Court mandate. Any statements made by the Court regard-
ing the applicability of section 2254(d) were in direct response to
Mata's contention that use of the statute was inappropriate when a state
appellate court, as opposed to a trial court, made the pertinent findings
of fact.238 9 The question raised by the Simmons standard was never
explicitly characterized as a factual finding entitled to a "presumption
of correctness" on federal habeas review. Whether the Court implicitly
characterized the issue in this manner is open to interpretation.2390
This seems unlikely, however, because the same Court, composed of
substantially the same justices, previously determined that the issue
raised by this standard did not constitute a factual finding, but a legal
conclusion.2391
It should also be noted that the Supreme Court specifically re-
manded Sumner to enable the Ninth Circuit either to apply a "pre-
sumption of correctness" to the factual findings of the state appellate
court, or to explain why the presumption was inapplicable.2392 Such an
explanation, the Court stated, should rest on the presence of one or
more of the section 2254(d) factors.2393 In its opinion, however, the
Ninth Circuit clearly indicated that it declined to apply the presump-
tion, not because of the existence of one of these factors, but because
the issue raised under the Simmons standard was a mixture of law and
fact?. 3 94 How the Supreme Court will regard such an approach is pres-
ently unresolved.
2388. 449 U.S. at 545-46 (emphasis added).
2389. See id at 545-47.
2390. See 649 F.2d at 717-18 (Sneed, C.J., dissenting).
2391. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972). In Neil, a federal habeas court concluded
that pretrial identification procedures had violated a state prisoner's due process rights. The
court reached this result after applying the Simmons standard. Id at 199-200. The Supreme
Court reversed, rejecting a contention that this violated an established practice not to depart
from a lower court's factual findings unless those findings were clearly erroneous. Id at 193
n.3. According to the Court, adherence to this "established practice" was unnecessary be-
cause the issue raised under the Simmons standard did not create a dispute over the elemen-
talfacts of the case so much as it created a dispute over the constitutionalsignocance to be
attached to those facts. Id
At the time Neil was decided, the Supreme Court was composed of the following jus-
tices: Burger, Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehn-
quist. See id at 189. With the exception of Justice Douglas, who was replaced by Justice
Stevens in 1975, these same justices decided the issue raised in Sumner. See 449 U.S. at 540.
2392. See supra notes 2374-75 and accompanying text.
2393. See supra note 2376 and accompanying text.
2394. See supra notes 2383-87 and accompanying text.
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2. Exhaustion of state remedies
A state prisoner must normally exhaust all available state judicial
remedies before a federal court will consider that prisoner's petition for
a writ of habeas corpus.2395  The exhaustion requirement is derived
from the doctrine of CoMity. 23 9 6 Comity between courts assures that a
federal court cannot upset a state court conviction unless the state
courts have had an opportunity to determine whether a constitutional
violation has occurred.
2397
When a petition for a writ of habeas corpus contains more than
one issue, the Ninth Circuit usually refuses to address any issue until
available state remedies have been exhausted with respect to all is-
sues. 3 9 Hearing exhausted issues while refusing to hear unexhausted
2395. Sweet v. Cupp, 640 F.2d 233, 235 (9th Cir. 1981); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1977). Sec-
tion 2254(b) provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that
the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or
that there is either an absence of available State corrective process or the existence
of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the
prisoner.
In Carothers v. Rhay, 594 F.2d 225, 228 (9th Cir. 1979), the court stated: "failure to
exhaust state remedies with respect to one issue presented in a habeas corpus petition...
requires dismissal of the entire petition by the district court." The court decided, however,
to review the exhausted claims in the mixed petition because the district court had errone-
ously reached the merits of these claims. See Galtieri v. Wainwright, 582 F.2d 348, 362 (5th
Cir. 1978) (court of appeals will review exhausted claim in mixed petition if district court
erroneously reached merits).
2396. Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950) (Comity teaches that "one court should
defer action on causes properly within its jurisdiction until the courts of another sovereignty
with concurrent powers, and already cognizant of the litigation, have had an opportunity to
pass upon the matter.").
2397. Sweet v. Cupp, 640 F.2d 233, 236 (9th Cir. 1981).
2398. See Gonzales v. Stone, 546 F.2d 807, 810 (9th Cir. 1976) (court refused to hear two
exhausted claims because petitioner also raised two unexhausted claims). Blair v. California,
340 F.2d 741, 744-45 (9th Cir. 1965) (court refused to review mixed petition containing both
exhausted and unexhausted issues); Schiers v. California, 333 F.2d 173, 174 (9th Cir. 1964)
(court declined to hear issues involving "substantial equivalent" of contentions being
presented by petitioner to state courts in appeal from conviction).
Most other circuits permit habeas corpus review of mixed petitions when the exhausted
and unexhausted claims are unrelated. See, e.g., Meeks v. Jago, 548 F.2d 134, 137 (6th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 844 (1977); Brown v. Wisconsin Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 457 F.2d
257, 259 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 862 (1972); Hewett v. North Carolina, 415 F.2d
1316, 1320 (4th Cir. 1969). The Third Circuit, however, disapproves of hearing mixed peti-
tions. See, e.g., United States v. Hatrack, 563 F.2d 86, 96-97 (3d Cir. 1977).
The Ninth Circuit may also refuse to hear the merits of a petition for failure to exhaust
state collateral remedies, a position taken recently in Campbell v. Crist, 647 F.2d 956, 956-57
(9th Cir. 1981) (interests of comity allow court to refuse to adjudicate appeal when record
fails to reflect exhaustion of state collateral remedies); see also Rose v. Dickson, 327 F.2d 27,
28 (9th Cir. 1964).
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issues in the same case would impair comity and frustrate the policy
against fragmentary appeals.2399 The exhaustion requirement was re-
cently reafTirmed by the Ninth Circuit in Sweet v. Cupp, 24 0 where the
court found that the petitioner had failed both to appeal directly his
equal protection claim and to seek relief under Oregon's post-convic-
tion relief statutes.2401
The general rule requiring exhaustion does not, however, apply
when the petitioner can show that further adjudication in state courts
would be futile,24' 2 or that fairness mandates that the federal court hear
the petition.24°3 For instance, it would have been futile for the peti-
tioner in Montague v. Vinzant24" to exhaust state remedies concerning
the retroactivity of a repealed state statute when the state had a "sav-
ings" statute which expressly limited the retroactive effect of repealed
statutes.24 5 The Montague court relied on Sweet for authority to use
the futility doctrine despite the fact that the Sweet court's language
with respect to the doctrine was clearly dictum.2 4°6 Because Montague
involved futility, however, the doctrine should now be clearly estab-
lished in Ninth Circuit law.
In Little Light v. Crst,2407 the Ninth Circuit appeared to depart
from its traditional reluctance to hear exhausted claims when accompa-
nied by unexhausted claims.2 °8 The court found that when certain
"conditions of fairness" dictate, it could rule upon exhausted issues in a
mixed petition.24°9 Little Light asserted for the first time in his petition
2399. See Gonzales v. Stone, 546 F.2d 807, 809 (9th Cir. 1976); Blair v. California, 340
F.2d 741, 744-45 (9th Cir. 1965).
2400. 640 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1981).
2401. Id at 238. The petitioner had relief available under Oregon post-conviction relief
statutes. See OR. REv. STAT. §§ 34.330, 138.510-.680 (1959).
2402. Montague v. Vinzant, 643 F.2d 657, 659 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Sweet v. Cupp, 640
F.2d at 236 (dictum) ("We adopt the futility doctrine because it promotes comity by requir-
ing exhaustion where resort to state courts would serve a useful function .. ").
2403. Little Light v. Crist, 649 F.2d 682, 684 (9th Cir. 1981) (footnote omitted).
2404. 643 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1981).
2405. Id at 659 ("savings" statute provided that repeal of criminal statute would not affect
previously imposed penalty, unless repealing statute declared otherwise).
2406. See Sweet v. Cupp, 640 F.2d at 236, 238. In Sweet, the court adopted the futility
exception to the exhaustion requirement, but found it inapplicable because of the clear
availablity of a remedy in the Oregon post-conviction relief statutes. The Sweet court men-
tioned in passing that the petitioner's resort to state remedies is likewise deemed "futile" if
the highest state court has recently decided the issue adversely to the petitioner's interests
and there have been no intervening Supreme Court decisions on point. Id
2407. 649 F.2d 682 (9th Cir. 1981).
2408. Id at 684.
2409. The "conditions of fairness" influencing the court were the length of Little Light's
incarceration (six years for a forcible rape conviction), his appeal pro se, the fact that refusal
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to the district court that the state courts lacked jurisdiction over his
offense. 241° The Ninth Circuit, nevertheless, ruled upon the exhausted
issues, adopting the Fifth Circuit's position in West v. Louisiana. 24"
Since Little Light, two Ninth Circuit decisions appear to have fur-
ther relaxed the exhaustion requirement. In the first decision, Briggs v.
Raines, 241 2 the court agreed to hear a habeas corpus petition, although
the state had adopted a new rule of criminal procedure that might have
permitted the petitioner to appeal at the state level before bringing his
habeas action.2413 This potential state remedy had been available to
Briggs before he filed his habeas petition. Nevertheless, the court held
that Briggs had exhausted his state remedies.
24 14
In making its determination, the Briggs court relied on two
Supreme Court cases; however, the salient facts in those cases differ so
significantly from Briggs that it is difficult to understand how they sup-
port that decision. The court itself offered no explanation.241 5 In Rob-
erts v. La Vallee,241 6 for example, the change in the law creating an
additional state remedy occurred after, not before, the habeas peti-
tioner had filed in federal court.241 7 Similarly, in Francisco v. Gath-
right,2418 the state supreme court case creating an additional state
to review would require reinitiating the appeal in the state courts, and the state's failure to
raise the exhaustion question. Id at 684-85.
2410. Id. at 684. The petitioner alleged that the land on which he was arrested was the
subject of an illegal land purchase, subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction.
2411. lId at 684-85 (citing West v. Louisiana, 478 F.2d 1026, 1034-35 (5th Cir. 1973), affid
en banc, 510 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1975) (requirement that petitioner must exhaust state reme-
dies before seeking federal relief not jurisdictional prerequisite but instead based on flexible
considerations of comity)). The Little Light court cited Galtieri v. Wainwright, 582 F.2d
348, 362 (5th Cir. 1978), in which the Fifth Circuit labelled as "erroneous" the district court's
adjudication of the merits of an exhausted claim in a mixed petition. The Little Light court,
however, did not label similar actions of district courts as "erroneous."
The Little Light court also cited Kelley v. Estelle, 521 F.2d 238, 240-41 (5th Cir. 1975),
in which the Fifth Circuit stated that factors such as a pro se appeal, the length of incarcera-
tion, and considerations of fairness and judicial economy are reasons for departing from the
exhaustion requirement in a mixed petition.
2412. 652 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1981).
2413. Id at 863-64.
2414. Id at 864.
2415. Id at 865.
2416. 389 U.S. 40 (1967).
2417. Id at 40-43. Shortly after the federal filing, the New York Court of Appeals held
unconstitutional the contested requirement. Id at 41 (citing People v. Montgomery, 18 N.Y.
2d 993, 995, 224 N.E.2d 730, 731 (1966)). On appeal, the Second Circuit held that petitioner
Roberts should apply to the state courts for relief under the doctrine of Montgomery 389
U.S. at 41. Instead, he petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
Id at 42. The Court granted the writ and held that Roberts had thoroughly exhausted his
state remedies and that additional state litigation would be burdensome. Id at 42-43.
2418. 419 U.S. 59 (1974).
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remedy was decided just four days after the habeas petition was
received informa pauperis Il 9 In both cases, the petitioners had ex-
hausted their then available state remedies before filing their habeas
petitions. Briggs, however, had almost nine months to avail himself of
the new state remedy before filing his petition.242 0
In the second decision, Garrison v. McCarthy,1421 the Ninth Circuit
reviewed two exhausted claims despite the presence of two
unexhausted claims. The court explained that it was balancing "the
possibility of judicial duplication" against comity concerns. 2422 It ap-
pears, however, that the court sought to avoid a possible conflict be-
tween federal and state decisions, as well as between decisions within
the federal system itself. The district court had already ruled on the
merits of the two exhausted claims. Therefore, if the Ninth Circuit had
vacated the district court's judgment for failure to exhaust completely,
Garrison could have relitigated all four claims in the district court once
he exhausted his state judicial remedies. Likewise, upon consideration
of unexhausted claims, the state court could reconsider the exhausted
claims and decide them differently from the district court.2423 Finally,
the district court could reverse its decisions on the exhausted claims on
a second habeas petition.
2424
3. Sufficiency of record on review
In a federal habeas corpus proceeding, a state court's determina-
tion of the merits of a factual issue is presumed correct, unless the peti-
tioner can show that the determination is not fairly supported by the
record.242' If the state court's record is incomplete or otherwise indi-
cates that the petitioner did not receive a full and fair factual hearing
on the issues presented to the district court, that court must hold evi-
2419. 1d at 61 n.3.
2420. 652 F.2d at 864. Briggs filed a petition in district court on March 6, 1980; the Ari-
zona Supreme Court changed the relevant state law on July 13, 1979.
2421. 653 F.2d 374 (9th Cir. 1981).
2422. Id at 378.
2423. Id at 376.
2424. Id
2425. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1976) provides in part:
In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a writ of
habeas corpus.. . a determination... by a State court.. . evidenced by a writ-
ten finding. . . shall be presumed to be correct. . . (8). . . unless that part of the
record of the State court proceeding in which the determination of such factual
issue was made, pertinent to a determination of the sufficiency of the evidence to
support such factual determination, is produced as provided for hereinafter, and
the Federal court on a consideration of such part of the record as a whole con-
cludes that such factual determination is not fairly supported by the record. ...
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dentiary hearings on those issues.2426 This point is exemplified by the
Ninth Circuit's recent ruling in Little Light v. Crst2 427 that a district
court could not summarily dismiss a petition unless it had a sufficient
record of the relevant state court proceedings. According to the court,
only the presence of a complete transcript would enable the court in a
habeas proceeding to determine the adequacy of the state process.2428
The case was, therefore, remanded to the district court in order that it
either procure the record of the state trial court's hearing of the habeas
petition or conduct an appropriate evidentiary hearing.2429
4. Delay in filing
Rule 9(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases permits a
court to dismiss a habeas corpus petition for prejudicial delay in filing
it.2430 Rule 9(a) specifically exempts a petition from dismissal when the
petitioner could not have known the legal grounds for his petition
before prejudice to the state occurred 43' In Myers v. Washington,2432
the Ninth Circuit held that Rule 9(a) did not permit dismissal of a peti-
tion that challenged the constitutionality of jury instructions given
twenty-four years earlier, because the petitioner could not have antici-
pated recent changes in the controlling law upon which his petition was
based.2433 However, the majority opinion failed to address the dissent's
argument that challenges to similar jury instructions in other jurisdic-
tions twenty-four years earlier should have put the petitioner on notice
of the legal grounds upon which to assert a similar challenge in state
court.
2 4 3 4
2426. In Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), the Supreme Court ruled that an eviden-
tiary hearing is mandatory if any of the following six circumstances is present: (1) the merits
of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing; (2) the state factual determina-
tion is not fairly supported by the record as a whole; (3) the factfinding procedure employed
by the state court was inadequate to afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there is a substantial
allegation of newly discovered evidence; (5) the material facts were not adequately devel-
oped in the state court proceeding; or (6) for any reason it appears that the state trier of fact
did not afford the habeas applicant a full and fair factual hearing. Id at 313.
2427. 649 F.2d 682 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
2428. I'd at 686.
2429. Id
2430. Rule 9(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976), pro-
vides in pertinent part: A petition may be dismissed if it appears that the state.., has been
prejudiced.. . by delay.. . unless the petitioner shows that [his petition] is based on
grounds of which he could not have had knowledge by the exercise of reasonable diligence
before the circumstances prejudicial to the state occurred.
2431. Id
2432. 646 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1981).
2433. Id at 361.
2434. Id at 364 (Poole, J., dissenting).
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5. Independent state grounds
The United States Supreme Court has established that absent
proof of (1) sufficient cause for noncompliance with a state contempo-
raneous objection rule and (2) actual prejudice arising from an alleged
constitutional violation, failure to comply with such a rule constitutes
an adequate and independent state procedural ground which precludes
federal habeas corpus review.
24 35
Again in Myers v. Washington, 2436 the Ninth Circuit held that al-
though petitioner Myers failed to satisfy Washington's contemporane-
ous objection rule, he was nevertheless entitled to habeas corpus
relief.24 37 At trial, Myers was found guilty of second degree murder,
and his conviction was affirmed on appeal.2438 Twenty years later My-
ers petitioned the Washington Supreme Court for release from per-
sonal restraint.2439 He asserted for the first time that the jury
instructions given by the trial court had unconstitutionally shifted to
the defense the burden of proving the intent element of the crime.2"0
Although the controlling law had changed since the time of Myers'
conviction,2" 1 the state high court reasoned that "'the interest of the
state in achieving a final judgment not subject to the frustrations associ-
ated with retrial years after the original proceeding outweighs any in-
terest in readjudicating convictions according to subsequently
developed legal standards.'-242 The court held that because Myers
did not object to the jury instructions at trial or their validity on appeal,
he was precluded from raising such an objection in a collateral at-
tack.2 " 3 Myers subsequently petitioned for habeas corpus relief in fed-
eral district court. A motion for summary judgment was granted in
2435. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86-87 (1977). The rule in Sykes required that
motions to suppress a defendant's inculpatory statements be made at trial or not at all.
2436. 646 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1981).
2437. Id at 360.
2438. Id at 356.
2439. Id This petition is used only by Washington appellate courts in lieu of the writ of
habeas corpus and the application for post-conviction relief. Principles applicable to habeas
petitions are, however, employed in considering personal restraint petitions. Id at n.l.
2440. Id at 356-57. The challenged jury instructions permitted the jury to presume (1)
every killing to be without excuse or justification, and (2) intent to kill if the victim was
killed by an act which would naturally and ordinarily result in death. Id at 362 n.l 1.
2441. Instructions which shift the burden of proof on any element of a charged offense
were declared unconstitutional in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975). That holding
was reaffirmed in Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233 (1977).
2442. 646 F.2d at 357 (quoting Petition of Myers, 91 Wash. 2d 120, 125-26, 587 P.2d 532,
535 (1979)).
2443. 646 F.2d at 357.
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favor of the State, however, and Myers appealed.2 444
The Ninth Circuit initially questioned whether the Sykes rule
should extend to the procedural default involved in Myers. 245 In the
words of the court: "Here we have a failure to raise on appeal a consti-
tutional issue that had not yet been identified, not a failure to object at
trial to an alleged error that should have been apparent at the time."2446
The court observed that the policy considerations announced in Sykes
would not be furthered by denying Myers habeas corpus relief.2" 7 The
court further noted that normally the enforcement of state contempora-
neous objection rules (1) encourages error free proceedings, (2) discour-
ages "sandbagging" by defense attorneys who gamble on acquittals
intending to raise constitutional challenges in federal habeas corpus
proceedings if their clients are convicted, and (3) assures a record that
reflects the fresh recollection of witnesses and the observation of their
demeanor by the trial court.2448 These considerations, the court rea-
soned, were not applicable to the case at bar because Myers had no
reason to believe that his constitutional rights were violated by the jury
instructions.2 " 9
The court held, in addition, that even if the Sykes rule did apply to
Myers' procedural default, he had satisfied that rule and was entitled to
habeas relief.2450 The court determined that because the basis for My-
ers' constitutional argument did not exist until a United States Supreme
Court decision changed the prevailing law many years after his
trial,245 1 he had adequate cause for not anticipating such a change on
direct appeal.2452 Furthermore, because the court found that one of the
challenged instructions might well have played a crucial role in secur-
ing his conviction, he was deemed to have suffered actual prejudice as a
result of the instructions.2453
In a dissent, Justice Poole stated that the policy considerations un-
derlying the rule in Sykes were clearly implicated in Myers. 254 He
2444. Id
2445. Id at 359.
2446. Id
2447. Id
2448. Id
2449. Id at 360.
2450. Id
2451. Id. See supra note 2440 and accompanying text. The court characterized the state of
federal constitutional law regarding presumptions and burdens of proof as "settled." 646
F.2d at 360. But see infra text accompanying notes 2454-55.
2452. 646 F.2d at 360.
2453. Id at 360-61.
2454. Id at 364 (Poole, J., dissenting).
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pointed out that, although at the time of trial the state of Washington
considered such instructions proper, there had been challenges to simi-
lar jury instructions in other jurisdictions. 245 5 Justice Poole described
the issue as one "on the frontier of the criminal law. 2 456 He argued
that a diligent and thoughtful attorney would have provided the trial
court with the opportunity to consider such a challenge.2457
For the same reasons Justice Poole did not agree that Myers had
demonstrated cause sufficient to satisfy the rule in Sykes, again noting
that the constitutional issue at bar "could reasonably have been ex-
pected to be raised" at trial.2458 He ultimately concluded that the ma-
jority holding created an exception that would devour the cause
requirement of Sykes.245 9
The plain implication of the Myers case is that, regardless of sig-
nificant controversy elsewhere, if it appears that an objection made on
constitutional grounds will not succeed in the forum, failure to object at
trial and to raise the issue on direct appeal will not bar collateral attack
in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. It should be noted, however,
that the result in Myers might have been different had the basis for the
petitioner's attack arisen sooner after trial or had there existed at the
time of trial persuasive authority from other jurisdictions to support
such a challenge.
6. Effective assistance of counsel
After pleading guilty, a defendant cannot challenge constitutional
violations that occurred prior to entry of that plea.2460 A defendant
may, however, attempt to prove that, because the advice received from
counsel was "'not within the range of competence demanded of attor-
neys in criminal cases,' ,,2461 the guilty plea was not knowing and
intelligent.2462
2455. Id
2456. Id
2457. Id
2458. Id at 364-65.
2459. Id
2460. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742,
748 (1970); Thundershield v. Solem, 565 F.2d 1018, 1026 (8th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 435
U.S. 954 (1978).
2461. Toilett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973) (petitioner may attack character of
guilty plea by showing that counsel's advice failed to meet standards set forth by Court in
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-71 (1970)).
2462. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973) (petitioner may attack only voluntary
and intelligent character of guilty plea, not deprivation of constitutional rights preceding it);
Sober v. Crist, 644 F.2d 807, 808-09 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
[Vol. 15
CRIMINAL LA4W SURVEY
The Supreme Court has held that a plea is not voluntary unless a
defendant has received notice of the elements of the charged of-
fense.246s In Sober v. Crist, 24  the Ninth Circuit held that an eviden-
tiary hearing on the effectiveness of defense counsel must be granted
when the record shows that no "explanation" of the charge was given
to the defendant and the prosecution cannot otherwise prove that one
was given.' 46s In Sober, the defendant based his charge of ineffective
counsel on his attorney's confusion as to the maximum sentence, his
failure to spend sufficient time to elicit the facts, and his failure to ex-
plain the elements of, or the defenses to, the charge.2466 The record
showed that the trial court also neglected to advise the defendant of the
elements of the crime.2 7 The Ninth Circuit placed the burden on the
prosecution to prove that defense counsel had given the advice before
the plea, but it failed to sustain this burden.2468 Consequently, a hear-
ing was considered necessary.
Moreover, in noteworthy dicta, the Ninth Circuit imposed the ad-
ditional requirement that the defendant be informed of possible de-
fenses to the crime as well as its elements, "at least where the attorney
or court is made aware of facts that would constitute . ..a de-
fense." 2469 This effectively imposes a duty on the prosecution to as-
sume one of the duties normally performed by the defense attorney.
The Ninth Circuit has long recognized that a defendant's sixth
amendment right to counsel may be impaired when a court refuses to
grant a continuance due to the unavailability of retained counsel.2470
2463. Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 647 (1976) (defendant's guilty plea held invol-
untary because he did not receive adequate notice of offense charged).
2464. 644 F.2d 807 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
2465. Id at 810 (citing Burden v. Alabama, 584 F.2d 100, 102 (5th Cir. 1978) ("When the
state record is insufficient to allow a determination of the merits of a defendant's habeas
claims, the district court must hold a hearing to develop those facts.")); see also Machibroda
v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 495 (1962) ("The Government's contention that [petitioner's]
allegations are improbable and unbelievable cannot serve to deny him an opportunity to
support them by evidence.").
2466. 644 F.2d at 808-09.
2467. Id at 808.
2468. Id at 810.
2469. Id at 809 n.3 (citing Thundershield v. Solem, 565 F.2d 1018, 1028 (8th Cir. 1977)
(petition denied because, although trial court inadvertently omitted reference to possible
defense of justifiable homicide, record indicated that defense counsel had explained ele-
ments of charge and possible defenses), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 954 (1978)).
2470. Releford v. United States, 288 F.2d 298, 302 (9th Cir. 1961). In Releford, after the
defendant's attorney became ill, the trial court refused to grant the defendant a continuance
to secure a substitute attorney and insisted that an attorney who shared the same offices with
the first attorney would suffice. Id at 299-300. The court of appeals issued a writ of habeas
corpus and the defendant was granted a new trial. Id at 302.
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Recently, the court extended this rule to cover appointed counsel, thus
adopting the position of the California Supreme Court.247' In Slappy v.
Morris, 2472 the Ninth Circuit ruled that there is no reason to differenti-
ate between retained and appointed counsel "in the context of preserv-
ing any attorney-client relationship. 2473 That relationship, the court
reasoned, involves an "intimate process of consultation and planning"
which is "no less inviolable" if counsel is appointed rather than
retained.2474
In Slappy, the defendant's first appointed attorney underwent an
appendectomy and a second attorney was appointed six days before
trial. The defendant refused to cooperate, insisting upon the first attor-
ney's representation, but the court denied his request for a continuance.
The Ninth Circuit held that the trial judge's failure to inquire how long
the original counsel would be unavailable, when refusing to grant a
continuance, constituted a "complete disregard" of Slappy's right to
choose his own counsel.24 75 The Slappy court followed the established
Ninth Circuit rule that in cases of complete disregard, the defendant
need not establish prejudice; prejudice will be presumed.2476
7. Determinate sentencing
The purpose of California's Determinate Sentencing Law2 477 is to
achieve uniformity in sentencing by requiring that all persons con-
victed of the same crime receive the same sentence, subject to certain
aggravating, mitigating or enhancing circumstances.2478 The law be-
came effective in 1977, and acts as a replacement for the Indeterminate
Sentencing Law.2 4 7 9 The Ninth Circuit recently examined the Deter-
minate Sentencing Law for potential constitutional violations.
2471. See Smith v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. 2d 547, 561-62, 440 P.2d 65, 74, 68 Cal. Rptr. 1,
10 (1968).
2472. 649 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1981).
2473. Id at 721.
2474. Id (quoting Smith v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. 2d 547, 561-62, 440 P.2d 65, 74, 68 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 10 (1968)).
2475. 649 F.2d at 722.
2476. See Releford v. United States, 288 F.2d 298, 301-02 (9th Cir. 1961) (complete disre-
gard of right to choose counsel is reversible error regardless of whether prejudice shown).
2477. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170 (West Supp. 1981). The Determinate Sentencing Law is
applicable retroactively to prisoners who committed felonies prior to the law's effective date,
July 1, 1977. Id § 1170.2. Id
2478. Guzman v. Morris, 644 F.2d 1295, 1296 (9th Cir. 1981).
2479. Id. at 1296. Under the Indeterminate Sentencing Law, criminal statutes contained
minimum and maximum sentences. Judges did not sentence convicted criminals to specific
prison terms, but to "the term prescribed by the law." The length of time a prisoner would
actually serve was determined by the California Adult Authority. Id.
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In Guzman v. Morris,248 defendant Guzman argued that the appli-
cation of the Determinate Sentencing Law by the Community Release
Board (CRB) 481 deprived him of due process. 482 Guzman asserted (1)
that the CRB improperly considered his prior felony convictions in re-
determining his prison release date,2483 and (2) that he had received a
longer sentence under the Determinate Sentencing Law than he would
have served under the Indeterminate Sentencing Law. 484
The court found that the CRB had not violated Guzman's due
process rights by considering his prior felony convictions because the
CRB acted within the authority of its predecessor, the Adult Author-
ity.2485 The court rejected Guzman's second assertion by explaining
that his new release date was actually two years earlier than that sched-
uled under the Indeterminate Sentencing Law,"' and that while the
total prison term imposed could not have exceeded seven years under
the Determinate Sentencing Law, a life term could have been imposed
under the former law.
2487
In Lambdin v. Caifornia Correctional Institution ,2488 the defendant
challenged the Determinate Sentencing Law procedure by asserting
that in redetermining his prison release date the CRB had denied him
due process and equal protection, and had subjected him to double
jeopardy and to cruel and unusual punishment. In addition, Lambdin
argued that the CRB had violated his plea agreement by imposing con-
secutive as opposed to concurrent sentences. 2489
2480. 644 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1981).
2481. In 1979, the CRB was renamed the Board of Prison Terms. Id. at 1296 n.l.
2482. Id. at 1298.
2483. Id. at 1297-98.
2484. Id. at 1298-99. The Determinate Sentencing Law provides that the CRB must reset
the prison terms of prisoners who were sentenced under the prior Indeterminate Sentencing
Law. Id. at 1296. The court summarily dismissed three additional claims raised by Guz-
man. His contention that his due process and equal protection rights had been violated
because a non-judicial body, the CRB, had increased his sentence after his prison term had
begun was rejected, following an observation by the court that delegation of this type of
authority to a non-judicial body is "well-settled." Id. at 1299. See, e.g., Bennett v. Califor-
nia, 406 F.2d 36, 38 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 966 (1969). His claim that he had been
subjected to double jeopardy was similarly rejected. According to the court he "simply was
not put in jeopardy twice for the same offense." 644 F.2d at 1299. Finally, his claim that the
Determinate Sentencing Law is an ex post facto law or a bill of attainder was rejected on the
ground that he had suffered no additional punishment from the law's enactment. Id.
2485. 644 F.2d at 1298; see also Lambdin v. California Correctional Inst., 640 F.2d 245,
247 (9th Cir. 1981).
2486. 644 F.2d at 1299.
2487. Id.
2488. 640 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1981).
2489. Id. at 247.
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In support of his contention that he was denied due process,
Lambdin asserted that at his "serious offender hearing"24 90 he was enti-
tled to have a jury trial with proof presented beyond a reasonable
doubt, a unanimous jury verdict, and a complete right of confrontation.
The Ninth Circuit found, however, that the rights accorded Lambdin
under section 2165 of the California Administrative Code satisfied due
process. 2491 The court, in addition, specifically rejected his assertion
that his plea bargain had been violated by the CRB's imposition of
consecutive sentences; it called the claim a "ludicrous exaltation of
form over substance," because the total length of his sentence had not
been affected.2492 Lambdin's equal protection claim was denied be-
cause the court found the serious offender classification to be "so sub-
stantially related to the legitimate object of the DSL [le., the
achievement of uniform sentences] [that] it constitutes no denial of
equal protection to one so denominated. 2493 The court also rejected
Lambdin's argument that his serious offender hearing subjected him to
double jeopardy reiterating that he had not been resentenced but had
received a redetermined release date.2494 Finally, the court summarily
dismissed Lambdin's cruel and unusual punishment contention.249'
F Ex Post Facto Clause
The ex post facto clause 2496 is triggered when the following cir-
cumstances are present: retroactivity of a statute and material disad-
vantage to the offender.24 97 A statute is normally considered
retroactive when it applies to events occurring before its enactment.2498
2490. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.2(b) (West Supp. 1981) provides that when the CRB deter-
mines that aggravating circumstances indicate that a prisoner is a serious offender and that a
longer term than the base term is appropriate, the prisoner must be afforded a "serious
offender" hearing.
2491. 640 F.2d at 247-48. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, R. 2165 (1981) provides that at seri-
ous offender hearings prisoners have all ordinary hearing rights including notice, right to
counsel, opportunity to testify, to ask and answer questions, to produce evidence, to call
witnesses in case of a factual dispute, and to receive a copy of the record.
2492. 640 F.2d at 248 (citing in re Thoren, 90 Cal. App. 3d 704, 709, 153 Cal. Rptr. 617,
620 (2d Dist. 1979)).
2493. 640 F.2d at 248.
2494. Id.
2495. Id.
2496. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. I provides in pertinent part: "No State shall.. . pass
any ex post facto law."
2497. See Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397,401 (1937); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
385, 390 (1798).
2498. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981) (citing Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S.
397, 401 (1937); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 385, 390 (1798)). See also Jaehne v. New
York, 128 U.S. 189, 193-94 (1888) (dicta).
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In Weaver v. Graham,2499 the Supreme Court ruled that changes in the
computation of "gain time for good conduct" are considered retroac-
tive for ex post facto purposes when applied to offenders sentenced
before the changes were enacted.2 50 The changes were considered ret-
roactive although they operated prospectively, because they "change[d]
the legal consequences" of the offender's crime after its commission. 5 0'
The petitioner in Weaver was an inmate in a Florida prison who
had been entitled under the old statute to automatic monthly gain time
credits againist his sentence if he simply avoided, disciplinary infrac-
tions and performed assigned tasks.ns" u The new statute reduced the
gain time credits available to inmates who avoided infractions and who
performed their tasks,250 3 although it did provide for increased gain
time if more extraordinary efforts were expended. 5 °4 The Court deter-
mined, however, that because the possibilities of increased gain time
were discretionary and not automatic this provision failed to rectify the
statute's material disadvantage to the offender.50
2499. 450 U.S. 24 (1981).
2500. Id. at 31-33. Weaver involved Florida law, which uses the term "gain time" to refer
to various kinds of time credited to reduce a prisoner's term. Id. at 25 n.l.
2501. Id. at 31.
2502. Id. at 26. The old statute directed that gain time for good conduct should be granted
a prisoner as follows: "(a) Five days per month off the first and second years of his sentence;
(b) Ten days per month off the third and fourth years of his sentence; and (c) Fifteen days
per month off the fifth and all succeeding years of his sentence." FLA. STAT. § 944.27(1)
(1975).
2503. 450 U.S. at 33. The Florida Legislature repealed § 944.27(1) in 1978 and enacted a
new formula for monthly gain time deductions. The new statute provided: "(a) Three days
per month off the first and second years of the sentence; (b) Six days per month off the third
and fourth years...; and (c) Nine days per month off the fifth and all succeeding years of
the sentence." FLA. STAT. § 944.275(1) (1979).
2504. A discretionary award of gain time was possible for acts such as saving a life or
diligent performance in an academic program. FLA. STAT. § 944.275(3)(a) (1979).
2505. 450 U.S. at 35-36. Traditionally, parole had been viewed as a matter of "grace," not
of right. See, eg., Cox v. Maxwell, 366 F.2d 765, 767 (6th Cir. 1966); Curtis v. Bennett, 351
F.2d 931, 933 (8th Cir. 1965). A convicted person, for example, does not possess a right to be
conditionally released before a valid sentence has expired. Greenholtz v. Inmates of the
Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). Furthermore, a state does not
have a duty to establish a parole system, and if it does so, it is free to choose which factors to
consider in granting parole. Id. at 7-8. See Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974).
The implication of Weaver is that the concept of parole as a matter of "grace" applies only
to the legislature's decision to create a parole system. Once the system has been created, a
defendant has a right to the parole provisions in effect at the time that the offense was
committed.
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G. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
1. Disproportionality
The Supreme Court has defined cruel and unusual punishment by
referring to "evolving standards of decency" that mark the progress of
a "maturing" society.25°6 The eighth amendment protection against
such punishment seeks to confine the state's power to punish within
civilized standards.5 °7 Consequently, penal laws must be applied non-
arbitrarily.5 08
Disproportionality of punishment has been used as a reason to va-
cate severe forms of punishment for non-capital crimes.250 9 However, a
recent Supreme Court ruling that the length of a prison sentence in
felony cases is a matter of "legislative prerogative" 2 10 has foreclosed,
for most practical purposes, disproportionality challenges in non-capi-
tal cases.
Disproportionality still remains a viable means of attacking a
death sentence under the cruel and unusual punishment clause.251' In
United States v. Valenzuela,2512 the Ninth Circuit ruled that, for dispro-
portionality purposes, life imprisonment without possibility of parole is
not analogous to capital punishment.2 l3 Valenzuela's organization
was one of the major sources of Mexican heroin being smuggled into
the United States. He was convicted of nine drug smuggling offenses,
including one continuing enterprise count for which he was sentenced
to life in prison without possibility of parole.251 4 In rejecting
Valenzuela's argument that life imprisonment without possibility of pa-
role was analogous to a death sentence, the Ninth Circuit simply noted
2506. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion). See also Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910). The determination of what constitutes "cruel and
unusual" punishment is based on ostensibly objective factors, including "public attitudes
concerning a particular sentence-history and precedent, legislative attitudes, and the re-
sponse ofjuries [as] reflected in their sentencing decisions." Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
592 (1977) (plurality opinion).
2507. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality). The scope of "civilized" stan-
dards is not static. Id. at 101. The questionable assumption underlying this construction of
the eighth amendment is that society becomes increasingly "civilized" as time passes.
2508. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 274 (1972) (per curiam) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
2509. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368 (1910).
2510. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 (1980).
25 11. Id. at 272.
2512. 646 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1980).
2513. Id. at 354.
2514. Valenzuela was convicted of seven substantive narcotics counts under 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1) (1976), one count of conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976), and a continuing
enterprise count under 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1976).
[Vol. 15
1982] CRIMINAL L,4W SURVEY
that the Supreme Court has treated this punishment similarly to "other
imprisonment sentences."
25 15
2. Right to medical treatment
The eighth amendment guarantees prisoners the right to adequate
medical treatment. Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs
constitutes" 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.' ,,2516 A claim
of inadequate medical treatment, however, must be based on medical
necessity, not the mere desire for medical aid.2517 Recent judicial deci-
sions make no distinction between mental and physical ailments. 51 8 A
prisoner is entitled to psychological or psychiatric treatment if it can be
shown with reasonable medical certainty that (1) the prisoner's symp-
toms demonstrate a serious disease or injury; (2) the disease or injury is
curable or may be substantially alleviated; and (3) the potential for
harm to the prisoner by reason of delay or denial of care would be
substantial.2519
The right to treatment has been limited to what is reasonable in
terms of time and cost.2520 However, in Ohlinger v. Watson ,2521 the
Ninth Circuit ruled that constitutionally adequate treatment for sex of-
fenders who are incarcerated for rehabilitation consists of such treat-
ment that "'will give each [offender] a realistic opportunity to be cured
or to improve his or her mental condition.' "2522 In Ohlinger, the de-
2515. 646 F.2d at 354 (citing Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 267 & n.7 (1974)). Schick
involved a challenge to a no-parole condition affixed to the commutation of a death penalty.
The petitioner argued that had his death penalty been set aside in the wake of Furman, the
no-parole condition would not have attached. However, because his case arose before
Furman, he was now in a worse position than he would have been without the commutation.
Id at 259. In rejecting this argument, the Court characterized the petitioner's status after
commutation as a "lesser punishment with conditions." Id. at 267.
2516. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 173 (1976) (per curiam)).
2517. See Woodall v. Foti, 648 F.2d 268, 272 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (district court
erred in dismissing prison inmate's complaint for psychiatric care as frivolous).
2518. See, e.g., Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 763 (3d Cir.
1979) (psychological care of confined pretrial detainees should be same standard as medical
care); Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1977) ("We see no underlying distinc-
tion between the right to medical care for physical ills and its psychological or psychiatric
counterpart. Modem science has rejected the notion that mental or emotional disturbances
are the products of afflicted souls, hence beyond the purview of counseling, medication and
therapy.").
2519. Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1977).
2520. See id; Woodall v. Foti, 648 F.2d 268, 272 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
2521. 652 F.2d 775 (9th Cir. 1981).
2522. Id. at 778 (quoting Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971)); see
also McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Inst., 407 U.S. 245, 252 (1972); Jackson v. Indiana, 406
U.S. 715, 735-39 (1972).
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fendants had been committed to an Oregon state prison for child mo-
lesting. Instead of receving the maximum sentence of fifteen years
under the state sodomy statute, they were sentenced as "sex offenders"
to indeterminate life sentences.2523
The Ninth Circuit ruled that the trial court, by following Bowring
v. Godwin,2524 unduly limited the state's responsibility to provide treat-
ment.2525 In Bowring, the defendant had been sentenced solely because
he had committed criminal offenses; the underlying purpose of the sen-
tence, therefore, was topunish. In Ohlinger, however, the underlying
purpose of the statute under which the defendants had been sentenced
was to rehabilitate sex offenders. 2526 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that
because treatment was the statute's primary objective, persons sen-
tenced on the basis of mental illness were entitled to treatment that was
constitutionally adequate for sex offenders committed in civil proceed-
ings.2527 The court did not analyze whether there existed a "deliberate
indifference" by the state toward the defendant's serious psychiatric
needs, thereby obviating the need to address issues raised by the rule
that indifference constitutes the gratuitous infliction of pain.2528
H. Commutations
State statutes mandating that inmates be given specific reasons for
denial of their petitions for parole have been recognized as the source
of a constitutionally protected liberty interest.2529 Procedural due pro-
2523. 652 F.2d at 776. The Ohlinger court noted that under OR. REv. STAT. § 137.11 (re-
pealed 1971), the court had the discretion to impose an indeterminate life sentence ifi (1) the
offense involved a child under sixteen years of age and (2) the defendant "had a mental or
emotional disturbance, deficiency or condition, predisposing him to the commission of...
[various sex offenses] to a degree rendering the person a menace to the health and safety of
others." Id.
2524. 551 F.2d 44 (4th Cir. 1977).
2525. 652 F.2d at 777, 779.
2526. 652 F.2d at 777 (citing Barnett v. Gladden, 237 Or. 76, 390 P.2d 614 (1964)).
2527. 652 F.2d at 777 n.5.
2528. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
2529. Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 11
(1979). The statutes addressed by the Court provide in part:
Whenever the Board of Parole considers the release of a committed offender
who is eligible for release on parole, it shall order his release unless it is of the
opinion that his release should be deferred because:
(a) There is a substantial risk that he will not conform to the conditions of
parole;
(b) His release would depreciate the seriousness of his crime or promote disre-
spect for law;
(c) His release would have a substantially adverse effect on institutional disci-
pline; or
(d) His continued correctional treatment, medical care, or vocational or other
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cess under the Constitution requires no more than the furnishing to
prisoners of these reasons.
2530
This limitation was illustrated in Connecticut Board of Pardons v.
Dumschat,253 1 where the Supreme Court determined that the Board's
consistent practice of granting commutations to most life inmates was
insufficient to create a protected liberty interest. 2532 A group of life in-
mates argued that because the Board granted seventy-five percent of
the commutation requests, it had "'created an unwritten common law
of sentence commutation' "2533 and was thus required to explain its rea-
sons for denial of an application.2534
Although the Second Circuit found the inmates' argument merito-
rious, 2535 the Supreme Court held that no explanation was neces-
sary.2536 The Supreme Court characterized the inmates' expectation of
commutation as "simply a unilateral hope. 2537 It then explained that
a constitutional liberty interest cannot be created by estoppel merely
because a discretionary state privilege has been granted generously in
the past.2538 In apparently foreclosing past practice as a source of con-
stitutional entitlement, the Court noted that "the statistical probabili-
ties [of commutation] standing alone generate no constitutional
protections. . . . The ground for a constitutional claim, if any, must
be found in statutes and other rules defining the obligations of the au-
thority charged with exercising clemency."
2539
training in the facility will substantially enhance his capacity to lead a law-abiding
life when released at a later date.
NEB. REv. STAT § 83-1, 114(1) (1976).
2530. 442 U.S. at 16.
2531. 452 U.S. 458 (1981).
2532. Id. at 467.
2533. Id. at 459 (quoting Brief of Respondents at 17, Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dum-
schat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981)).
2534. 452 U.S. at 461.
2535. Id. at 462-63.
2536. Id. at 467.
2537. Id. at 465.
2538. Id.
2539. Id. In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan qualified this statement. Although he
agreed that a demonstration of the statistical likelihood of commutation was insufficient to
establish a constitutionally protected liberty interest, he did not limit the source of such an
interest to state statutes. Justice Brennan would require that the inmates "also show-by
reference to statute, regulation, administrative practice, contractual arrangement or other
mutual understanding-that particularized standards or criteria guide the State's deci-
sionmakers." Id. at 467 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Leis v. Flint, 439 U.S. 438, 442
(1979); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 577 (1972)).
If, as it appears, the majority opinion limits the source of constitutionally protected
interests to "statutes or other rules," the validity of the holding in Perry v. Sindermann, 408
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In addition, the Court concluded that the Connecticut commuta-
tion statute itself did not create a protected liberty interest. Because the
statute contained no definitions, no criteria, and no requirements for
commutation, 2540 it established no analogous duty or constitutional re-
quirement.2 541 Absent such a duty, there was no basis for the inmates'
claim that they were constitutionally entitled to an explanation when
denied commutation.2542
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens criticized the majority for
holding that constitutionally protected liberty interests have their roots
in state law.25 43 He found it "self-evident" that the liberty protected by
the due process clause is bestowed by "the Creator" rather than the
state.25 " He further argued that because conviction does not com-
U.S. 593 (1972), is called into question. In the latter case, a teacher's employment was termi-
nated without hearing or notice of reasons after he had been employed by a college for four
successive years under a series of one year contracts. The Court stated that there "may be an
unwritten 'common law' in a particular university that certain employees shall have the
equivalent of tenure" and that plaintiff was entitled to show whether such an equivalence
existed in this case. Id. at 602-03. If the plaintiff was able to establish such a common law,
then he would be entitled to an order obligating college officials to give him a hearing. Id. at
603.
There are two points of distinction between Perry and Dumschat: (1) Perry involved a
property interest in employment, whereas Dumschat concerned a liberty interest in commu-
tation; and (2) the past behavior establishing Perry's "unwritten common law" was the be-
havior of the state toward Perry himself, whereas in Dumschat, the past behavior was that of
the state toward other inmates. The Dumschat Court, however, did not cite either of these
dissimilarities as its reason for refusing to apply the "unwritten common law" theory.
Rather, it seemed to suggest "that state law is the only source of a prisoner's liberty worthy
of federal constitutional protection." 452 U.S. at 467-68 (White, J., concurring).
2540. The Connecticut statute provides:
(a) Jurisdiction over the granting of, and the authority to grant, commutations
of punishment or releases, conditioned or absolute, in the case of any person con-
victed of any offense against the state and commutations from the penalty of death
shall be vested in the board of pardons.
(b) Said board shall have authority to grant pardons, conditioned or absolute,
for any offense against the state at any time after the imposition and before or after
the service of any sentence.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-26 (West Supp. 1981).
2541. 452 U.S. at 466.
The Dunschat Court distinguished Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal and Cor-
rectional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979), by observing that the Nebraska parole statute under
attack in that case expressly mandated that the Board "shall" release an inmate "unless" it
decided that one of four specific reasons for denial was applicable. Because the statute ex-
plicitly established criteria for parole reviews, Nebraska inmates had an interest in the state's
adherence to the criteria.
2542. Id. at 467.
2543. Id. at 469 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Accordid at 467-68 (White, J., concurring) (cita-
tions omitted).
2544. Id at 469 & n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 230
(Stevens, J., dissenting)).
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pletely terminate a defendant's liberty,2545 and because the Constitution
affords some protection at different stages of the post-conviction pro-
cess, 254 6 the issue in Dumschat was not whether Connecticut life in-
mates were totally divested of any constitutionally protected liberty
interest. Instead, the question presented was whether a refusal to com-
mute a sentence constituted a deprivation of liberty sufficient to war-
rant invocation of the protection of the due process clause.25 47
Justice Stevens observed that while the ordinary litigant is af-
forded procedural safeguards against arbitrary decision-making by the
judiciary, the inmate does not enjoy the same protection. 2548 The obli-
gation to justify publicly a denial of commutation would ensure that
the Board's decision was not arbitrary.25 49 He therefore concluded that
such an explanation was an essential element of the process that was
due the Dumschat inmates.
2550
IV. TRIAL PROCEEDINGS
4. Marc J Graboff
B. K#7p Ian Lyons
C. Janice M. Lipeles
. Marc J Graboff
E. Marc J Graboff
1. Anthony 4. DeCorso
2. Karen J Henderson
3. Karen J Henderson
4. Karen J Henderson
5. Karen J Henderson
a. Karen J Henderson
b. Gregory J Karns
Gregory J Karns
Karen J Henderson
Katherine A. Lind
G. Susan M. Gill
H Katherine A. Lind
V. POST-CONVICTION
PROCEEDINGS
A. James M Stanich
B. Anthony A. DeCorso
C. Stephen L. Chesney
D. Stephen L. Chesney
E.
1. Katherine A. Lind
2. Lesley M Mehran
3. Lesley M. Mehran
4. Lesley M Mehran
5. Frances J Sulman
6. Lesley M. Mehran
F Stephen L. Chesney
G. Stephen L. Chesney
H. Frances J Sulman
2545. 452 U.S. at 469 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Accord id at 468 (White, J., concurring)
(citations omitted).
2546. Id at 470-71 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). The pertinent stages here
were identified as sentencing, commutation, and discharge. ld at 471.
2547. Id. at 469.
2548. Id. at 472. "Indeed, as in this case, often he is not even afforded the protection of
written standards to govern the exercise of the powers of the Board of Pardons." Id.
2549. Id. (citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex, 442
U.S. 1, 40 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
2550. 452 U.S. at 472 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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